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  1. Signaling with private monitoring
    Autor*in: Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 207
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his actions. Preferences are linear-quadratic and the information structure is Gaussian. We construct linear Markov equilibria using belief states up to the sender's second-order belief. Because of the private monitoring, this state is an explicit function of the sender's past play, leading to a novel separation effect through the second-order belief channel. Applications to models of organizations and reputation are examined.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/262044
    Schriftenreihe: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; no. 994 (December 2021)
    Schlagworte: signaling; private monitoring; continuous time
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Consumer scores and price discrimination
    Autor*in: Bonatti, Alessandro; Cisternas, Gonzalo
    Erschienen: 19 June 2018
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 32 (13004)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP 13004
    Schlagworte: Preisdifferenzierung; Konsumentenverhalten; Bewertung; Signalling
    Umfang: 61 Seiten
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  3. Activist manipulation dynamics
    Autor*in: Cetemen, Doruk; Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron; Viswanathan, S.
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    Two activists with correlated private positions in a firm's stock, trade sequentially before simultaneously exerting effort that determines the firm's value. We document the existence of a novel linear equilibrium in which an activist's trades have... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 207
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Two activists with correlated private positions in a firm's stock, trade sequentially before simultaneously exerting effort that determines the firm's value. We document the existence of a novel linear equilibrium in which an activist's trades have positive sensitivity to her block size, but such orders are not zero on average: the leader activist manipulates the price to induce the follower to acquire a larger position and thus add more value. We examine the implications of this equilibrium for market outcomes and discuss its connection with the prominent phenomenon of "wolf-pack" activism-multiple hedge funds engaging in parallel with a target firm. We also explore the possibility of other equilibria where the activists trade against their initial positions.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/266114
    Schriftenreihe: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; no. 1030 (September 2022)
    Schlagworte: activism; insider trading; noisy signaling; price manipulation; hedge funds
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Misinformation in social media
    the role of verification incentives
    Autor*in: Cisternas, Gonzalo; Vásquez, Jorge
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    We develop a model of misinformation wherein users' decisions to verify and share news of unknown truthfulness interact with producers' choices to generate fake content as two sides of a market that balance to deliver an equilibrium prevalence and... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 207
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We develop a model of misinformation wherein users' decisions to verify and share news of unknown truthfulness interact with producers' choices to generate fake content as two sides of a market that balance to deliver an equilibrium prevalence and pass-through of fake news. We leverage the tractability of the model to examine the efficacy of various policies intended to combat misinformation that are in place currently, stressing how these may nontrivially interact with users' incentives: news verification is a costly activity. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of examining users' and producers' decisions jointly, as well as of evaluating how policies interact with one another. It also provides sensitivity measures that are key for policy evaluation.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/266112
    Schriftenreihe: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; no. 1028 (August 2022)
    Schlagworte: misinformation; news verification; social media
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen