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  1. Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
    Autor*in: Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
    Erschienen: November 2020
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 191
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    We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - have severe behavioral constraints because the fines induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration. Incorporating reciprocity preferences into the theory explains the observed behavioral patterns and helps us develop a new mechanism that is more robust and achieves high rates of truth-telling and efficiency. Our results highlight the importance of tailoring implementation mechanisms to the underlying behavioral environment.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/227459
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised version
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 171
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 88 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Career Spillovers in Internal Labor Markets
    Autor*in: Bianchi, Nicola; Bovini, Giulia; Li, Jin; Paradisi, Matteo; Powell, Michael L.
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    This paper studies career spillovers across workers, which arise in firms with limited promotion opportunities. We exploit a 2011 Italian pension reform that unexpectedly tightened eligibility criteria for the public pension, leading to sudden,... mehr

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    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    This paper studies career spillovers across workers, which arise in firms with limited promotion opportunities. We exploit a 2011 Italian pension reform that unexpectedly tightened eligibility criteria for the public pension, leading to sudden, substantial, and heterogeneous retirement delays. Using administrative data on Italian private-sector workers, the analysis leverages cross-firm variation to isolate the effect of retirement delays among soon-to-retire workers on the wage growth and promotions of their colleagues. We find evidence of spillover patterns consistent with older workers blocking the careers of their younger colleagues, but only in firms with limited promotion opportunities

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w28605
    Schlagworte: Rentenreform; Spillover-Effekt; Interner Arbeitsmarkt; Ältere Arbeitskräfte; Erwerbsverlauf; Karriereplanung; Italien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  3. Corporate capture of blockchain governance
    Autor*in: Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares; Li, Jin; Nikolowa, Radoslawa
    Erschienen: 27 January 2019
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP13493
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Federated Causal Inference in Heterogeneous Observational Data
    Autor*in: Xiong, Ruoxuan; Koenecke, Allison; Powell, Michael; Shen, Zhu; Vogelstein, Joshua T.; Athey, Susan
    Erschienen: 2023
    Verlag:  SSRN, [S.l.]

    Analyzing observational data from multiple sources can be useful for increasing statistical power to detect a treatment effect; however, practical constraints such as privacy considerations may restrict individual-level information sharing across... mehr

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    Analyzing observational data from multiple sources can be useful for increasing statistical power to detect a treatment effect; however, practical constraints such as privacy considerations may restrict individual-level information sharing across data sets. This paper develops federated methods that only utilize summary-level information from multiple heterogeneous data sets. Our federated methods provide doubly-robust point estimates of treatment effects as well as variance estimates. We derive the asymptotic distributions of our federated estimators, which are shown to be asymptotically equivalent to the corresponding estimators from the combined individual-level data. We show that to achieve these properties, federated methods should be adjusted based on conditions such as whether models are correctly specified and stable across heterogeneous data sets

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper
    Schlagworte: Causal Inference; Propensity Scores; Federated Learning; Multiple Data Sets
    Weitere Schlagworte: Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (63 p)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 16, 2021 erstellt
  5. Haipai xiaoshuo lun
    Autor*in: Li, Jin
    Erschienen: 2005 nian 1 yue
    Verlag:  Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi, Taibei

    Standort:
    Gemeinsame Fachbibliothek Asien / China
    Signatur:
    CHIN/895.135-388
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Chinesisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    ISBN: 9867614801
    Weitere Schlagworte: Literatur / China / Shanghai; Literatur / China / Moderne
    Umfang: xviii, 238 Seiten, 21 cm
  6. "Graf Spee"
    Autor*in: Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 1956
    Verlag:  Hodder & Stoughton, London

    Standort:
    Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Bibliothek
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    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schlagworte: River Plate, Battle of the, 1939
    Weitere Schlagworte: Admiral Graf Spee (Battleship)
    Umfang: 224 S, 1 Abb
  7. Marketplace scalability and strategic use of platform investment
    Autor*in: Li, Jin; Pisano, Gary P.; Zhu, Feng
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Harvard Business School, [Boston, MA]

    The scalability of a marketplace depends on the operations of the marketplace platform as well as its sellers' cost structures and capacities. When fixed costs of entry are high, sellers with small capacities may be deterred from entering the market... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    The scalability of a marketplace depends on the operations of the marketplace platform as well as its sellers' cost structures and capacities. When fixed costs of entry are high, sellers with small capacities may be deterred from entering the market because of their inability to leverage economies of scale. In this study, we explore one strategy that a marketplace platform can use to enhance its scalability: providing an ancillary service to sellers to reduce their fixed costs. In our model, a platform can choose whether and when to provide this service to sellers. When the platform provides the service, it encourages the entry of small sellers. However, it diminishes large sellers' incentives to make their own investment, thus reducing their potential output. When the output reduction by the large sellers is substantial, the platform may not want to provide the ancillary service even if it could do so at no cost. To encourage entry while mitigating output reduction, the platform may choose to strategically delay providing the service

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Harvard Business School ; 19, 063
    Harvard Business School Technology & Operations Mgt. Unit Working Paper ; No. 19-063
    Schlagworte: Electronic Commerce; Strategisches Management; Skalenertrag; Dienstleistung; Markteintritt
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Mein Hunde-Album
    Autor*in: Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Knesebeck, München

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek der LMU München
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    ISBN: 9783868737394
    DDC Klassifikation: Englische, altenglische Literaturen (820)
    Schlagworte: Hundehaltung
    Umfang: 96 S., Ill., 180 mm x 180 mm
  9. Games on Thrones
    100 Dinge, die du auf dem Porzellanthron tun kannst
    Autor*in: Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2016
    Verlag:  riva, München

    Standort:
    Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
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    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek der LMU München
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    Beteiligt: Walter, Birgit
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    ISBN: 9783868838848; 3868838848
    Weitere Identifier:
    9783868838848
    DDC Klassifikation: Literaturen germanischer Sprachen; Deutsche Literatur (830)
    Auflage/Ausgabe: 1. Auflage
    Weitere Schlagworte: Humor, Satire / gatbeg
    Umfang: 96 Seiten, Illustrationen, 16 cm x 16 cm
  10. Black narcissus
    = Die schwarze Narzisse
    Beteiligt: Powell, Michael; Pressburger, Emeric; Kerr, Deborah; Robson, Flora; Sabu
    Erschienen: 2004
    Verlag:  Magic Video [u.a.], [S.l.]

    Standort:
    Hochschule für Bildende Künste Braunschweig, Bibliothek
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    VCD 110/04
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    Beteiligt: Powell, Michael; Pressburger, Emeric; Kerr, Deborah; Robson, Flora; Sabu
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    RVK Klassifikation: AP 59800
    Umfang: 1 DVD-Video (PAL, 97 Min.), farb., dolby digital 2.0, 4:3, Code 0
    Bemerkung(en):

    Orig.: GB 1947
  11. Corporate capture of blockchain governance
    Autor*in: Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares; Li, Jin; Nikolowa, Radoslawa
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London

    We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services.... mehr

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    We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the two-way interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. Our main result is that the proof-of-work system leads to a situation where the governance of the blockchain is captured by a large firm.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/210437
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London ; no. 880 (January 2019)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. "Graf Spee"
    Autor*in: Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 1956
    Verlag:  Hodder & Stoughton, London

    Standort:
    Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Bibliothek
    Signatur:
    IV:le:2:::8
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    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Signatur:
    EL Pow 16
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schlagworte: River Plate, Battle of the, 1939
    Weitere Schlagworte: Admiral Graf Spee (Battleship)
    Umfang: 224 S, 1 Abb
  13. Handing out guns at a knife fight
    behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
    Autor*in: Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Zurich

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
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    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/111229
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; 171
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (58 S.), graph. Darst.
  14. Handing out guns at a knife fight
    behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
    Autor*in: Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on... mehr

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/102108
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 4948
    Umfang: Online-Ressource ([1], 58 S.), graph. Darst.
  15. Handing out guns at a knife fight
    behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
    Autor*in: Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted, they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/101934
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 8404
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (58 S.), graph. Darst.
  16. Firms in markets under uncertainty
    Autor*in: Gibbons, Robert; Holden, Richard T.; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, Mass.

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and a downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 67 (4744)
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    We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and a downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at private cost. As in property-rights models, different governance structures induce different investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring (common-value) information, which is then incorporated into the market-clearing price by the parties' trading behaviors. The informativeness of the price mechanism affects the returns to specific investments and hence the optimal governance structure for individual dyads; meanwhile, the governance-structure choices by individual dyads affect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium, firms and the market coexist and shape each other. In particular, the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogeneous dyads to choose heterogeneous governance structures

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 1721.1/66948
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Rev.
    Schriftenreihe: Sloan working papers ; 4744-09
    MIT Sloan Research Paper ; No. 4744-09
    Schlagworte: Preismanagement; Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit; Marktmechanismus
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S., 278 KB), graph. Darst.
  17. Integration and information
    markets and hierarchies revisited
    Autor*in: Gibbons, Robert; Holden, Richard T.; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, Mass.

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 67 (4776)
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    We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at private cost, and there is a machine that either party can own. As in property rights models, different ownership structures create different incentives for the parties' investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring information, which is then incorporated into the market-clearing price by the parties' trading behaviors. The informativeness of the price mechanism affects the returns to specific investments and hence the optimal ownership structure for individual dyads; meanwhile, the ownership choices by individual dyads affect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogeneous dyads to choose heterogeneous ownership structures

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 1721.1/66680
    Schriftenreihe: Sloan working papers ; 4776-10
    Schlagworte: Preistheorie; Vorleistungen; Informationsversorgung; Informationskosten; Sachenrecht; Rationale Erwartung; Noise Trading
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S., 403 KB), graph. Darst.
  18. Rational-expectations equilibrium in intermediate good markets/ Robert Gibbons, Richard Holden and Michael Powell
    Autor*in: Gibbons, Robert; Holden, Richard T.; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, Mass.

    We analyze a rational-expectations model of information acquisition and price formation in an intermediate-good market: prices and net supply are non-negative, there are no noise traders, and the intermediate good has multiple potential uses. Several... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We analyze a rational-expectations model of information acquisition and price formation in an intermediate-good market: prices and net supply are non-negative, there are no noise traders, and the intermediate good has multiple potential uses. Several of our results differ from the classic Grossman-Stiglitz approach. For example, the price mechanism is more informative at high and low prices and potentially uninformative at middle prices. Also, an informed trade by a producer of one final good amounts to a noise trade from the perspective of a producer of another final good, so (a) as the price mechanism becomes more informative for producers of one final good, it becomes less informative for producers of others, who therefore have a stronger incentive to acquire information, so information acquisition has the strategic-complements property between groups, and (b) having more producers (in multiple groups) become informed need not increase the informativeness of the price mechanism

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Rev.
    Schriftenreihe: Sloan working papers ; 4775-10
    MIT Sloan Research Paper ; No. 4775-10
    Schlagworte: Preistheorie; Vorleistungen; Informationsversorgung; Rationale Erwartung; Noise Trading
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (34 S., 293 KB), graph. Darst.
  19. Power dynamics in organizations
    Autor*in: Li, Jin; Matouschek, Niko; Powell, Michael
    Erschienen: December 2015
    Verlag:  Northwestern University, Weinberg College of Arts & Sciences, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization, [Evanston, IL]

    We examine an in…finitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 74 (139)
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    We examine an in…finitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to persistent differences in performance, and why established firms fail to exploit new opportunities, even when they are publicly observable.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/142013
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: December 2015
    Schriftenreihe: CSIO working paper ; #0139
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Sticking points
    common-agency problems and contracting in the U.S. healthcare system
    Autor*in: Frandsen, Brigham; Powell, Michael; Rebitzer, James B.
    Erschienen: February 2017
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (23177)
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    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 23177
    Umfang: 42 Seiten, Illustrationen
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    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  21. Relatinal contracts with subjective peer evaluations
    Autor*in: Deb, Joyee; Li, Jin; Mukherjee, Arijit
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn.

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 29 (1995)
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; 1995
    Schlagworte: Unvollständiger Vertrag; Leistungsanreiz; Asymmetrische Information; Soziale Beziehungen; Arbeitsgruppe; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (44 S.), graph. Darst.