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  1. Misdemeanor Prosecution
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda Y.; Doleac, Jennifer L.; Harvey, Anna
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Communities across the United States are reconsidering the public safety benefits of prosecuting nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. So far there has been little empirical evidence to inform policy in this area. In this paper we report the first... mehr

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Communities across the United States are reconsidering the public safety benefits of prosecuting nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. So far there has been little empirical evidence to inform policy in this area. In this paper we report the first estimates of the causal effects of misdemeanor prosecution on defendants' subsequent criminal justice involvement. We leverage the as-if random assignment of nonviolent misdemeanor cases to Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) who decide whether a case should move forward with prosecution in the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office in Massachusetts. These ADAs vary in the average leniency of their prosecution decisions. We find that, for the marginal defendant, nonprosecution of a nonviolent misdemeanor offense leads to large reductions in the likelihood of a new criminal complaint over the next two years. These local average treatment effects are largest for first-time defendants, suggesting that averting initial entry into the criminal justice system has the greatest benefits. We also present evidence that a recent policy change in Suffolk County imposing a presumption of nonprosecution for a set of nonviolent misdemeanor offenses had similar beneficial effects: the likelihood of future criminal justice involvement fell, with no apparent increase in local crime rates

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w28600
    Schlagworte: Kriminalität; Rechtsdurchsetzung; Rechtsprechung; Prävention; Kriminalpolitik; Massachusetts; USA
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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  2. Salary History and Employer Demand
    Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda Y.; Cowgill, Bo; Gee, Laura K.
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand by using a novel, two-sided field experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters reviewing over 2000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary history questions as well as... mehr

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand by using a novel, two-sided field experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters reviewing over 2000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary history questions as well as candidates' disclosures. We find that employers make negative inferences about non-disclosing candidates, and view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly-paid candidates) yield higher salary offers, however they are negative signals of value (net of salary), and thus yield fewer callbacks. Male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other sources (such as the premiums from working at higher paying firms, or being well-paid compared to peers). Recruiters correctly anticipate that women are less likely to disclose salary history at any level, and punish women less than men for silence. In our simulation of bans, we find no evidence that bans affect the gender ratio of callback choices, but find large reductions in gender inequality in salary offers among candidates called back. However, salary offers are lower overall (especially for men). A theoretical framework shows how these effects may differ by key properties of labor markets

     
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w29460
    Schlagworte: Personalbeschaffung; Lohnniveau; Arbeitsmarkt
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  3. Automating Automaticity
    How the Context of Human Choice Affects the Extent of Algorithmic Bias
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda Y.; Davenport, Diag; Ludwig, Jens; Mullainathan, Sendhil
    Erschienen: February 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Consumer choices are increasingly mediated by algorithms, which use data on those past choices to infer consumer preferences and then curate future choice sets. Behavioral economics suggests one reason these algorithms so often fail: choices can... mehr

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    Consumer choices are increasingly mediated by algorithms, which use data on those past choices to infer consumer preferences and then curate future choice sets. Behavioral economics suggests one reason these algorithms so often fail: choices can systematically deviate from preferences. For example, research shows that prejudice can arise not just from preferences and beliefs, but also from the context in which people choose. When people behave automatically, biases creep in; snap decisions are typically more prejudiced than slow, deliberate ones, and can lead to behaviors that users themselves do not consciously want or intend. As a result, algorithms trained on automatic behaviors can misunderstand the prejudice of users: the more automatic the behavior, the greater the error. We empirically test these ideas in a lab experiment, and find that more automatic behavior does indeed seem to lead to more biased algorithms. We then explore the large-scale consequences of this idea by carrying out algorithmic audits of Facebook in its two biggest markets, the US and India, focusing on two algorithms that differ in how users engage with them: News Feed (people interact with friends' posts fairly automatically) and People You May Know (people choose friends fairly deliberately). We find significant out-group bias in the News Feed algorithm (e.g., whites are less likely to be shown Black friends' posts, and Muslims less likely to be shown Hindu friends' posts), but no detectable bias in the PYMK algorithm. Together, these results suggest a need to rethink how large-scale algorithms use data on human behavior, especially in online contexts where so much of the measured behavior might be quite automatic

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w30981
    Schlagworte: Konsumentenverhalten; Digitale Plattform; Algorithmus; Kaufentscheidung; Konsumentenpräferenzen; Manipulation; Meinung; USA; Indien; Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  4. The minimum wage, EITC, and criminal recidivism
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda Y.; Makowsky, Michael D.
    Erschienen: September 2018
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 25116
    Schlagworte: Straffälligenhilfe; Mindestlohn; Lohnpolitik; Erwerbstätigkeit; Strafvollzug; Schätzung; USA
    Umfang: 55 Seiten, Illustrationen
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    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  5. The minimum wage, EITC, and criminal recidivism
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda Y.; Makowsky, Michael D.
    Erschienen: January 9, 2018
    Verlag:  Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section ; #616
    Schlagworte: Straffälligenhilfe; Mindestlohn; Lohnpolitik; Erwerbstätigkeit; Strafvollzug; Schätzung; USA
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Can you Erase the Mark of a Criminal Record? Labor Market Impacts of Criminal Record Remediation
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda Y.; Garin, Andrew; Koustas, Dmitri; Mas, Alexandre; Yang, Crystal
    Erschienen: May 2024
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We investigate whether removing a previously-obtained criminal record improves employment outcomes. We estimate the causal impact of criminal record remediation laws that have been widely enacted with the goal of improving employment opportunities... mehr

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We investigate whether removing a previously-obtained criminal record improves employment outcomes. We estimate the causal impact of criminal record remediation laws that have been widely enacted with the goal of improving employment opportunities for millions of individuals with records. We find consistent evidence that removing an existing record does not improve labor market outcomes, on average. A notable exception is participation in gig work through online platforms, which often screen workers based on their records but not their employment histories. The evidence is consistent with records initially scarring labor market trajectories in a way that is difficult to undo later

     
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w32394
    Schlagworte: Straftäter; Erwerbsverlauf; Straffälligenhilfe; Beschäftigungseffekt; USA; General; General
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  7. The gender disclosure gap
    salary history bans unravel when men volunteer their income
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda Y.; Cowgill, Bo; Gee, Laura K.
    Erschienen: June 2024
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4
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    This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that non-disclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6-8 percentage points.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/300961
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 17065
    Schlagworte: voluntary disclosure; information economics; organizations; hiring; compensation; inequality; salary history bans; statistical discrimination
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Labor Market Impacts of Reducing Felony Convictions
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda Y.; Garin, Andrew; Koustas, Dmitri; Mas, Alexandre; Yang, Crystal
    Erschienen: October 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We study the labor market impacts of retroactively reducing felonies to misdemeanors in San Joaquin County, CA, where criminal justice agencies implemented Proposition 47 reductions in a quasi-random order, without requiring input or action from... mehr

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We study the labor market impacts of retroactively reducing felonies to misdemeanors in San Joaquin County, CA, where criminal justice agencies implemented Proposition 47 reductions in a quasi-random order, without requiring input or action from affected individuals. Linking records of reductions to administrative tax data, we find employment benefits for individuals who (likely) requested their reduction, consistent with selection, but no benefits among the larger subset of individuals whose records were reduced proactively. A field experiment notifying a subset of individuals about their proactive reduction also shows null results, implying that lack of awareness is unlikely to explain our findings

     
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w31773
    Schlagworte: Strafverfahren; Rechtsdurchsetzung; Straftäter; Strafrecht; Beschäftigungseffekt; Kalifornien; General; General
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  9. The gender disclosure gap
    salary history bans unravel when men volunteer their income
    Autor*in: Cowgill, Bo; Agan, Amanda Y.; Gee, Laura K.
    Erschienen: June 2024
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that non-disclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6-8 percentage points.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/301294
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 11168 (2024)
    Schlagworte: voluntary disclosure; information economics; organizations; hiring; compensation; inequality; salary history bans; statistical discrimination
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten)