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  1. Competitiveness of entrepreneurs and salaried workers
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Batsaikhan, Mongoljin; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs... mehr

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    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers, but that in the public condition this ordering is reversed. Data from a follow-up survey suggest that social image concerns of entrepreneurs and perceived norms can explain why entrepreneurs are more competitive when decisions are publicly observable. Our survey also reveals that more competitive entrepreneurs earn higher profits in their businesses.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/232921
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14169
    Schlagworte: ompetitiveness; entrepreneurs; salaried workers; profits; field behavior; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Competitiveness of entrepreneurs and salaried workers
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Batsaikhan, Mongoljin; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 62
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers, but that in the public condition this ordering is reversed. Data from a follow-up survey suggest that social image concerns of entrepreneurs and perceived norms can explain why entrepreneurs are more competitive when decisions are publicly observable. Our survey also reveals that more competitive entrepreneurs earn higher profits in their businesses.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0008-1913-7
    hdl: 10419/245970
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 4 March 2021
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2021, 7
    Schlagworte: Competitiveness; Entrepreneurs; Salaried Workers; Profits; Field Behavior; Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Conflict in the pool
    a field experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Faravelli, Marco; Sheremeta, Roman M.
    Erschienen: 9-1-2021
    Verlag:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: ESI working papers ; 21, 16
    Schlagworte: conflict; conflict resolution; field experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten)
  4. Predictably competitive?
    what faces can tell us about competitive behavior
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Grosskopf, Brit
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  University of Exeter, Business School, [Exeter]

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    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Department of Economics Discussion Papers ; paper number 21, 07
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten)
  5. Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: November 2020
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Credence goods markets – like for health care or repair services – with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that... mehr

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    Credence goods markets – like for health care or repair services – with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that considers both diagnostic uncertainty of sellers and the effects of insurance coverage of consumers in a unified framework. We test the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic uncertainty decreases the rate of efficient service provision and leads to less trade. In theory, insurance also decreases the rate of efficient service provision, but at the same time it also increases the volume of trade, leading to an ambiguous net effect on welfare. In the experiment, the net effect of insurance coverage on efficiency turns out to be positive. We also uncover an important interaction effect: if consumers are insured, experts invest less in diagnostic precision. We discuss policy implications of our results.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/229499
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8681 (2020)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: November 2020
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Credence goods markets - like for health care or repair services - with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that... mehr

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    Credence goods markets - like for health care or repair services - with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that considers both diagnostic uncertainty of sellers and the effects of insurance coverage of consumers in a unified framework. We test the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic uncertainty decreases the rate of efficient service provision and leads to less trade. In theory, insurance also decreases the rate of efficient service provision, but at the same time it also increases the volume of trade, leading to an ambiguous net effect on welfare. In the experiment, the net effect of insurance coverage on efficiency turns out to be positive. We also uncover an important interaction effect: if consumers are insured, experts invest less in diagnostic precision. We discuss policy implications of our results.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/227375
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 13848
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Ostracism and theft in heterogeneous groups
    Autor*in: Baier, Alexandra; Balafoutas, Loukas; Jaber-Lopez, Tarek
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Ostracism, or exclusion by peers, has been practiced since ancient times as a severe form of punishment against transgressors of laws or social norms. The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive analysis on how ostracism affects behavior... mehr

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    Ostracism, or exclusion by peers, has been practiced since ancient times as a severe form of punishment against transgressors of laws or social norms. The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive analysis on how ostracism affects behavior and the functioning of a social group. We present data from a laboratory experiment, in which participants face a social dilemma on how to allocate limited resources between a productive activity and theft, and are given the opportunity to exclude members of their group by means of majority voting. Our main treatment features an environment with heterogeneity in productivity within groups, thus creating inequalities in economic opportunities and income. We find that exclusion is an effective form of punishment and decreases theft by excluded members once they are re-admitted into the group. However, it also leads to some retaliation by low-productivity members. A particularly worrisome aspect of exclusion is that punished group members are stigmatized and have a higher probability of facing exclusion again. We discuss implications of our findings for penal systems and their capacity to rehabilitate prisoners.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/240447
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 22.06.2021
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 19
    Schlagworte: ostracism; social dilemma; theft; rehabilitation; heterogeneous groups
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Competitiveness of entrepreneurs and salaried workers
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Batsaikhan, Mongoljin; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs... mehr

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    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers, but that in the public condition this ordering is reversed. Data from a follow-up survey suggest that social image concerns of entrepreneurs and perceived norms can explain why entrepreneurs are more competitive when decisions are publicly observable. Our survey also reveals that more competitive entrepreneurs earn higher profits in their businesses.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/231494
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 4 March 2021
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 069
    Schlagworte: Competitiveness; Entrepreneurs; Salaried Workers; Profits; Field Behavior; Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Köln

    Credence goods markets – like for health care or repair services – with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that... mehr

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    Credence goods markets – like for health care or repair services – with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that considers both diagnostic uncertainty of sellers and the effects of insurance coverage of consumers in a unified framework. We test the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic uncertainty decreases the rate of efficient service provision and leads to less trade. In theory, insurance also decreases the rate of efficient service provision, but at the same time it also increases the volume of trade, leading to an ambiguous net effect on welfare. In the experiment, the net effect of insurance coverage on efficiency turns out to be positive. We also uncover an important interaction effect: if consumers are insured, experts invest less in diagnostic precision. We discuss policy implications of our results.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/226838
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 5 November 2020
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 038 (November 2020)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 81 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: November 2020
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Credence goods markets - like for health care or repair services - with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that... mehr

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    DS 62
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    Credence goods markets - like for health care or repair services - with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that considers both diagnostic uncertainty of sellers and the effects of insurance coverage of consumers in a unified framework. We test the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic uncertainty decreases the rate of efficient service provision and leads to less trade. In theory, insurance also decreases the rate of efficient service provision, but at the same time it also increases the volume of trade, leading to an ambiguous net effect on welfare. In the experiment, the net effect of insurance coverage on efficiency turns out to be positive. We also uncover an important interaction effect: if consumers are insured, experts invest less in diagnostic precision. We discuss policy implications of our results.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0007-57D2-A
    hdl: 10419/230981
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 5 November 2020
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2020, 26
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment
    Beteiligt: Balafoutas, Loukas (Mitwirkender); Kocher, Martin (Mitwirkender); Putterman, Louis G. (Mitwirkender); Sutter, Matthias (Mitwirkender)
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH, Bonn

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    Beteiligt: Balafoutas, Loukas (Mitwirkender); Kocher, Martin (Mitwirkender); Putterman, Louis G. (Mitwirkender); Sutter, Matthias (Mitwirkender)
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schlagworte: Soziale Ungleichheit; Rationalprinzip; Verteilungsgerechtigkeit; Entscheidungstheorie; Experiment
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)Soziale Ungleichheit; (stw)Rationalität; (stw)Verteilungsgerechtigkeit; (stw)Entscheidungstheorie; (stw)Experiment; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Online-Publikation; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Umfang: Online-Ressource
  12. What drives taxi drivers?
    a field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods
    Beteiligt: Balafoutas, Loukas (Mitwirkender)
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich

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    Beteiligt: Balafoutas, Loukas (Mitwirkender)
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; No. 3461 : Category 13, Behavioural economics
    Schlagworte: Taxiverkehr; Betrug; Vertrauensgut; Asymmetrische Information; Feldforschung
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)Taxigewerbe; (stw)Betrug; (stw)Vertrauensgüter; (stw)Asymmetrische Information; (stw)Feldforschung; (stw)Athen; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Umfang: 41 S., Ill., graph. Darst., Kt., 21 cm
    Bemerkung(en):

    Literaturangaben. - Zusätzliches Online-Angebot unter www.SSRN.com, www.RePEc.org und www.CESifo-group.org/wp
  13. What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods
    Beteiligt: Balafoutas, Loukas (Mitwirkender); Beck, Adrian (Mitwirkender); Kerschbamer, Rudolf (Mitwirkender); Sutter, Matthias (Mitwirkender)
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH, Bonn

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    Beteiligt: Balafoutas, Loukas (Mitwirkender); Beck, Adrian (Mitwirkender); Kerschbamer, Rudolf (Mitwirkender); Sutter, Matthias (Mitwirkender)
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: IZA Discussion Papers ; 5700
    Schlagworte: Taxiverkehr; Betrug; Vertrauensgut; Asymmetrische Information; Feldforschung
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)Taxigewerbe; (stw)Betrug; (stw)Vertrauensgüter; (stw)Asymmetrische Information; (stw)Feldforschung; (stw)Athen; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Umfang: Online-Ressource
  14. Gender, competition and the efficiency of policy interventions
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH, Bonn

  15. How uncertainty and ambiguity in tournaments affect gender differences in competitive behavior
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: May 2019
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets. Yet, the number of tournament winners is often unclear to competitors. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field, it can be... mehr

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    Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets. Yet, the number of tournament winners is often unclear to competitors. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field, it can be studied in a controlled lab experiment. We present a novel experiment where subjects can compete against each other, but the number of winners is either uncertain (but with known probabilities) or ambiguous (with unknown probabilities for different numbers of winners). We compare these two conditions to a control treatment with a known number of winners. We find that ambiguity induces a significant increase in the performance of men who choose to compete, while we observe no change for women. Men also increase their willingness to enter competition in the presence of ambiguity. Overall, both effects contribute to men winning the tournament significantly more often than women under uncertainty and ambiguity. These findings suggest that management should make tournament conditions transparent and information available in order to prevent gender disparities from increasing under uncertainty and ambiguity.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0003-9CDA-8
    hdl: 10419/204707
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2019, 9
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. How uncertainty and ambiguity in tournaments affect gender differences in competitive behavior
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: May 2019
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets. Yet, the number of tournament winners is often unclear to competitors. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field, it can be... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets. Yet, the number of tournament winners is often unclear to competitors. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field, it can be studied in a controlled lab experiment. We present a novel experiment where subjects can compete against each other, but the number of winners is either uncertain (but with known probabilities) or ambiguous (with unknown probabilities for different numbers of winners). We compare these two conditions to a control treatment with a known number of winners. We find that ambiguity induces a significant increase in the performance of men who choose to compete, while we observe no change for women. Men also increase their willingness to enter competition in the presence of ambiguity. Overall, both effects contribute to men winning the tournament significantly more often than women under uncertainty and ambiguity. These findings suggest that management should make tournament conditions transparent and information available in order to prevent gender disparities from increasing under uncertainty and ambiguity.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/202694
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 12348
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Credence goods in the literature
    what the past fifteen years have taught us about fraud, incentives, and the role of institutions
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    We review the literature on credence goods since Dulleck and Kerschbamer (Journal of Economic Literature 44(1), 5-42, 2006). We consider various markets for credence goods and briefly discuss evidence on the extent of fraud. We then review... mehr

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    We review the literature on credence goods since Dulleck and Kerschbamer (Journal of Economic Literature 44(1), 5-42, 2006). We consider various markets for credence goods and briefly discuss evidence on the extent of fraud. We then review theoretical and empirical contributions on the determinants of seller and consumer behavior in markets for credence goods. The topics include informational asymmetries, pro-social motivations and seller characteristics, as well as several features of the market structure and institutional environment (separation of diagnosis and treatment, liability, verifiability, reputational concerns, competition between experts and second opinions). We also describe recent developments in this area of research (such as the role of investing in more precise diagnostic technologies) and offer an outlook on future questions.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/238225
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: February 1, 2020
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2020, 01
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten)
  18. Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Credence goods markets - like health care or repair services - with their informational asymmetries between expert sellers and uninformed customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. Only little is known... mehr

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    Credence goods markets - like health care or repair services - with their informational asymmetries between expert sellers and uninformed customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. Only little is known so far about how diagnostic uncertainty of sellers affects market outcomes, and how one widespread feature of such markets, insurance on the customer side, interacts with the degree of diagnostic uncertainty. We present a model that analyzes the effects of both diagnostic uncertainty and insurance in a unified framework and we test the model's predictions in lab experiments. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic uncertainty increases the rate of incorrect service provision and leads to less trade, thus reducing efficiency. In theory, insurance also increases the provision of incorrect services, but at the same time it also increases the volume of trade leading to an ambiguous net effect on welfare. In the experiments the net effect of insurance coverage on efficiency turns out to be negative. We also find an important interaction effect: if consumers are insured, experts invest less in diagnostic precision.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/238245
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 5 November 2020
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2020, 21
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: October 2023
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, [Bonn]

    In markets for credence goods – such as health care or repair services – fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts’ provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i)... mehr

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    In markets for credence goods – such as health care or repair services – fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts’ provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii) insurance coverage of consumers; (iii) malpractice payments for treatment failure; and (vi) consumer-regarding preferences of experts. Diagnostic imprecision unambiguously leads to less efficient provision. Insurance coverage and malpractice payments have an ambiguous effect on efficient provision. The impact of consumer-regarding preferences on efficiency is positive without insurance but ambiguous in the presence of insurance.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283299
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 29 September 2023
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 257
    Schlagworte: Credence goods; diagnostic uncertainty; insurance coverage; social preferences
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Serving consumers in an uncertain world
    a credence goods experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: October 2023
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, [Bonn]

    Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 711
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    Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by sellers and the trading decisions by consumers. Our results reveal that diagnostic uncertainty is a major source of inefficiency by decreasing efficient service provision. Insurance coverage has a positive net effect on market efficiency, despite making information acquisition and efficient service provision less likely. We also examine the role of -s and of sellers’ prosociality in shaping service provision and information acquisition.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283300
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 3 October 2023
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 258
    Schlagworte: Credence goods; diagnostic uncertainty; insurance coverage; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i)... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 395
    Fernleihe:
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    In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii) insurance coverage of consumers; (iii) malpractice payments for treatment failure; and (vi) consumer-regarding preferences of experts. Diagnostic imprecision unambiguously leads to less efficient provision. Insurance coverage and malpractice payments have an ambiguous effect on efficient provision. The impact of consumer-regarding preferences on efficiency is positive without insurance but ambiguous in the presence of insurance.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283396
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 29 September 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2023, 14
    Schlagworte: Credence goods; diagnostic uncertainty; insurance coverage; social preferences
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Serving consumers in an uncertain world
    a credence goods experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 395
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by sellers and the trading decisions by consumers. Our results reveal that diagnostic uncertainty is a major source of inefficiency by decreasing efficient service provision. Insurance coverage has a positive net effect on market efficiency, despite making information acquisition and efficient service provision less likely. We also examine the role of -s and of sellers' prosociality in shaping service provision and information acquisition.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283397
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 30 September 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2023, 15
    Schlagworte: Credence goods; diagnostic uncertainty; insurance coverage; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Serving consumers in an uncertain world
    a credence goods experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: October 2023
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the... mehr

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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 62
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by sellers and the trading decisions by consumers. Our results reveal that diagnostic uncertainty is a major source of inefficiency by decreasing efficient service provision. Insurance coverage has a positive net effect on market efficiency, despite making information acquisition and efficient service provision less likely. We also examine the role of -s and of sellers' prosociality in shaping service provision and information acquisition.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-000D-C226-D
    hdl: 10419/283134
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 3 October 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2023, 11
    Schlagworte: Credence goods; diagnostic uncertainty; insurance coverage; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Tverdostup, Maryna
    Erschienen: September 2023
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i)... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 62
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii) insurance coverage of consumers; (iii) malpractice payments for treatment failure; and (vi) consumer-regarding preferences of experts. Diagnostic imprecision unambiguously leads to less efficient provision. Insurance coverage and malpractice payments have an ambiguous effect on efficient provision. The impact of consumer-regarding preferences on efficiency is positive without insurance but ambiguous in the presence of insurance.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-000D-C219-C
    hdl: 10419/283135
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 29 September 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2023, 12
    Schlagworte: Credence goods; diagnostic uncertainty; insurance coverage; social preferences
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Gender, competition and the efficiency of policy interventions
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Univ. of Innsbruck, Inst. für Finanzwiss., Innsbruck

    Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition... mehr

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    DS 395 (2010,12)
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    Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition unless a critical number of female winners is reached. We find that Quotas and Preferential Treatment encourage women to compete significantly more often than in a control treatment, while efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners is not worse. The level of cooperation in a post-competition teamwork task is even higher with successful policy interventions. Hence, policy measures promoting women can have a double dividend. -- competition ; gender gap ; experiment ; affirmative action ; teamwork ; coordination

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/73518
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 10 May 2010
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2010-12
    Schlagworte: Verhaltensökonomik; Wettbewerb; Geschlecht; Frauenpolitik; Arbeitsgruppe; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S.), graph. Darst.