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  1. Competitiveness of entrepreneurs and salaried workers
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Batsaikhan, Mongoljin; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers, but that in the public condition this ordering is reversed. Data from a follow-up survey suggest that social image concerns of entrepreneurs and perceived norms can explain why entrepreneurs are more competitive when decisions are publicly observable. Our survey also reveals that more competitive entrepreneurs earn higher profits in their businesses.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/232921
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14169
    Schlagworte: ompetitiveness; entrepreneurs; salaried workers; profits; field behavior; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Competitiveness of entrepreneurs and salaried workers
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Batsaikhan, Mongoljin; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 62
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers, but that in the public condition this ordering is reversed. Data from a follow-up survey suggest that social image concerns of entrepreneurs and perceived norms can explain why entrepreneurs are more competitive when decisions are publicly observable. Our survey also reveals that more competitive entrepreneurs earn higher profits in their businesses.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0008-1913-7
    hdl: 10419/245970
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 4 March 2021
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2021, 7
    Schlagworte: Competitiveness; Entrepreneurs; Salaried Workers; Profits; Field Behavior; Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Conflict in the pool
    a field experiment
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Faravelli, Marco; Sheremeta, Roman M.
    Erschienen: 9-1-2021
    Verlag:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: ESI working papers ; 21, 16
    Schlagworte: conflict; conflict resolution; field experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten)
  4. Predictably competitive?
    what faces can tell us about competitive behavior
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Grosskopf, Brit
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  University of Exeter, Business School, [Exeter]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Department of Economics Discussion Papers ; paper number 21, 07
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten)
  5. Ostracism and theft in heterogeneous groups
    Autor*in: Baier, Alexandra; Balafoutas, Loukas; Jaber-Lopez, Tarek
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Ostracism, or exclusion by peers, has been practiced since ancient times as a severe form of punishment against transgressors of laws or social norms. The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive analysis on how ostracism affects behavior... mehr

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    DS 395
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Ostracism, or exclusion by peers, has been practiced since ancient times as a severe form of punishment against transgressors of laws or social norms. The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive analysis on how ostracism affects behavior and the functioning of a social group. We present data from a laboratory experiment, in which participants face a social dilemma on how to allocate limited resources between a productive activity and theft, and are given the opportunity to exclude members of their group by means of majority voting. Our main treatment features an environment with heterogeneity in productivity within groups, thus creating inequalities in economic opportunities and income. We find that exclusion is an effective form of punishment and decreases theft by excluded members once they are re-admitted into the group. However, it also leads to some retaliation by low-productivity members. A particularly worrisome aspect of exclusion is that punished group members are stigmatized and have a higher probability of facing exclusion again. We discuss implications of our findings for penal systems and their capacity to rehabilitate prisoners.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/240447
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 22.06.2021
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 19
    Schlagworte: ostracism; social dilemma; theft; rehabilitation; heterogeneous groups
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Competitiveness of entrepreneurs and salaried workers
    Autor*in: Balafoutas, Loukas; Batsaikhan, Mongoljin; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 711
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers, but that in the public condition this ordering is reversed. Data from a follow-up survey suggest that social image concerns of entrepreneurs and perceived norms can explain why entrepreneurs are more competitive when decisions are publicly observable. Our survey also reveals that more competitive entrepreneurs earn higher profits in their businesses.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/231494
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 4 March 2021
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 069
    Schlagworte: Competitiveness; Entrepreneurs; Salaried Workers; Profits; Field Behavior; Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen