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  1. Distributional preferences and competitive behavior
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  Univ. of Innsbruck, Inst. für Finanzwiss., Innsbruck

    We study experimentally the relationship between distributional preferences and competitive behavior. We find that spiteful subjects react strongest to competitive pressure and win in a tournament significantly more often than efficiency-minded and... mehr

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    We study experimentally the relationship between distributional preferences and competitive behavior. We find that spiteful subjects react strongest to competitive pressure and win in a tournament significantly more often than efficiency-minded and inequality averse subjects. However, when given the choice between a tournament and a piece rate scheme, efficiency-minded subjects choose the tournament most often, while spiteful and inequality averse subjects avoid it. When controlling for distributional preferences, risk attitudes and past performance, the gender gap in the willingness to compete is no longer significant, indicating that gender-related variables explain why twice as many men as women self-select into competition. -- competition ; distributional preferences ; gender gap

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/73492
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2011-04
    Schlagworte: Wettbewerbsverhalten; Verteilungsfunktion; Geschlechtsunterschied;
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (28 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. How much income redistribution?
    an explanation based on vote-buying and corruption
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Univ. of Innsbruck, Inst. für Finanzwiss., Innsbruck

    This paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture. A model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In... mehr

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    This paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture. A model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption. When rich voters can bribe the government, an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible. The link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data; the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model. -- tax rates ; vote-buying ; lobbying ; government corruption

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/73477
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: December 21, 2009
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2009-29
    Schlagworte: Umverteilung; Interessenpolitik; Einkommensteuertarif; Korruption; Wahlverhalten; Neue politische Ökonomie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (34 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Norm enforcement in the city
    a natural field experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Nikiforakis, Nikos
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  Univ. of Melbourne, Dep. of Economics, Melbourne

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
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    ISBN: 9780734044860
    Schriftenreihe: Research paper / The University of Melbourne, Department of Economics ; 1133
    Schlagworte: Soziale Norm; Soziales Verhalten; Altruismus; Kooperation; Athen; Griechenland; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (24 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. Distributional preferences and competitive behavior
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  Dep. of Economics (Inst. für Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte), Innsbruck ; Dep. of Public Finance (Inst. für Finanzwiss.) ; Dep. of Statistics (Inst. für Statistik)

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2011,04
    Schlagworte: Wettbewerbsverhalten; Verteilungsfunktion; Geschlechtsunterschied;
    Umfang: 28 S., 1 graph. Darst
    Bemerkung(en):

    Literaturverz. S. 16 - 18

    Erhältl. bei: Inst. für Finanzwiss., A-6020 Innsbruck, Universitätsstraße 15
  5. Norm enforcement in the city
    a natural field experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Nikiforakis, Nikos
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Univ. of Innsbruck, Inst. für Finanzwiss., Innsbruck

    Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that many individuals are willing to use costly punishment to enforce social norms, even in one-shot interactions. However, there appears to be little evidence in the literature of such... mehr

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    Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that many individuals are willing to use costly punishment to enforce social norms, even in one-shot interactions. However, there appears to be little evidence in the literature of such behavior in the field. We study the propensity to punish norm violators in a natural field experiment conducted in the main subway station in Athens, Greece. The large number of passengers ensures that strategic motives for punishing are minimized. We study violations of two distinct efficiency enhancing social norms. In line with laboratory evidence, we find that individuals punish norm violators. Men are more likely than women to punish violators, while the decision to punish is unaffected by the violator's height and gender. Interestingly, we find that violations of the better known of the two norms are substantially less likely to trigger punishment. We present additional evidence from two surveys providing insights into the determinants of norm enforcement. -- norm enforcement ; social norms ; field experiment ; altruistic punishment ; cooperation

     
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    hdl: 10419/73860
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2012-12
    Schlagworte: Soziale Norm; Soziales Verhalten; Altruismus; Kooperation; Athen; Griechenland; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (26 S.), graph. Darst.
  6. Sabotage in tournaments
    evidence from a natural experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Univ. of Innsbruck, Inst. für Finanzwiss., Innsbruck

    Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage... mehr

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    Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule change in 2009 basically constituted a natural experiment that introduced one costless opportunity for sabotage. In Judo, competitors can break an opponent's attack in an unsportsmanlike manner; these are seen as acts of sabotage. Based on a unique dataset of 1,422 fights, we find that the rule change in 2009 has led to a large increase in the use of sabotage. Moreover, sabotage is more likely to be employed by relatively less qualified individuals, and to be targeted at more qualified ones. From a survey among spectators, we show that sabotage is welfare-reducing. -- tournaments ; sabotage ; Judo ; natural experiment

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/73485
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 26th January 2012
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2012-01
    Schlagworte: Extensives Spiel; Feldforschung; Sport
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (25 S.), graph. Darst.
  7. Second-degree moral hazard in a real-world credence goods market
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call... mehr

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    Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply side in a market to react to anticipated moral hazard on the demand side by increasing the extent or the price of the service. In the market for taxi rides, our moral hazard manipulation consists of some passengers explicitly stating that their expenses will be reimbursed by their employer. This has an economically important and statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of overcharging, with passengers in that treatment being about 13% more likely to pay higher-than-justified prices for a given ride. This indicates that second-degree moral hazard may have a substantial impact on service provision in a credence goods market.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/89685
    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 16 October 2013
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 4458
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (28 S.), Ill., graph. Darst.
  8. Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a Real-World Credence Goods Market
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  Univ. of Innsbruck, Inst. für Finanzwiss., Innsbruck

    Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call... mehr

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    Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard - the tendency of the supply side in a market to react to anticipated moral hazard on the demand side by increasing the extent or the price of the service. In the market for taxi rides, our moral hazard manipulation consists of some passengers explicitly stating that their expenses will be reimbursed by their employer. This has an economically important and statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of overcharging, with passengers in that treatment being about 13% more likely to pay higher-than-justified prices for a given ride. This indicates that second-degree moral hazard may have a substantial impact on service provision in a credence goods market.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/101105
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 16 October 2013
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2013-26
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (28 S.), Ill., graph. Darst.
  9. Second-degree moral hazard in a real-world credence goods market
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call... mehr

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    Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard - the tendency of the supply side in a market to react to anticipated moral hazard on the demand side by increasing the extent or the price of the service. In the market for taxi rides, our moral hazard manipulation consists of some passengers explicitly stating that their expenses will be reimbursed by their employer. This has an economically important and statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of overcharging, with passengers in that treatment being about 13% more likely to pay higher-than-justified prices for a given ride. This indicates that second-degree moral hazard may have a substantial impact on service provision in a credence goods market.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/89868
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 7714
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (28 S.), Ill., graph. Darst.
  10. How do third parties matter?
    theory and evidence in a dynamic psychological game
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Dep. of Economics (Inst. für Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte), Innsbruck ; Dep. of Public Finance (Inst. für Finanzwiss.) ; Dep. of Statistics (Inst. für Statistik)

    Literaturverz. S. 30 - 31 mehr

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    Literaturverz. S. 30 - 31

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2009,01
    Schlagworte: Spieltheorie; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Experiment; Theorie
    Umfang: 37 S., graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erhältl. bei: Inst. für Finanzwiss., A-6020 Innsbruck, Universitätsstraße 15
  11. Gender, competition and the efficiency of policy interventions
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition... mehr

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    Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition unless a critical number of female winners is reached. We find that Quotas and Preferential Treatment encourage women to compete significantly more often than in a control treatment, while efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners is not worse. The level of cooperation in a post-competition teamwork task is even higher with successful policy interventions. Hence, policy measures promoting women can have a double dividend. -- Competition ; gender gap ; experiment ; affirmative action ; teamwork ; coordination

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/36894
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 4955
    Schlagworte: Verhaltensökonomik; Wettbewerb; Geschlecht; Frauenpolitik; Arbeitsgruppe; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S.), graph. Darst.
  12. How much income redistribution?
    an explanation based on vote-buying and corruption
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Dep. of Economics (Inst. für Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte), Innsbruck ; Dep. of Public Finance (Inst. für Finanzwiss.) ; Dep. of Statistics (Inst. für Statistik)

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2009,29
    Schlagworte: Umverteilung; Interessenpolitik; Einkommensteuertarif; Korruption; Wahlverhalten; Neue politische Ökonomie
    Umfang: 34 S., graph. Darst.
  13. Gender, competition and the efficiency of policy intervention
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Dep. of Economics, Göteborg Univ., Göteborg

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    hdl: 2077/22369
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics / Department of Economics, Göteborg University ; 450
    Schlagworte: Verhaltensökonomik; Wettbewerb; Geschlecht; Frauenpolitik; Arbeitsgruppe; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressoure (35 S., 208 KB)
  14. Gender, competition and the efficiency of policy interventions
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Dep. of Economics (Inst. für Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte), Innsbruck ; Dep. of Public Finance (Inst. für Finanzwiss.) ; Dep. of Statistics (Inst. für Statistik)

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2010,12
    Schlagworte: Verhaltensökonomik; Wettbewerb; Geschlecht; Frauenpolitik; Arbeitsgruppe; Experiment
    Umfang: 33 S., graph. Darst.
  15. Norm enforcement in the city
    a natural field experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Nikiforakis, Nikos
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Dep. of Economics (Inst. für Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte), Innsbruck ; Dep. of Public Finance (Inst. für Finanzwiss.) ; Dep. of Statistics (Inst. für Statistik)

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2012,12
    Schlagworte: Soziale Norm; Soziales Verhalten; Altruismus; Kooperation; Athen; Griechenland; Experiment
    Umfang: 26 S., graph. Darst.
  16. Sabotage in tournaments
    evidence from a natural experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Dep. of Economics (Inst. für Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte), Innsbruck ; Dep. of Public Finance (Inst. für Finanzwiss.) ; Dep. of Statistics (Inst. für Statistik)

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2012,01
    Schlagworte: Extensives Spiel; Feldforschung; Sport
    Umfang: 25 S., graph. Darst.
  17. Sabotage in tournaments
    evidence from a natural experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule change in 2009 basically constituted a natural experiment that introduced one costless opportunity for sabotage. In Judo, competitors can break an opponent's attack in an unsportsmanlike manner; these are seen as acts of sabotage. Based on a unique dataset of 1,422 fights, we find that the rule change in 2009 has led to a large increase in the use of sabotage. Moreover, sabotage is more likely to be employed by relatively less qualified individuals, and to be targeted at more qualified ones. From a survey among spectators, we show that sabotage is welfare-reducing. -- tournaments ; sabotage ; Judo ; natural experiment

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/58661
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 6316
    Schlagworte: Extensives Spiel; Feldforschung; Sport
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S., 275,27 KB), graph. Darst.
  18. Second-degree moral hazard in a real-world credence goods market
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  Europ. Univ. Inst., Badia Fiesolana

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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 1814/28598
    Schriftenreihe: EUI working papers / ECO ; 2013/08
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (28 S.), Ill., graph. Darst.
  19. The limits of guilt
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena
    Erschienen: 2016
    Verlag:  Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck

    According to the theory of guilt aversion, agents suffer a psychological cost whenever they fall short of other people's expectations. In this paper we suggest that there may be limits to this kind of motivation. We present evidence from an... mehr

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    According to the theory of guilt aversion, agents suffer a psychological cost whenever they fall short of other people's expectations. In this paper we suggest that there may be limits to this kind of motivation. We present evidence from an experimental dictator game showing that dictators display behavior consistent with guilt aversion for relatively low levels of recipient expectations, roughly up to the point where the recipient expects half of the available surplus. Beyond that point the relationship between expectations and transfers becomes negative. We argue that this non-monotonicity can help explain why the economic literature on guilt aversion offers conflicting findings on the relationship between expectations and behavior. Moreover, we examine this relationship at the individual level and establish a typology of subjects depending on how and whether they condition their behavior on recipient expectations. Our evidence is consistent with a simple theoretical model of guilt aversion.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/146126
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 25 April 2016
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2016-09
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Affirmative action or just discrimination?
    a study on the endogenous emergence of quotas
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Davis, Brent J.; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2016
    Verlag:  Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck

    Affirmative action rules are often implemented to promote women on labor markets. Little is known, however, about how and whether such rules emerge endogenously in groups of potentially affected subjects. We experimentally investigate whether... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 395 (2016,10)
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    Affirmative action rules are often implemented to promote women on labor markets. Little is known, however, about how and whether such rules emerge endogenously in groups of potentially affected subjects. We experimentally investigate whether subjects vote for affirmative action rules, against, or abstain. If approved by the vote, a quota rule is implemented that favors women in one treatment, but members of an artificially created group based on random color assignment in another treatment. We find that quota rules based on gender are implemented frequently and do not affect the performance of men and women in a contest. Quota rules based on an arbitrary criterion, however, are less often approved and lead to strong individual reactions of advantaged and disadvantaged group members and to efficiency losses. These results show that the effects of affirmative action policies largely depend on whether these policies are viewed favorably within the affected groups.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/146127
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 16 February 2016
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2016-10
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Trust and communication in a property rights dilemma
    Autor*in: Ahn, T. K.; Balafoutas, Loukas; Batsaikhan, Mongoljin; Campos-Ortiz, Francisco; Putterman, Louis G.; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: [2016]
    Verlag:  [Brown University, Department of Economics], [Providence, RI]

    We study a laboratory social dilemma game in which incentives to steal from others lead to the socially inefficient diversion of resources from production unless the members of a given mini-society can abide by norms of non-theft or engage in low... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 171 (2016,5)
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    We study a laboratory social dilemma game in which incentives to steal from others lead to the socially inefficient diversion of resources from production unless the members of a given mini-society can abide by norms of non-theft or engage in low cost collective protection of their members' wealth accumulations. We compare two treatments in which subjects have opportunities to exchange free-form messages to one without such opportunities, finding that most subjects allocate far less to theft and most groups achieve much greater efficiency in the presence of communication. Ease of identifying who has engaged in theft varies across the two communication treatments, but is of minor importance to the outcome. We find several coding-amenable elements of message content to be statistically significant predictors of group and individual outcomes.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/162755
    Schriftenreihe: [Working papers] / [Brown University, Department of Economics] ; 2016-5
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Incentives for dishonesty
    an experimental study with internal auditors
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Czermak, Simon; Eulerich, Marc; Fornwagner, Helena
    Erschienen: 2017-04
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    This study examines experimentally how dishonest behavior in the form of misreporting others' performance depends on the nature of provided incentives. We conduct a 'lab in the field' experiment with internal auditors during two large conferences in... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 395 (2017,06)
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    This study examines experimentally how dishonest behavior in the form of misreporting others' performance depends on the nature of provided incentives. We conduct a 'lab in the field' experiment with internal auditors during two large conferences in Germany and evaluate their performance and objectivity, measured as the extent to which they truthfully report the performance of other participants in a real-effort task. It has been suggested in the literature that incentive-pay compensation for auditors has the potential to lead to dishonest behavior on their part, for instance when their payoff depends on the performance of the unit that they are auditing. We vary incentives in the experiment from individual (piece rate) to competitive (tournament against another auditor) and collective (based on performance within a team). In line with our hypotheses, we find that incentive-based compensation increases dishonest behavior among internal auditors: competitive incentives lead to under-reporting of other participants' performance, while collective incentives lead to over-reporting of performance.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/180157
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 20 April 2017
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2017, 06
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Univ. of Innsbruck, Inst. für Finanzwiss., Innsbruck

    This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat,... mehr

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    DS 395 (2009,1)
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    This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived public beliefs, when these are constant and when they are allowed to vary over time. With time-varying beliefs, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are updated fast. -- psychological games ; corruption ; bureaucracy ; guilt ; third party

     
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/73498
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: November 10th, 2010
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2009-01
    Schlagworte: Korruption; Wiederholte Spiele
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (18 S.)
  24. How uncertainty and ambiguity in tournaments affect gender differences in competitive behavior
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Davis, Brent J.; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: September 12, 2017
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets, in particular with respect to promotions. Yet, it is often unclear to competitors how many winners there will be or how many applicants compete in the tournament. While it is hard to measure how this... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 62 (2017,18)
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    Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets, in particular with respect to promotions. Yet, it is often unclear to competitors how many winners there will be or how many applicants compete in the tournament. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field, it can be studied in a controlled lab experiment. We present a novel experiment where subjects can compete against each other, but where the number of winners is either uncertain (i.e., unknown numbers of winners, but known probabilities) or ambiguous (unknown probabilities for different numbers of winners). We compare these two conditions with a control treatment with a known number of winners. We find that ambiguity induces a significant increase in performance of men, while we observe no change for women. Both men and women increase their willingness to enter competition with uncertainty and ambiguity, but men react slightly more than women. Overall, both effects contribute to men winning the tournament significantly more often than women under uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence, previous experiments on gender differences in competition may have measured a lower bound of differences between men and women.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/174497
    Schriftenreihe: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2017, 18
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. How uncertainty and ambiguity in tournaments affect gender differences in competitive behavior
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Davis, Brent J.; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: September 12, 2017
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets, in particular with respect to promotions. Yet, it is often unclear to competitors how many winners there will be or how many applicants compete in the tournament. While it is hard to measure how this... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 395 (2017,20)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets, in particular with respect to promotions. Yet, it is often unclear to competitors how many winners there will be or how many applicants compete in the tournament. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field, it can be studied in a controlled lab experiment. We present a novel experiment where subjects can compete against each other, but where the number of winners is either uncertain (i.e., unknown numbers of winners, but known probabilities) or ambiguous (unknown probabilities for different numbers of winners). We compare these two conditions with a control treatment with a known number of winners. We find that ambiguity induces a significant increase in performance of men, while we observe no change for women. Both men and women increase their willingness to enter competition with uncertainty and ambiguity, but men react slightly more than women. Overall, both effects contribute to men winning the tournament significantly more often than women under uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence, previous experiments on gender differences in competition may have measured a lower bound of differences between men and women.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/180170
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2017, 20
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen