Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Filtern nach
Aktive Filter
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 3 von 3.

  1. Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    We show that dynamic bargaining games are characterized by a continuum of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are patient. In fact, we show that there is a continuum of equilibria close... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 175 (2015,1)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We show that dynamic bargaining games are characterized by a continuum of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are patient. In fact, we show that there is a continuum of equilibria close to any alternative satisfying a simple linear independence condition on the players' gradients. The approach extends the construction of simple solutions from Anesi and Seidmann (2015) to the spatial setting. The implication is that constructive techniques, which involve an explicit specification of a particular equilibrium and are common in the literature, implicitly rely on a restrictive selection of equilibria.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129823
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2015-01
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (16 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Coercive trade policy
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Facchini, Giovanni
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 32 (10687)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 10687
    Schlagworte: Handelskonflikt; Internationale Organisation; Zwei-Länder-Modell; Normbefolgung; Theorie
    Umfang: 35 S.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  3. Dynamic bargaining and external stability with veto players
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the nite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions:... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 175 (2015,12)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the nite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibira.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129818
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2015-12
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (22 S.), graph. Darst.