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  1. A new old solution for weak tournaments
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 175 (2010,08)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the tournament game introduced by Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1993) [The bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 182-201]. The exploration of a specific class of Markov perfect equilibria in these 'dynamic tournament games' yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We find that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. -- Electoral competition ; stable set ; stationary Markov equilibrium ; weak tournament ; solution theory

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/49695
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Rev. version of 2010-04
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper ; 2010,08
    Schlagworte: Spieltheorie; Dynamisches Spiel
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 16 S.)
  2. Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world
    Autor*in: Anesi, Vincent
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    With the changing economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 175 (2010,15)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    With the changing economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession, using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries. In a situation of asymmetric information, in which the policy-maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader, signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not. We also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre-committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy-maker. Additionally, the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders. -- Constitutional commitment ; secession ; signaling ; regional redistribution

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/49670
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2010,15
    Schlagworte: Minderheit; Regionales Cluster; Minderheitenpolitik; Asymmetrische Information; Signalling; Sezession; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S., 713 KB), graph. Darst.