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  1. Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
    Autor*in: Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
    Erschienen: November 2020
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 191
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - have severe behavioral constraints because the fines induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration. Incorporating reciprocity preferences into the theory explains the observed behavioral patterns and helps us develop a new mechanism that is more robust and achieves high rates of truth-telling and efficiency. Our results highlight the importance of tailoring implementation mechanisms to the underlying behavioral environment.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/227459
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised version
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 171
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 88 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. "Graf Spee"
    Autor*in: Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 1956
    Verlag:  Hodder & Stoughton, London

    Standort:
    Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schlagworte: River Plate, Battle of the, 1939
    Weitere Schlagworte: Admiral Graf Spee (Battleship)
    Umfang: 224 S, 1 Abb
  3. Handing out guns at a knife fight
    behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
    Autor*in: Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Zurich

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 191 (171)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/111229
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; 171
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (58 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. Handing out guns at a knife fight
    behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
    Autor*in: Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63 (4948)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/102108
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 4948
    Umfang: Online-Ressource ([1], 58 S.), graph. Darst.
  5. Handing out guns at a knife fight
    behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
    Autor*in: Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4 (8404)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted, they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/101934
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 8404
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (58 S.), graph. Darst.
  6. Power dynamics in organizations
    Autor*in: Li, Jin; Matouschek, Niko; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: December 2015
    Verlag:  Northwestern University, Weinberg College of Arts & Sciences, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization, [Evanston, IL]

    We examine an in…finitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 74 (139)
    Fernleihe:
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    We examine an in…finitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to persistent differences in performance, and why established firms fail to exploit new opportunities, even when they are publicly observable.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/142013
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: December 2015
    Schriftenreihe: CSIO working paper ; #0139
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Sticking points
    common-agency problems and contracting in the U.S. healthcare system
    Autor*in: Frandsen, Brigham; Powell, Michael; Rebitzer, James B.
    Erschienen: February 2017
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (23177)
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 23177
    Umfang: 42 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  8. Mein Hunde-Album
    Autor*in: Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Knesebeck, München

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek der LMU München
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    ISBN: 9783868737394
    DDC Klassifikation: Englische, altenglische Literaturen (820)
    Schlagworte: Hundehaltung
    Umfang: 96 S., Ill., 180 mm x 180 mm
  9. Games on Thrones
    100 Dinge, die du auf dem Porzellanthron tun kannst
    Autor*in: Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2016
    Verlag:  riva, München

    Standort:
    Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek der LMU München
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Beteiligt: Walter, Birgit
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    ISBN: 9783868838848; 3868838848
    Weitere Identifier:
    9783868838848
    DDC Klassifikation: Literaturen germanischer Sprachen; Deutsche Literatur (830)
    Auflage/Ausgabe: 1. Auflage
    Weitere Schlagworte: Humor, Satire / gatbeg
    Umfang: 96 Seiten, Illustrationen, 16 cm x 16 cm
  10. Federated Causal Inference in Heterogeneous Observational Data
    Autor*in: Xiong, Ruoxuan; Koenecke, Allison; Powell, Michael; Shen, Zhu; Vogelstein, Joshua T.; Athey, Susan
    Erschienen: 2023
    Verlag:  SSRN, [S.l.]

    Analyzing observational data from multiple sources can be useful for increasing statistical power to detect a treatment effect; however, practical constraints such as privacy considerations may restrict individual-level information sharing across... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Analyzing observational data from multiple sources can be useful for increasing statistical power to detect a treatment effect; however, practical constraints such as privacy considerations may restrict individual-level information sharing across data sets. This paper develops federated methods that only utilize summary-level information from multiple heterogeneous data sets. Our federated methods provide doubly-robust point estimates of treatment effects as well as variance estimates. We derive the asymptotic distributions of our federated estimators, which are shown to be asymptotically equivalent to the corresponding estimators from the combined individual-level data. We show that to achieve these properties, federated methods should be adjusted based on conditions such as whether models are correctly specified and stable across heterogeneous data sets

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper
    Schlagworte: Causal Inference; Propensity Scores; Federated Learning; Multiple Data Sets
    Weitere Schlagworte: Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (63 p)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 16, 2021 erstellt
  11. Integration and information
    markets and hierarchies revisited
    Autor*in: Gibbons, Robert; Holden, Richard T.; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, Mass.

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 67 (4776)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at private cost, and there is a machine that either party can own. As in property rights models, different ownership structures create different incentives for the parties' investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring information, which is then incorporated into the market-clearing price by the parties' trading behaviors. The informativeness of the price mechanism affects the returns to specific investments and hence the optimal ownership structure for individual dyads; meanwhile, the ownership choices by individual dyads affect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogeneous dyads to choose heterogeneous ownership structures

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 1721.1/66680
    Schriftenreihe: Sloan working papers ; 4776-10
    Schlagworte: Preistheorie; Vorleistungen; Informationsversorgung; Informationskosten; Sachenrecht; Rationale Erwartung; Noise Trading
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S., 403 KB), graph. Darst.
  12. Rational-expectations equilibrium in intermediate good markets/ Robert Gibbons, Richard Holden and Michael Powell
    Autor*in: Gibbons, Robert; Holden, Richard T.; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, Mass.

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of information acquisition and price formation in an intermediate-good market: prices and net supply are non-negative, there are no noise traders, and the intermediate good has multiple potential uses. Several... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of information acquisition and price formation in an intermediate-good market: prices and net supply are non-negative, there are no noise traders, and the intermediate good has multiple potential uses. Several of our results differ from the classic Grossman-Stiglitz approach. For example, the price mechanism is more informative at high and low prices and potentially uninformative at middle prices. Also, an informed trade by a producer of one final good amounts to a noise trade from the perspective of a producer of another final good, so (a) as the price mechanism becomes more informative for producers of one final good, it becomes less informative for producers of others, who therefore have a stronger incentive to acquire information, so information acquisition has the strategic-complements property between groups, and (b) having more producers (in multiple groups) become informed need not increase the informativeness of the price mechanism

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
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    Auflage/Ausgabe: Rev.
    Schriftenreihe: Sloan working papers ; 4775-10
    MIT Sloan Research Paper ; No. 4775-10
    Schlagworte: Preistheorie; Vorleistungen; Informationsversorgung; Rationale Erwartung; Noise Trading
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (34 S., 293 KB), graph. Darst.
  13. Firms in markets under uncertainty
    Autor*in: Gibbons, Robert; Holden, Richard T.; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, Mass.

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and a downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 67 (4744)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and a downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at private cost. As in property-rights models, different governance structures induce different investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring (common-value) information, which is then incorporated into the market-clearing price by the parties' trading behaviors. The informativeness of the price mechanism affects the returns to specific investments and hence the optimal governance structure for individual dyads; meanwhile, the governance-structure choices by individual dyads affect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium, firms and the market coexist and shape each other. In particular, the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogeneous dyads to choose heterogeneous governance structures

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 1721.1/66948
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Rev.
    Schriftenreihe: Sloan working papers ; 4744-09
    MIT Sloan Research Paper ; No. 4744-09
    Schlagworte: Preismanagement; Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit; Marktmechanismus
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S., 278 KB), graph. Darst.
  14. "Graf Spee"
    Autor*in: Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 1956
    Verlag:  Hodder & Stoughton, London

    Standort:
    Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Bibliothek
    Signatur:
    IV:le:2:::8
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Signatur:
    EL Pow 16
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schlagworte: River Plate, Battle of the, 1939
    Weitere Schlagworte: Admiral Graf Spee (Battleship)
    Umfang: 224 S, 1 Abb
  15. Black narcissus
    = Die schwarze Narzisse
    Beteiligt: Powell, Michael; Pressburger, Emeric; Kerr, Deborah; Robson, Flora; Sabu
    Erschienen: 2004
    Verlag:  Magic Video [u.a.], [S.l.]

    Standort:
    Hochschule für Bildende Künste Braunschweig, Bibliothek
    Signatur:
    VCD 110/04
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Beteiligt: Powell, Michael; Pressburger, Emeric; Kerr, Deborah; Robson, Flora; Sabu
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    RVK Klassifikation: AP 59800
    Umfang: 1 DVD-Video (PAL, 97 Min.), farb., dolby digital 2.0, 4:3, Code 0
    Bemerkung(en):

    Orig.: GB 1947