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  1. Career Spillovers in Internal Labor Markets
    Autor*in: Bianchi, Nicola; Bovini, Giulia; Li, Jin; Paradisi, Matteo; Powell, Michael L.
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    This paper studies career spillovers across workers, which arise in firms with limited promotion opportunities. We exploit a 2011 Italian pension reform that unexpectedly tightened eligibility criteria for the public pension, leading to sudden,... mehr

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    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    This paper studies career spillovers across workers, which arise in firms with limited promotion opportunities. We exploit a 2011 Italian pension reform that unexpectedly tightened eligibility criteria for the public pension, leading to sudden, substantial, and heterogeneous retirement delays. Using administrative data on Italian private-sector workers, the analysis leverages cross-firm variation to isolate the effect of retirement delays among soon-to-retire workers on the wage growth and promotions of their colleagues. We find evidence of spillover patterns consistent with older workers blocking the careers of their younger colleagues, but only in firms with limited promotion opportunities

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w28605
    Schlagworte: Rentenreform; Spillover-Effekt; Interner Arbeitsmarkt; Ältere Arbeitskräfte; Erwerbsverlauf; Karriereplanung; Italien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  2. Corporate capture of blockchain governance
    Autor*in: Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares; Li, Jin; Nikolowa, Radoslawa
    Erschienen: 27 January 2019
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    LZ 161
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP13493
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Corporate capture of blockchain governance
    Autor*in: Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares; Li, Jin; Nikolowa, Radoslawa
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London

    We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services.... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 217
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    We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the two-way interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. Our main result is that the proof-of-work system leads to a situation where the governance of the blockchain is captured by a large firm.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/210437
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London ; no. 880 (January 2019)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Haipai xiaoshuo lun
    Autor*in: Li, Jin
    Erschienen: 2005 nian 1 yue
    Verlag:  Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi, Taibei

    Standort:
    Gemeinsame Fachbibliothek Asien / China
    Signatur:
    CHIN/895.135-388
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Chinesisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    ISBN: 9867614801
    Weitere Schlagworte: Literatur / China / Shanghai; Literatur / China / Moderne
    Umfang: xviii, 238 Seiten, 21 cm
  5. Marketplace scalability and strategic use of platform investment
    Autor*in: Li, Jin; Pisano, Gary P.; Zhu, Feng
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Harvard Business School, [Boston, MA]

    The scalability of a marketplace depends on the operations of the marketplace platform as well as its sellers' cost structures and capacities. When fixed costs of entry are high, sellers with small capacities may be deterred from entering the market... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    The scalability of a marketplace depends on the operations of the marketplace platform as well as its sellers' cost structures and capacities. When fixed costs of entry are high, sellers with small capacities may be deterred from entering the market because of their inability to leverage economies of scale. In this study, we explore one strategy that a marketplace platform can use to enhance its scalability: providing an ancillary service to sellers to reduce their fixed costs. In our model, a platform can choose whether and when to provide this service to sellers. When the platform provides the service, it encourages the entry of small sellers. However, it diminishes large sellers' incentives to make their own investment, thus reducing their potential output. When the output reduction by the large sellers is substantial, the platform may not want to provide the ancillary service even if it could do so at no cost. To encourage entry while mitigating output reduction, the platform may choose to strategically delay providing the service

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Harvard Business School ; 19, 063
    Harvard Business School Technology & Operations Mgt. Unit Working Paper ; No. 19-063
    Schlagworte: Electronic Commerce; Strategisches Management; Skalenertrag; Dienstleistung; Markteintritt
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Power dynamics in organizations
    Autor*in: Li, Jin; Matouschek, Niko; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: December 2015
    Verlag:  Northwestern University, Weinberg College of Arts & Sciences, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization, [Evanston, IL]

    We examine an in…finitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 74 (139)
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    We examine an in…finitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to persistent differences in performance, and why established firms fail to exploit new opportunities, even when they are publicly observable.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/142013
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: December 2015
    Schriftenreihe: CSIO working paper ; #0139
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Relatinal contracts with subjective peer evaluations
    Autor*in: Deb, Joyee; Li, Jin; Mukherjee, Arijit
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn.

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 29 (1995)
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; 1995
    Schlagworte: Unvollständiger Vertrag; Leistungsanreiz; Asymmetrische Information; Soziale Beziehungen; Arbeitsgruppe; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (44 S.), graph. Darst.