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  1. Cloturing deliberation
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Safronov, Mikhail
    Erschienen: February, 2021
    Verlag:  University of Luxemborg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10993/46112
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2021, 03
    Schlagworte: Cloture; deliberation; obstruction; pivots; political failure; stability; voting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten)
  2. The politics of bargaining as a group
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter
    Erschienen: December 2023
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the 'agent') in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over... mehr

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    We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the 'agent') in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent's resolve. We show that all group members favor more aggressive proposals than they would if they were negotiating alone. By eliciting more information about the agent's resolve, these offers reduce the group members' uncertainty about the agent's preferences and therefore reduce the group's internal conflicts over its negotiating strategy. To mitigate the consequent risk that negotiations fail, decisive group members successively give up their influence over proposals: starting from any initially democratic decision process, the group eventually consolidates its entire negotiation authority into the hands of a single member.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282511
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10823 (2023)
    Schlagworte: adverse selection; collective choice; political economy; dictatorship; bargaining
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The politics of bargaining as a group
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter
    Erschienen: Nov. 2023
    Verlag:  University of Luxemborg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

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    hdl: 10993/57657
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2023, 12
    Schlagworte: Adverse selection; collective choice; political economy; dictatorship; bargaining
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten)
  4. Policy experimentation, redistribution and voting rules
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Bowen, T. Renee
    Erschienen: 20 March 2018
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP 12797
    Schlagworte: Politische Reform; Gruppenentscheidung; Umverteilung; Abstimmungsregel; Veto; Verhandlungstheorie; Theorie
    Umfang: 70 Seiten
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  5. Dynamic legislative policy making under adverse selection
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent
    Erschienen: August 2018
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    This paper develops a dynamic model of legislative policy making with evolving, privately observed policy preferences. Our goal is to find conditions under which decision rules, which assign feasible policies based on the legislators' preferences,... mehr

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    This paper develops a dynamic model of legislative policy making with evolving, privately observed policy preferences. Our goal is to find conditions under which decision rules, which assign feasible policies based on the legislators' preferences, are sustainable in the long run. We show that under some mild conditions, every decision rule that would be implementable with monetary transfers can be approximately sustained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the dynamic model. In this equilibrium, the legislators receive payoffs arbitrarily close to those they would obtain if they could commit ex ante to truthfully apply the decision rule in every period. An application of our result yields a dynamic issue-by-issue median voter theorem in the vein of Baron's (1996) for a spatial framework with incomplete information.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/200427
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2018, 08
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Policy experimentation, redistribution and voting rules
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Bowen, T. Renee
    Erschienen: August 2018
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    We study conditions under which optimal policy experimentation can be implemented by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose to implement either a risky reform or a safe alternative with known returns each... mehr

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    We study conditions under which optimal policy experimentation can be implemented by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose to implement either a risky reform or a safe alternative with known returns each period. We find that when no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When committee members are allowed to redistribute resources (even arbitrarily small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule with no veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than constraints on redistribution.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/200428
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2018, 09
    Schlagworte: Politische Reform; Gruppenentscheidung; Umverteilung; Abstimmungsregel; Veto; Verhandlungstheorie; Theorie
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten)
  7. Policy experimentation, redistribution and voting rules
    Autor*in: Bowen, T. Renee; Anesi, Vincent
    Erschienen: September 2018
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 25033
    Schlagworte: Politische Reform; Gruppenentscheidung; Umverteilung; Abstimmungsregel; Veto; Verhandlungstheorie; Theorie
    Umfang: 70 Seiten
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  8. Party formation and racism
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; De Donder, Philippe
    Erschienen: 2007
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 6281
    Schlagworte: Politische Willensbildung; Wahlverhalten; Politische Partei; Ideologie; Einkommen; Ethnische Diskriminierung; Wirtschaftsmodell; Elections; Political parties; Racism; Representative government and representation
    Umfang: 28, [2] S., graph. Darst.
  9. Secondary issues and party politics
    an application to environmental policy
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; De Donder, Philippe
    Erschienen: 2008
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 6774
    Schlagworte: Wirtschaftspolitik; Umverteilung; Umweltpolitik; Politische Partei; Politisches Ziel; Parteipolitik; Spieltheorie
    Umfang: 32 [2] S., graph. Darst.
  10. Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Univ. of Rochester, Rochester Center for Economic Research, Rochester, NY

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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Rochester Center for Economic Research ; 551
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, (15 S.)
  11. Redistribution in the open economy
    a political economy approach
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Kreickemeier, Udo
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, Nottingham

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    Schriftenreihe: Research paper / Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy ; 2009,25 : Globalisation, productivity and technology
    Schlagworte: Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen; Außenwirtschaftspolitik; Medianwähler-Modell; Einkommensteuertarif; Zoll; Soziale Ungleichheit; Umverteilung; Zwei-Länder-Modell
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 27 S.), graph. Darst.
  12. Optimal delegation with a finite number of states
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    This paper contributes to the literature on optimal delegation, dating back to Holmstrom's (1984) seminal work. In contrast to models in the Holmstrom tradition, we assume that the set of states is finite. We provide a full characterization of the... mehr

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    This paper contributes to the literature on optimal delegation, dating back to Holmstrom's (1984) seminal work. In contrast to models in the Holmstrom tradition, we assume that the set of states is finite. We provide a full characterization of the class of optimal delegation sets under this assumption, and show that they have a different structure from that in the continuous-state model. As the number of states tends to infinity, however, every optimal delegation set converges to that of Holmstrom (1984). We also show that, for intermediate bias, the Ally Principal fails for small changes in bias, the Uncertainty Principle may fail, and the principal prefers to appoint an amateur agent. -- Optimal delegation ; finite states ; Ally Principle ; Uncertainty Principle ; expertise

     
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    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper ; 2009,20
    Schlagworte: Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit; Zustandsraummodell
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 46 S.)
  13. Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then... mehr

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    We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which can be implemented from any initial default in a pure strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multi-dimensional and infinite policy spaces. Minimumwinning coalitions may not form, and the set of equilibrium policies may be unaffected by a change in the set of proposers. The set of stable policies (which are implemented, once reached as default) forms a weakly stable set; and conversely, any weakly stable set is supported by some equilibrium. If the policy space is well ordered then the committee implements the ideal policy of the last proposer in a subset of a weakly stable set. However, this result does not generalize to other cases, allowing us to explore the effects of protocol manipulation. Variations in the quota and in the number of proposers may have surprising effects on the set of stable decisions. We also show that equilibria of our model are contemporaneous perfect e-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that stable decisions in semi-Markovian equilibria form the largest consistent set. -- bargaining ; evolving default ; stable set

     
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    hdl: 10419/100150
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2011-10
    Schlagworte: Verhandlungstheorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 52 S., 1,03 MB), graph. Darst.
  14. Optimal delegation with a finite number of states
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    This paper studies delegation without monetary transfers when the number of possible states is small, and therefore finite. To do so, we fully characterize the class of optimal delegation sets in the finite-state version of Holmstrom's (1984) seminal... mehr

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    This paper studies delegation without monetary transfers when the number of possible states is small, and therefore finite. To do so, we fully characterize the class of optimal delegation sets in the finite-state version of Holmstrom's (1984) seminal model and analyze their properties. Our finite state assumption entails the following results: (i) the agent never takes her ideal decision, and takes a decision strictly between her and the principal’s ideal (thus compromising with the latter) in low enough states; (ii) the agent takes the same decision in high enough states, and is indifferent between the decision she takes and the next highest decision in every other state; (iii) the agent may be induced to take decisions outside the support of the principal's ideal decisions; (iv) marginal increases in the agent's bias do not (generically) cause optimal delegation sets to shrink, and may increase the variance of the decision taken by the agent. We also show that the principal and the agent may both be better off if the latter cannot distinguish between some states. -- Optimal delegation ; finite states ; Ally Principle ; expertise

     
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    hdl: 10419/49693
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2011-04
    Schlagworte: Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit; Zustandsraummodell
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 51 S., 995 KB + 18 S., 267 KB)
  15. Voting under the threat of secession
    accommodation vs. repression
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; De Donder, Philippe
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  IEB, Barcelona

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2011,40
    Schlagworte: Sezession; Risiko; Minderheitenpolitik; Wahlverhalten; Humangeographie; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (25 S.), graph. Darst.
  16. Coercive trade policy
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Facchini, Giovanni
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Nottingham Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham

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    Schriftenreihe: Research paper / Nottingham Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy ; 2014/09 : Political economy of globalisation
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (34 S.), graph. Darst.
  17. Coercive trade policy
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Facchini, Giovanni
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, [Milano]

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    Schriftenreihe: Development studies working papers / Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano ; 376
    Schlagworte: GATT; WTO; Dispute Settlement; Political Economy
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (34 S.), graph. Darst.
  18. A new old solution for weak tournaments
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea... mehr

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    This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the tournament game introduced by Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1993) [The bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 182-201]. The exploration of a specific class of Markov perfect equilibria in these 'dynamic tournament games' yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We find that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. -- Electoral competition ; stable set ; stationary Markov equilibrium ; weak tournament ; solution theory

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/49695
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Rev. version of 2010-04
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper ; 2010,08
    Schlagworte: Spieltheorie; Dynamisches Spiel
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 16 S.)
  19. Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    With the changing economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the... mehr

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    With the changing economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession, using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries. In a situation of asymmetric information, in which the policy-maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader, signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not. We also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre-committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy-maker. Additionally, the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders. -- Constitutional commitment ; secession ; signaling ; regional redistribution

     
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    hdl: 10419/49670
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2010,15
    Schlagworte: Minderheit; Regionales Cluster; Minderheitenpolitik; Asymmetrische Information; Signalling; Sezession; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S., 713 KB), graph. Darst.
  20. Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then... mehr

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    We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which can be implemented from any initial default in a pure strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multi-dimensional and infinite policy spaces. Minimumwinning coalitions may not form, and a player who does not propose may nevertheless earn all of the surplus from agreement. The set of immovable policies (which are implemented, once reached as default) forms a weakly stable set; and conversely, any weakly stable set is supported by some equilibrium. If the policy space is well ordered then the committee implements the ideal policy of the last proposer in a subset of a weakly stable set. However, this result does not generalize to other cases, allowing us to explore the effects of protocol manipulation. Variations in the quota and in the set of proposers may have surprising effects on the set of immovable policies. We also show that equilibria of our model are contemporaneous perfect E-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that immovable policies in semi-Markovian equilibria form the largest consistent set.

     
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    hdl: 10419/100141
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2012-03
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 57 S., 955,27 KB)
  21. A positive theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; De Donder, Philippe
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 7333
    Schlagworte: Arbeitsmarkt; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Arbeitnehmerschutz; Politisches Ziel; Politische Partei; Wahlverhalten; Theorie
    Umfang: 30, [1] S., graph. Darst.
  22. Bargaining in standing committees
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however,... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 175 (2012,9)
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    Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This paper studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which in turn determines the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. In particular: (i) Substantial shares of the pie are wasted each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria of non-unanimity games with patient enough players; and (ii) All Markov perfect equilibria are Pareto inefficient when discount factors are heterogenous. However, there is a unique equilibrium outcome in unanimity standing committee games, which coincides with the unique equilibrium outcome of the corresponding Baron-Ferejohn framework.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100167
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2012-09
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 38 S., 680,82 KB), graph. Darst.
  23. Voting under the threat of secession
    accommodation vs. repression
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; De Donder, Philippe
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    We build a model of secession crises where voters may wish to accommodate the minority to prevent secession. We show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium with a government's type biased in favor of the minority. We propose a measure of... mehr

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63 (3458)
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    We build a model of secession crises where voters may wish to accommodate the minority to prevent secession. We show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium with a government's type biased in favor of the minority. We propose a measure of secession risk and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession risk with respect to the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to economic factors, the relative size of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the intra-regional heterogeneity of preferences. -- majority voting ; secession risk ; cultural distinctiveness ; conflict ; overlapping regional preferences

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/46289
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 3458
    Schlagworte: Sezession; Risiko; Minderheitenpolitik; Wahlverhalten; Humangeographie; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S., 272,69 KB), graph. Darst.
  24. The politics of bargaining as a group
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter
    Erschienen: December 2023
    Verlag:  Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications, Coventry, United Kingdom

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications ; no: 81
    Schlagworte: Adverse selection; collective choice; political economy; dictatorship; bargaining
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten)
  25. Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    We show that dynamic bargaining games are characterized by a continuum of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are patient. In fact, we show that there is a continuum of equilibria close... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We show that dynamic bargaining games are characterized by a continuum of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are patient. In fact, we show that there is a continuum of equilibria close to any alternative satisfying a simple linear independence condition on the players' gradients. The approach extends the construction of simple solutions from Anesi and Seidmann (2015) to the spatial setting. The implication is that constructive techniques, which involve an explicit specification of a particular equilibrium and are common in the literature, implicitly rely on a restrictive selection of equilibria.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129823
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2015-01
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (16 S.), graph. Darst.