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  1. The long-term effects of hedge fund activism
    Autor*in: Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Brav, Alon; Jiang, Wei
    Erschienen: 2015

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (21227)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; 21227
    Schlagworte: Hedgefonds; Anlageverhalten; Corporate Governance; Shareholder Value; Kapitalmarktrendite; myopic-activists claim
    Umfang: 82 S., graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  2. The untenable case for perpetual dual-class stock
    Autor*in: Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Kastiel, Kobi
    Erschienen: 04/2017
    Verlag:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    The desirability of a dual-class structure, which enables founders of public companies to retain a lock on control while holding a minority of the company's equity capital, has long been the subject of a heated debate. This debate has focused on... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The desirability of a dual-class structure, which enables founders of public companies to retain a lock on control while holding a minority of the company's equity capital, has long been the subject of a heated debate. This debate has focused on whether dual-class stock is an efficient capital structure that should be permitted at the time of initial public offering (“IPO”). By contrast, we focus on how the passage of time since the IPO can be expected to affect the efficiency of such a structure.Our analysis demonstrates that the potential advantages of dual-class structures (such as those resulting from founders' superior leadership skills) tend to recede, and the potential costs tend to rise, as time passes from the IPO. Furthermore, we show that controllers have perverse incentives to retain dual-class structures even when those structures become inefficient over time. Accordingly, even those who believe that dual-class structures are in many cases efficient at the time of the IPO should recognize the substantial risk that their efficiency may decline and disappear over time. Going forward, the debate should focus on the permissibility of finite-term dual-class structures — that is, structures that sunset after a fixed period of time (such as ten or fifteen years) unless their extension is approved by shareholders unaffiliated with the controller.We provide a framework for designing dual-class sunsets and address potential objections to their use. We also discuss the significant implications of our analysis for public officials, institutional investors, and researchers

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 905
    Schlagworte: corporations; dual-class; controlling shareholders; corporategovernance; agency costs; sunset
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten)
    Bemerkung(en):

    This paper is also Discussion Paper 2017-6 of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance
  3. Dancing with activists
    Autor*in: Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Brav, Alon; Jiang, Wei; Keusch, Thomas
    Erschienen: 04/2017
    Verlag:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This revision: April 2017
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 906
    Schlagworte: Corporate governance; hedge fund activism; activist settlements
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    This paper is also Discussion Paper 2017-7 of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance