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  1. The shadow prices of voluntary caregiving
    using panel data of well-being to estimate the cost of informal care
    Autor*in: McDonald, Rebecca; Powdthavee, Nattavudh
    Erschienen: May 2018
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    This paper uses the wellbeing valuation (WV) approach to estimate and monetize the wellbeing impacts of informal care provision on caregivers. Using nationally representative longitudinal data from the U.K., we address two challenging methodological... mehr

    Standort:
    Deutsches Zentrum für Altersfragen e.V. (DZA), Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    This paper uses the wellbeing valuation (WV) approach to estimate and monetize the wellbeing impacts of informal care provision on caregivers. Using nationally representative longitudinal data from the U.K., we address two challenging methodological issues related to the economic valuation of informal care: (i) the endogeneity of informal care; and (ii) the sensitivity of income estimates used in valuation. We address the endogeneity issue by decomposing wellbeing losses into those associated with caring for a relative who had recently suffered a serious accident and those associated with caring for a relative who had not had an accident. We use of the Fixed Effects Filtered (FEF) estimator to enable the permanent income coefficient to be estimated free from individual fixed effects bias. This estimate is used instead of the transient income effect in the calculation of shadow prices of informal care. Our estimates suggest that permanent income would have to increase by approximately £102k per year on average to just compensate for the wellbeing losses from providing informal care.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/180563
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 11545
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The shadow prices of voluntary caregiving
    using panel data of well-being to estimate the cost of informal care
    Autor*in: McDonald, Rebecca; Powdthavee, Nattavudh
    Erschienen: May 2018
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    This paper uses the wellbeing valuation (WV) approach to estimate and monetize the wellbeing impacts of informal care provision on caregivers. Using nationally representative longitudinal data from the U.K., we address two challenging methodological... mehr

    Standort:
    Deutsches Zentrum für Altersfragen e.V. (DZA), Bibliothek
    Signatur:
    31
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4 (11545)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper uses the wellbeing valuation (WV) approach to estimate and monetize the wellbeing impacts of informal care provision on caregivers. Using nationally representative longitudinal data from the U.K., we address two challenging methodological issues related to the economic valuation of informal care: (i) the endogeneity of informal care; and (ii) the sensitivity of income estimates used in valuation. We address the endogeneity issue by decomposing wellbeing losses into those associated with caring for a relative who had recently suffered a serious accident and those associated with caring for a relative who had not had an accident. We use of the Fixed Effects Filtered (FEF) estimator to enable the permanent income coefficient to be estimated free from individual fixed effects bias. This estimate is used instead of the transient income effect in the calculation of shadow prices of informal care. Our estimates suggest that permanent income would have to increase by approximately £102k per year on average to just compensate for the wellbeing losses from providing informal care.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/180563
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 11545
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Absolute groupishness and the demand for information
    Autor*in: Lohse, Johannes; McDonald, Rebecca
    Erschienen: March 1, 2021
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    Does social identity affect how decision makers consume and digest new information? We study this question through a theoretically informed experiment, employing a variant of the sender receiver game in which receivers can purchase reports from up to... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Does social identity affect how decision makers consume and digest new information? We study this question through a theoretically informed experiment, employing a variant of the sender receiver game in which receivers can purchase reports from up to two senders. Depending on senders' preferences for truth-telling, reports are either informative or not. In the baseline condition of our experiment, receivers observe senders' incentives for reporting truthfully. In the treatment condition receivers additionally observe whether they share a group identity with the sender. Group identities are induced via a standard minimal group paradigm. We find that senders behave in line with a model that assumes senders incur a positive lying cost. Making social identity observable significantly affects information acquisition and makes receivers more prone to ignore potentially informative outgroup reports. This is especially the case when outgroup senders have higher incentives for truthtelling. This change in information acquisition has implications for optimal decision making: it negatively affects receivers' ability to correctly infer the true state of world.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242454
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 132
    Schlagworte: Misinformation; Social Identity; Sender-Receiver Game; Fake News; Information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. The swing voter's curse revisited
    transparency's impact on committee voting
    Autor*in: Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Deb, Moumita; Lohse, Johannes; McDonald, Rebecca
    Erschienen: 07 Mrz. 2024
    Verlag:  Heidelberg University, Department of Economics, Heidelberg

    Majority voting is considered an efficient information aggregation mechanism in committee decision-making. We examine if this holds in environments where voters first need to acquire information from sources of varied quality and cost. In such... mehr

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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Evangelische Hochschule Freiburg, Hochschulbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Standort:
    HeiBIB - Die Heidelberger Universitätsbibliographie
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 532
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Majority voting is considered an efficient information aggregation mechanism in committee decision-making. We examine if this holds in environments where voters first need to acquire information from sources of varied quality and cost. In such environments, efficiency may depend on free-riding incentives and the 'transparency' regime - the knowledge voters have about other voters' acquired information. Intuitively, more transparent regimes should improve efficiency. Our theoretical model instead demonstrates that under some conditions, less transparent regimes can match the rate of efficient information aggregation in more transparent regimes if all members cast a vote based on the information they hold. However, a Pareto inferior swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibrium arises in less transparent regimes if less informed members abstain. We test this proposition in a lab experiment, randomly assigning participants to different transparency regimes. Results in less transparent regimes are consistent with the SVC equilibrium, leading to less favourable outcomes than in more transparent regimes. We thus offer the first experimental evidence on the effects of different transparency regimes on information acquisition, voting, and overall efficiency.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/289812
    Schriftenreihe: AWI discussion paper series ; no. 744 (February 2024)
    Schlagworte: Information acquisition; Voting; Transparency; Swing voter's curse
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten), Diagramme