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  1. The proper basicality of belief in God and the evil-god challenge
    Erschienen: 2023

    The evil-god challenge is a challenge for theists to show that belief in God is more reasonable than belief in evil-god. In this article, I show that whether or not evil-god exists, belief in evil-god is unjustified. But this isn't the case for... mehr

    Index theologicus der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen
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    The evil-god challenge is a challenge for theists to show that belief in God is more reasonable than belief in evil-god. In this article, I show that whether or not evil-god exists, belief in evil-god is unjustified. But this isn't the case for belief in God: belief in God is probably justified if theism is true. And hence belief in God is (significantly) more reasonable than belief in evil-god, and the evil-god challenge has been answered.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Aufsatz aus einer Zeitschrift
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Übergeordneter Titel: Enthalten in: Religious studies; Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965; 59(2023), 1, Seite 55-62; Online-Ressource

    Schlagworte: Alvin Plantinga; divine hiddenness; evil-god challenge; justification; religious epistemology
  2. Sceptical theism and the evil-god challenge
    Erschienen: [2018]

    This article is a response to Stephen Law's article ‘The evil-god challenge'. In his article, Law argues that if belief in evil-god is unreasonable, then belief in good-god is unreasonable; that the antecedent is true; and hence so is the consequent.... mehr

    Index theologicus der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This article is a response to Stephen Law's article ‘The evil-god challenge'. In his article, Law argues that if belief in evil-god is unreasonable, then belief in good-god is unreasonable; that the antecedent is true; and hence so is the consequent. In this article, I show that Law's affirmation of the antecedent is predicated on the problem of good (i.e. the problem of whether an all-evil, all-powerful, and all-knowing God would allow there to be as much good in the world as there is), and argue that the problem of good fails. Thus, the antecedent is unmotivated, which renders the consequent unmotivated. Law's challenge for good-god theists is to show that good-god theism is not rendered unreasonable by the problem of evil in the same way that evil-god theism is rendered unreasonable by the problem of good. Insofar as the problem of good does not render belief in evil-god unreasonable, Law's challenge has been answered: since it is not unreasonable to believe in evil-god (at least for the reasons that Law gives) it is not unreasonable to believe in good-god. Finally, I show that - my criticism aside - the evil-god challenge turns out to be more complicated and controversial than it initially appears, for it relies on the (previously unacknowledged) contentious assumption that sceptical theism is false.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Aufsatz aus einer Zeitschrift
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Übergeordneter Titel: Enthalten in: Religious studies; Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965; 54(2018), 4, Seite 549-561; Online-Ressource

    Schlagworte: Theismus; Skeptizismus; Das Böse; Gott;