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  1. The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh
    evidence from a longitudinal household survey
    Autor*in: Hussain, A. K. M. Ghulam; Nargis, Nigar; Ashiquzzaman, Shah M.; Khalil, Fahad
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  Global Labor Organization (GLO), Maastricht

    Microcredit program, originating in Bangladesh in the late 1970s, has played an important role to meet the financing needs of the impoverished communities around the world. While the successes and failures of microcredit in lifting the poor out of... mehr

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    Microcredit program, originating in Bangladesh in the late 1970s, has played an important role to meet the financing needs of the impoverished communities around the world. While the successes and failures of microcredit in lifting the poor out of poverty have been recorded in a wide array of literature, the employment outcome of participating in a microcredit program as a pathway to poverty reduction has been studied much less. Using two waves of longitudinal data on over 2000 households, we examine the employment impact of microcredit program in Bangladesh during 1998-2004. The longitudinal nature of data allows us fixed effects estimation of the effect of microcredit program participation on self-employment hours and household labor income isolating the biases that may result from non-random program placement, censoring in self-employment work hours and income data, and non-random sample selection of households or individuals as participants who already have entrepreneurial skills or pre-existing household conditions favourable to self-employment activities. The fixed effects estimate shows that households that participate in microcredit program work on average 245 hours longer in self-employment activities and earn 9.4% higher labor income than non-participant households. These extra hours are equivalent to around 7 weeks of employment for a person. The income effect of microcredit program participation is more discernible on household labor income than on total household income due to lack of direct link of microcredit program with non-labor income sources such as remittance. The participating households at the bottom of the income distribution appear to have gained more than those at the upper end suggesting equalizing effect of microcredit program participation over and above the positive effect on employment and income growth. Thus microcredit program in Bangladesh has succeeded in providing employment generating capacities to participants and raised the potential for income growth that contributed to poverty reduction.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    hdl: 10419/157214
    Schriftenreihe: GLO discussion paper ; no. 59
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Auctioneers as market makers
    managing momentum in Chittagong tea auctions
    Autor*in: Hossain, Tanjim; Khalil, Fahad; Shum, Matthew
    Erschienen: March 2016
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, München

    In an auction market, the auctioneer exerts significant influence in choosing and administering a selling strategy. We make the case for viewing the auctioneer as a market maker, whose success depends on how well he manages externalities without... mehr

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    In an auction market, the auctioneer exerts significant influence in choosing and administering a selling strategy. We make the case for viewing the auctioneer as a market maker, whose success depends on how well he manages externalities without jeopardizing the trust of the buyers and sellers. We illustrate that incentives of the market maker may not be aligned with that of individual sellers. Using a unique data set, from tea auctions in Chittagong, Bangladesh, we argue that an auctioneer's actions maintain a careful balance of his own incentives vs. those of his clients, and the auction outcomes are affected by how much discretion the auctioneer has in choosing the selling strategy. Specifically, we find that raising the reserve price for a lot exerts a positive price externality on subsequent lots within the auction. To manage the momentum of market prices, the auctioneer chooses higher reserve prices for tea produced by tea estates in which he has an ownership stake. While these teas receive a higher price when sold, they sell less frequently creating a short run cost to the auctioneer but an overall positive impact on market prices. Thus, consistent with the role of a market maker, a desire to appear non-opportunistic, rather than opportunism, seems to better explain the auctioneer's actions.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/130469
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; no. 5843
    Schlagworte: Teehandel; Auktion; Strategie; Chittagong; Bangladesch
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten)
  3. The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As
    Autor*in: Hasan, Iftekhar; Khalil, Fahad; Sun, Xian
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  Bank of Finland, Helsinki

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    ISBN: 9789523231740
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/212388
    Schriftenreihe: Bank of Finland research discussion papers ; 2017, 17
    Schlagworte: Immaterialgüterrechte; Internationale Konzentration; Schwellenländer
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten)
  4. Big techs vs banks
    Autor*in: Gambacorta, Leonardo; Khalil, Fahad; Parigi, Bruno
    Erschienen: 06 November 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP17649
    Schlagworte: Kreditmarkt; Hochtechnologie; Bank; Wettbewerb; Adverse Selektion; Asymmetrische Information; Informationsverbreitung; Datenschutz; Big tech
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Big techs vs banks
    Autor*in: Gambacorta, Leonardo; Khalil, Fahad; Parigi, Bruno
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

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    Schriftenreihe: BIS working papers ; no 1037
    Schlagworte: Kreditmarkt; Hochtechnologie; Bank; Wettbewerb; Adverse Selektion; Asymmetrische Information; Informationsverbreitung; Datenschutz; Big tech; Big techs; credit markets; privacy; information sharing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Learning from failures
    optimal contract for experimentation and production
    Autor*in: Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive... mehr

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    Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his efficiency in experimentation. This private information in the experimentation stage generates asymmetric information in the production stage even though there was no disagreement about the profitability of the project at the outset. The degree of asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length of experimentation, the production scale, and the timing of payments to screen the agents. Due to the presence of an optimal production decision after experimentation, we find over-experimentation to be optimal. The asymmetric information generated during experimentation makes over-production optimal. An efficient type is rewarded early since he is more likely to succeed in experimenting, while an inefficient type is rewarded at the very end of the experimentation stage. This result is robust to the introduction of ex post moral hazard.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/185508
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; no. 7310
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Service-level selection
    strategic risk selection in Medicare advantage in response to risk adjustment
    Autor*in: Park, Sungchul; Basu, Anirban; Coe, Norma B.; Khalil, Fahad
    Erschienen: November 2017
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 24038
    Schlagworte: Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung; USA
    Umfang: 46 Seiten, Illustrationen
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  8. Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
    Autor*in: Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques
    Erschienen: January 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post... mehr

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    Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the rent of efficient firms, it exacerbates the problem due to moral hazard. If allocative efficiency is a requirement, limiting the number of participants may be optimal. Alternatively, the same incentives can be optimally provided using inefficient allocation rules.

     
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    hdl: 10419/232460
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8863 (2021)
    Schlagworte: competitive procurement; auctions; moral hazard
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Contracts and productive information gathering
    Autor*in: Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles
    Erschienen: 1997
    Verlag:  University of Southampton, Department of Economics, Southampton

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers in economics and econometrics ; 9707
    Schlagworte: Vertrag; Informationsökonomik; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Theorie
    Umfang: 23 S., graph. Darst.
  10. Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information
    Autor*in: Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J.
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the... mehr

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    When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from him. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so-called burning of money, where the monetary penalty is given away to a third party. We show that a more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible by exploiting the timing of private information. If the private information arrives before the agent has completed his effort, non-monetary tools like rescaling the project become optimal, and no money needs to be burned. We show that rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties, while money is equally valuable to all parties. An alternative way to solve the principal’s credibility problem is to certify the private signal and make it public. When collusion between the certifier and the agent is an issue, we uncover interesting similarities between private signals and public (certified) signals vulnerable to collusive manipulation. We show that certification of private information by a third party may not always be in the interest of the principal if this certification raises the specter of collusion.

     
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    hdl: 10419/89755
    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 4497
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.
  11. Contracts offered by bureaucrats
    Autor*in: Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define... mehr

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    We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low-powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low-powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.

     
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    hdl: 10419/89679
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 4511
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (45 S.), graph. Darst.
  12. The loan size as a commitment device
    Autor*in: Khalil, Fahad; Parigi, Bruno
    Erschienen: 1996
    Verlag:  University of Southampton, Department of Economics, Southampton

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers in economics and econometrics ; 9626
    Schlagworte: Kredit; Wirtschaftsprüfung; Anreiz; Theorie
    Umfang: 25 S.