Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 20 von 20.

  1. The leverage effect of bank disclosures
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Laux, Christian; Pothier, David
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    The general view underlying bank regulation is that bank disclosures providemarket discipline and reduce banks’ risk-taking incentives. We show that bankdisclosures can increase bank leverage and bank risk. The reason stems from... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 12
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The general view underlying bank regulation is that bank disclosures providemarket discipline and reduce banks’ risk-taking incentives. We show that bankdisclosures can increase bank leverage and bank risk. The reason stems from theinteraction between insured and uninsured debt. Bank disclosures reduce the agencyproblem between uninsured debt and equity, thereby lowering the cost of leverage forbanks. By issuing uninsured short-term debt that is repaid ahead of insured depositswhen economic conditions deteriorate, banks dilute insured deposits. Higher levelsof uninsured short-term debt increase the subsidy provided by deposit insurance,which increases banks’ risk-taking incentives. We identify conditions under whichthis negative leverage effect dominates the standard market discipline effect, so thatproviding market discipline through bank disclosures increases banks’ risk.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783957298393
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242955
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Deutsche Bundesbank ; no 2021, 31
    Schlagworte: Bank Disclosures; Market Discipline; Bank Leverage
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Optimal timing of policy interventions in troubled banks
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Mayer, Paul; Pothier, David
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    We analyze the problem of a policy authority (PA) that must decide when to resolve a troubled bank whose underlying solvency is uncertain. Delaying resolution increases the chance that information arrives that reveals the bank's true solvency state.... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 12
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We analyze the problem of a policy authority (PA) that must decide when to resolve a troubled bank whose underlying solvency is uncertain. Delaying resolution increases the chance that information arrives that reveals the bank's true solvency state. However, delaying resolution also gives uninsured creditors the opportunity to withdraw, which raises the cost of bailing out insured depositors. The optimal resolution date trades off these costs with the option value of making a more efficient resolution decision following the arrival of information. Providing the bank with liquidity support buys the PA time to wait for information, but increases the PA's losses if the bank is insolvent. The PA may therefore optimally choose to delay the provision of liquidity support in order to minimize its losses.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783957298782
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/251607
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Deutsche Bundesbank ; no 2022, 10
    Schlagworte: Bank Resolution; Lender of Last Resort; Banking Crises
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Leaping into the dark
    a theory of policy gambles
    Autor*in: Anand, Kartik; Gai, Prasanna; König, Philipp Johann
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    Why do politicians sometimes pursue policies with uncertain outcomes? We present a model in which politicians are unable to pre-commit to a status quo policy, and where investors and voters face a conflict over the division of output. Politicians may... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 12
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Why do politicians sometimes pursue policies with uncertain outcomes? We present a model in which politicians are unable to pre-commit to a status quo policy, and where investors and voters face a conflict over the division of output. Politicians may deviate from the status quo and pursue risky policy gambles in order to raise aggregate output to satisfy voters. These policy gambles may have a "populist" and self-fulfilling flavour: they can command electoral support despite being against voters' best interests. We analyse how consensus-building institutions eliminate the gamble equilibrium and enhance voter welfare. We interpret the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union through the lens of the model.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783957296733
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/214831
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Deutsche Bundesbank ; no 2020, 07
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Real interest rates, bank borrowing, and fragility
    Autor*in: Ahnert, Toni; Anand, Kartik; König, Philipp Johann
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    How do real interest rates affect financial fragility? We study this issue in a model in which bank borrowing is subject to rollover risk. A bank's optimal borrowing trades off the benefit from investing additional funds into profitable assets with... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 534
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    How do real interest rates affect financial fragility? We study this issue in a model in which bank borrowing is subject to rollover risk. A bank's optimal borrowing trades off the benefit from investing additional funds into profitable assets with the cost of greater risk of a run by bank creditors. Changes in the interest rate affect the price and amount of borrowing, both of which influence bank fragility in opposite directions. Thus, the marginal impact of changes to the interest rate on bank fragility depends on the level of the interest rate. Finally, we derive testable implications that may guide future empirical work.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289954037
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278243
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; no 2755 (December 2022)
    Schlagworte: bank borrowing; rollover risk; fragility; real interest rates; global games; funding liquidity risk channel
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Real interest rates, bank borrowing, and fragility
    Autor*in: Ahnert, Toni; Anand, Kartik; König, Philipp Johann
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    How do real interest rates affect financial fragility? We study this issue in a model in which bank borrowing is subject to rollover risk. A bank’s optimal borrowing trades off the benefit from investing additional funds into profitable assets with... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 12
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    How do real interest rates affect financial fragility? We study this issue in a model in which bank borrowing is subject to rollover risk. A bank’s optimal borrowing trades off the benefit from investing additional funds into profitable assets with the cost of greater risk of a run by bank creditors. Changes in the interest rate affect the price and amount of borrowing, both of which influence bank fragility in opposite directions. Thus, the marginal impact of changes to the interest rate on bank fragility depends on the level of the interest rate. Finally, we derive testable implications that may guide future empirical work.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783957299277
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/266683
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Deutsche Bundesbank ; no 2022, 48
    Schlagworte: bank borrowing; rollover risk; fragility; real interest rates; global games; funding liquidity risk channel
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. The "Celtic crisis"
    guarantees, transparency, and systemic liquidity risk ; conference paper
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Anand, Kartik; Heinemann, Frank
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experience of some European countries, most notably Ireland, has demonstrated, the... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experience of some European countries, most notably Ireland, has demonstrated, the credibility and effectiveness of these guarantees is crucially intertwined with the sovereign's funding risks. Employing methods from the literature on global games, we develop a simple model to explore the functional co-dependence between the rollover risks of a bank and a government, which are connected through the government's guarantee of bank liabilities. We show the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative static properties. In solving for the optimal guarantee, we further show that its credibility may be improved through policies that promote balance sheet transparency.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (Einzellizenz)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79747
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V1
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (41 S.), graph. Darst.
  7. Safe but fragile
    information acquisition, sponsor support and shadow bank runs
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Pothier, David
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    This paper proposes a theory of shadow bank runs in the presence of sponsor liquidity support. We show that liquidity lines designed to insulate shadow banks from market and funding liquidity risk can be destabilizing, as they provide them with... mehr

    Standort:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 12 (2018,15)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Osnabrück
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper proposes a theory of shadow bank runs in the presence of sponsor liquidity support. We show that liquidity lines designed to insulate shadow banks from market and funding liquidity risk can be destabilizing, as they provide them with incentives to acquire private information about their assets' type. This can lead to inefficient market liquidity dry-ups caused by self-fulfilling fears of adverse selection. By lowering asset prices, information acquisition also reduces shadow banks' equity value and may spur inefficient investor runs. We compare different policies that can be used to boost market and funding liquidity. While debt purchases prevent inefficient dry-ups, liquidity injections may backfire by exacerbating adverse selection frictions.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783957294579
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/179509
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Deutsche Bundesbank ; no 2018, 15
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. The economics of TARGET2 balances
    Autor*in: Bindseil, Ulrich; König, Philipp Johann
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  SFB 649, Economic Risk, Berlin

    It has recently been argued that intra-eurosystem claims and liabilities in the form of TARGET2 balances would raise fundamental issues within the European monetary union. This article provides a framework for the economic analysis of TARGET2... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 86 (2011,35)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    It has recently been argued that intra-eurosystem claims and liabilities in the form of TARGET2 balances would raise fundamental issues within the European monetary union. This article provides a framework for the economic analysis of TARGET2 balances and discusses the key arguments behind this recent debate. The analysis is conducted within a system of financial accounts in which TARGET2 balances can arise either due to current account transactions or cross-border capital ows. It is argued that the recent volatility of TARGET2 balances reflects capital flow movements, while the previously prevailing current account positions did not find a strong reflection in TARGET2 balances. Some recent statements regarding TARGET2 appear to be due to a failure to distinguish between the monetary base (a central bank liability concept) and the liquidity deficit of the banking system vis-à-vis the central bank (a central bank asset concept). Furthermore, the article highlights the importance of TARGET2 for the stability of the euro area and points out that the proposal to limit the size of TARGET2 liabilities essentially contradicts the idea of a monetary union. -- TARGET2 ; central bank balance sheet ; liquidity deficit ; financial crisis

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/56730
    Schriftenreihe: SFB 649 discussion paper ; 2011-035
    Schlagworte: Internationaler Zahlungsverkehr; Clearing; Internationale Staatsschulden; Außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht; Bankenliquidität; Geldmenge; Eurozone; Eurozone
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 28 S., 563 KB), graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    TARGET2 = Trans-European Automated Realtime Gross Settlement Express Transfer System
  9. Strategic complementarities and nominal rigidities
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Meyer-Gohde, Alexander
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  SFB 649, Economic Risk, Berlin

    We reconsider the canonical model of price setting with menu costs by Ball and Romer (1990). Their original model exhibits multiple equilibria for nominal aggregate demand shocks of intermediate size. By abandoning Ball and Romer's (1990) assumption... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 86 (2014,54)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We reconsider the canonical model of price setting with menu costs by Ball and Romer (1990). Their original model exhibits multiple equilibria for nominal aggregate demand shocks of intermediate size. By abandoning Ball and Romer's (1990) assumption that demand shocks are common knowledge among price setters, we derive a unique symmetric threshold equilibrium where agents adjust prices whenever the demand shock falls outside the thresholds. The comparative statics of this threshold may differ from the one that gives rise to maximal nominal rigidity examined by Ball and Romer (1990). In contrast to their analysis, we find that a decrease in real rigidities can be associated with an increase in nominal rigidities due to the endogenous adjustment of agents' beliefs regarding the aggregate price level.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/103799
    Schriftenreihe: SFB 649 discussion paper ; 2014-054
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (25 S.), graph. Darst.
  10. Liquidity and capital requirements and the probability of bank failure
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  SFB 649, Economic Risk, Berlin

    Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential regulator can in general not mitigate a bank’s failure risk solely by means of liquidity requirements. However, their effectiveness can be restored if, in addition, minimum... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 86 (2010.27)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential regulator can in general not mitigate a bank’s failure risk solely by means of liquidity requirements. However, their effectiveness can be restored if, in addition, minimum capital requirements are met. This provides a rationale for capital requirements beyond the commonly envoked reasoning that they are to be used to control the riskiness of banks’ asset portfolios. -- prudential regulation ; liquidity requirements ; minimum capital requirements ; global games

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/39333
    Schriftenreihe: SFB 649 discussion paper ; 2010,027
    Schlagworte: Bankinsolvenz; Bankenaufsicht; Mindestreserve; Basler Akkord; Bankenliquidität; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (8 S.)
  11. Asymmetric information and roll-over risk
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Pothier, David
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  DIW, Berlin

    How do banks choose their debt maturity structure when credit markets are subject to information frictions? This paper proposes a model of equilibrium maturity choice with asymmetric information and endogenous roll-over risk. We show that in the... mehr

    Standort:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 14 (1364)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    How do banks choose their debt maturity structure when credit markets are subject to information frictions? This paper proposes a model of equilibrium maturity choice with asymmetric information and endogenous roll-over risk. We show that in the presence of public signals about firms' creditworthiness (credit ratings), firms choose to expose themselves to positive roll-over risk in order to minimize price distortions. Short-term financing is socially desirable when banks' capacity to repay short-term creditors depends on their credit rating, as it helps mitigate the underlying adverse selection problem. Notwithstanding these social benefits, the equilibrium maturity structure always exhibits inefficient short-termism. If banks receiving a credit downgrade face sufficiently high roll-over risk, the equilibrium maturity structure approaches the constrained efficient allocation.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93069
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 1364
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (34 S.)
  12. Implications for the euro area of divergent monetary policy stances by the Fed and the ECB
    the role of financial spillovers : in-depth analysis
    Autor*in: Bernoth, Kerstin; König, Philipp Johann
    Erschienen: January 2016
    Verlag:  DIW Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin

    Standort:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 317 (107)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 3938762993; 9783938762998
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129787
    Schriftenreihe: DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt ; 107
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 18 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. The natural rate of interest
    Theory / Philipp König and Dmitry Chervyakov
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Chervyakov, Dmitry
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin

    The term natural (or neutral) real interest rate refers to the equilibrium value of the real interest rate. As this equilibrium is usually conceived as a situation where inflationary or deflationary pressures have abated, the natural real interest... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 506 (108)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The term natural (or neutral) real interest rate refers to the equilibrium value of the real interest rate. As this equilibrium is usually conceived as a situation where inflationary or deflationary pressures have abated, the natural real interest rate is a key concept for central banks seeking to stabilize the general price level or targeting the rate of inflation. The present roundup provides a brief historical review of this concept and explains the relevance of the natural real rate for monetary policy analysis.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/155339
    Übergeordneter Titel: The natural rate of interest - Alle Bände anzeigen
    Schriftenreihe: DIW Roundup ; 108
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 8 Seiten)
  14. The natural rate of interest
    Empirical overview / Dmitry Chervyakov and Philipp König
    Autor*in: Chervyakov, Dmitry; König, Philipp Johann
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin

    The concept of the natural rate of interest (NRI) dates back to Wicksell (1898) and has since then been highly debated in the economic literature. In practice, estimates of the NRI can be employed as a versatile tool for macroeconomic analysis and... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 506 (109)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The concept of the natural rate of interest (NRI) dates back to Wicksell (1898) and has since then been highly debated in the economic literature. In practice, estimates of the NRI can be employed as a versatile tool for macroeconomic analysis and are a core element within the popular neo-Wicksellian (or New-Keynesian) framework. The real rate gap, i.e. the difference between the actual interest rate and the NRI, provides valuable information about the state of the economy and can help policy makers to adjust the monetary policy stance. However, the NRI cannot be directly observed and has to be calculated from other economic data. While the empirical literature provides various estimation approaches, all of them are subject to serious measurement problems and yield fairly uncertain estimates. This Roundup reviews the advantages and shortcomings of the most popular measurement methods and presents an estimation of the NRI and the real rate gap based on the Laubach and Williams (2003) model.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/155340
    Übergeordneter Titel: The natural rate of interest - Alle Bände anzeigen
    Schriftenreihe: DIW Roundup ; 109
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 9 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. The bank capital debate
    should fragility be reduced?
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Pothier, David
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

    The recent financial crisis has exposed the fragility of the banking sector to sudden withdrawals of wholesale funding, asset price declines and market dry-ups. Governments and central banks had to step in to prevent major banks from defaulting.... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 506 (17)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The recent financial crisis has exposed the fragility of the banking sector to sudden withdrawals of wholesale funding, asset price declines and market dry-ups. Governments and central banks had to step in to prevent major banks from defaulting. These events led to renewed interest in the question whether the fragility of banks should be tolerated as a necessary, even desirable feature of an efficient process of financial intermediation, or whether banks should be subject to stricter regulation ex ante. This Round-Up summarizes the key arguments on both sides of the debate.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/111792
    Schriftenreihe: DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus ; 17
    Schlagworte: Bankrisiko; Bankenliquidität; Bankenregulierung; Diskurstheorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (5 S.), graph. Darst.
  16. Bubbles and monetary policy
    to burst or not to burst?
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Pothier, David
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

    The question of whether monetary policy should target asset prices remains a contentious issue. Prior to the 2007/08 financial crisis, central banks opted for a wait-and-see approach, remaining passive during the build-up of asset price bubbles but... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 506 (55)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The question of whether monetary policy should target asset prices remains a contentious issue. Prior to the 2007/08 financial crisis, central banks opted for a wait-and-see approach, remaining passive during the build-up of asset price bubbles but actively seeking to stabilize prices and output after they burst. The macroeconomic and financial turbulence that followed the subprime housing bubble has led to a renewed debate concerning monetary policy's role in maintaining financial stability. This Round-Up provides a brief overview of this topic.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/111837
    Schriftenreihe: DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus ; 55
    Schlagworte: Geldpolitisches Ziel; Spekulationsblase
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (5 S.)
  17. Central bank asset puchases I
    the theory
    Autor*in: Raab, Carolin; König, Philipp Johann; Bernoth, Kerstin
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

    In the face of interest rates having hit their zero lower bound in major economies, large-scale asset purchases have become an important weapon of central banks in recent years. It is, however, not clear whether and under which circumstances such... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 506 (60)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In the face of interest rates having hit their zero lower bound in major economies, large-scale asset purchases have become an important weapon of central banks in recent years. It is, however, not clear whether and under which circumstances such policy measures produce the desired effects. This round-up provides a selective overview of theoretical research that has been devoted to understand under what conditions central bank asset purchases lead to reductions in longer-term interest rates and produce stimulating effects on the overall economy.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/111845
    Schriftenreihe: DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus ; 60
    Schlagworte: Geldmengensteuerung; Quantitative Lockerung; Kapitalmarkttheorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (7 S.), graph. Darst.
  18. Large-scale asset purchases by central banks II
    empirical evidence
    Autor*in: Bernoth, Kerstin; König, Philipp Johann; Raab, Carolin
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

    Not just since the European Central Bank announced the large-scale purchase of government bonds a few weeks ago, large-scale asset purchases have always been a controversially discussed topic. This DIW Roundup summarizes the measures that have been... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 506 (61)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Not just since the European Central Bank announced the large-scale purchase of government bonds a few weeks ago, large-scale asset purchases have always been a controversially discussed topic. This DIW Roundup summarizes the measures that have been taken by central banks in Japan, USA and UK and the empirical evidence about the impacts of these measures on financial markets and the real economy.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/111846
    Schriftenreihe: DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus ; 61
    Schlagworte: Geldmengensteuerung; Quantitative Lockerung; Japan; USA; Großbritannien
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (7 S.), graph. Darst.
  19. The 'Celtic Crisis'
    guarantees, transparency, and systemic liquidity risk
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Anand, Kartik; Heinemann, Frank
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  SFB 649, Economic Risk, Berlin

    Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experiences of some European countries, most notably Ireland, have demonstrated, the... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 86 (2013,25)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experiences of some European countries, most notably Ireland, have demonstrated, the credibility and effectiveness of these guarantees is crucially intertwined with the sovereign's funding risks. Employing methods from the literature on global games, we develop a simple model to explore the systemic linkage between the rollover risks of a bank and a government, which are connected through the government's guarantee of bank liabilities. We show the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative static properties. In solving for the optimal guarantee numerically, we show how its credibility may be improved through policies that promote balance sheet transparency. We explain the asymmetry in risk-transfer between sovereign and banking sector, following the introduction of a guarantee as being attributed to the resolution of strategic uncertainties held by bank depositors and the opacity of the banks' balance sheets. -- bank debt guarantees ; transparency ; bank default ; sovereign default ; global games

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79562
    Schriftenreihe: SFB 649 discussion paper ; 2013-025
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (41 S.), graph. Darst.
  20. The "Celtic crisis"
    guarantees, transparency, and systemic liquidity risk ; conference paper
    Autor*in: König, Philipp Johann; Anand, Kartik; Heinemann, Frank
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experience of some European countries, most notably Ireland, has demonstrated, the... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experience of some European countries, most notably Ireland, has demonstrated, the credibility and effectiveness of these guarantees is crucially intertwined with the sovereign's funding risks. Employing methods from the literature on global games, we develop a simple model to explore the functional co-dependence between the rollover risks of a bank and a government, which are connected through the government's guarantee of bank liabilities. We show the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative static properties. In solving for the optimal guarantee, we further show that its credibility may be improved through policies that promote balance sheet transparency.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79747
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V1
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (41 S.), graph. Darst.