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  1. How altruistic is indirect reciprocity?
    evidence from gift-exchange games in the lab
    Autor*in: Becker, Johannes; Hopp, Daniel; Süß, Karolin
    Erschienen: 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    Indirect reciprocity is defined as a specific kind of behavior: An agent rewards or penalizes another agent for having behaved kindly or unkindly toward a third party. This paper analyzes the question of what drives indirect reciprocity: Does the... mehr

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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Indirect reciprocity is defined as a specific kind of behavior: An agent rewards or penalizes another agent for having behaved kindly or unkindly toward a third party. This paper analyzes the question of what drives indirect reciprocity: Does the agent reward or penalize because she (altruistically) cares for the third party? Or does she take the other agent's behavior as a signal of how the latter would treat her if they met? In order to measure the relative importance of the altruism motive versus the signaling motive, we consider a gift-exchange game with three players: an employer pays wages to a worker and a coworker, before the worker (but not the coworker) may reciprocate by exerting effort. We offer a theoretical framework to analyze both motives for indirect reciprocity and run a series of lab experiments. The treatments manipulate the worker's information on wages. We find that, if only the coworker's wage is observable, the worker's effort increases in the coworker's wage. In contrast, if the worker can observe her own wage, the coworker's wage does not affect worker effort at all. We interpret this as support for the signaling motive: Indirect reciprocity is rather a byproduct of direct reciprocity than an act of altruism.

     
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      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/224592
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 85
    Schlagworte: gift-exchange; indirect reciprocity; signaling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. High incentives without high cost
    the role of (perceived) stake sizes in dictator games
    Autor*in: Hopp, Daniel
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [CAWM], [Münster]

    The external validity of dictator games conducted in a lab is often questioned due to the use of small stake sizes that do not correspond to real-world settings. A potential solution to this problem is based on how participant perceptions of stake... mehr

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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 306
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The external validity of dictator games conducted in a lab is often questioned due to the use of small stake sizes that do not correspond to real-world settings. A potential solution to this problem is based on how participant perceptions of stake sizes are affected by their numerical representation. In this paper, I vary the stake size and its numerical representation to examine whether the illusion of large stakes can be created convincingly by implementing inflated numbers through an experimental currency. The share allocated to the recipient does not differ across treatments in this large-sample online experiment. This finding demonstrates that neither an increase in stake size nor a change in its numerical representation influence the share allocated to the recipient in a dictator game.

     
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      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/233116
    Schriftenreihe: [CAWM discussion paper] ; [123]
    Schlagworte: dictator game; stake size; numerosity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheinungsort, Verlag, monografische Reihe und deren Zählung von der Frontdoor
  3. Economic nowcasting with long short-term memory artificial neural networks (LSTM)
    Autor*in: Hopp, Daniel
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations, Geneva

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Nicht speichern
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: UNCTAD research paper ; No. 62
    Schlagworte: Nowcasting; Economic forecast; Neural networks; Machine learning; Python; nowcast_lstm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Feasibility of nowcasting SDG indicators
    a comprehensive survey
    Autor*in: Hopp, Daniel; Fu, Emily; Peltola, Anu
    Erschienen: Februar 2022
    Verlag:  United Nations, Geneva

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Nicht speichern
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: UNCTAD research paper ; No. 82
    Schlagworte: Nowcasting; Sustainable Devolopment Goals; SDG indicator; survey
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Benchmarking econometric and machine learning methodologies in nowcasting
    Autor*in: Hopp, Daniel
    Erschienen: May 2022
    Verlag:  United Nations, Geneva

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Nicht speichern
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: UNCTAD research paper ; No. 83
    Schlagworte: Economic forecast; Machine learning; GDP; LSTM; Bayesian VAR
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Performance of long short-term memory artificial neural networks in nowcasting during the COVID-19 crisis
    Autor*in: Hopp, Daniel
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations, Geneva

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Nicht speichern
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: UNCTAD research paper ; No. 74
    Schlagworte: Nowcasting; Economic forecast; Neural networks; Machinelearning; Python; R; MATLAB; Julia; LSTM; COVID
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. How altruistic is indirect reciprocity?
    evidence from gift-exchange games in the lab
    Autor*in: Becker, Johannes; Hopp, Daniel; Süß, Karolin
    Erschienen: July 2020
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Indirect reciprocity is defined as a specific kind of behavior: An agent rewards or penalizes another agent for having behaved kindly or unkindly toward a third party. This paper analyzes the question of what drives indirect reciprocity: Does the agent... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Indirect reciprocity is defined as a specific kind of behavior: An agent rewards or penalizes another agent for having behaved kindly or unkindly toward a third party. This paper analyzes the question of what drives indirect reciprocity: Does the agent reward or penalize because she (altruistically) cares for the third party? Or does she take the other agent's behavior as a signal of how the latter would treat her if they met? In order to measure the relative importance of the altruism motive versus the signaling motive, we consider a gift-exchange game with three players: an employer pays wages to a worker and a coworker, before the worker (but not the coworker) may reciprocate by exerting effort. We offer a theoretical framework to analyze both motives for indirect reciprocity and run a series of lab experiments. The treatments manipulate the worker's information on wages. We find that, if only the coworker's wage is observable, the worker's effort increases in the coworker's wage. In contrast, if the worker can observe her own wage, the coworker's wage does not affect worker effort at all. We interpret this as support for the signaling motive: Indirect reciprocity is rather a byproduct of direct reciprocity than an act of altruism.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/223495
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8423 (2020)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen