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  1. Ban the box, criminal records, and statistical discrimination
    a field experiment
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda; Starr, Sonja
    Erschienen: July 13, 2016
    Verlag:  Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 327 (598)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section ; #598
    Schlagworte: Personalauswahl; Unvollkommene Information; Arbeitsmarktdiskriminierung; Ethnische Diskriminierung; Geheimhaltung; Kriminalität; Schätzung; USA
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Misdemeanor prosecution
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda; Doleac, Jennifer L.; Harvey, Anna
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Communities across the United States are reconsidering the public safety benefits of prosecuting nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. So far there has been little empirical evidence to inform policy in this area. In this paper we report the first... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Communities across the United States are reconsidering the public safety benefits of prosecuting nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. So far there has been little empirical evidence to inform policy in this area. In this paper we report the first estimates of the causal effects of misdemeanor prosecution on defendants' subsequent criminal justice involvement. We leverage the as-if random assignment of nonviolent misdemeanor cases to Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) who decide whether a case should move forward with prosecution in the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office in Massachusetts. These ADAs vary in the average leniency of their prosecution decisions. We find that, for the marginal defendant, nonprosecution of a nonviolent misdemeanor offense leads to large reductions in the likelihood of a new criminal complaint over the next two years. These local average treatment effects are largest for first-time defendants, suggesting that averting initial entry into the criminal justice system has the greatest benefits. We also present evidence that a recent policy change in Suffolk County imposing a presumption of nonprosecution for a set of nonviolent misdemeanor offenses had similar beneficial effects: the likelihood of future criminal justice involvement fell, with no apparent increase in local crime rates.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236265
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14234
    Schlagworte: crime; prosecution; courts; recidivism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 89 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Salary history and employer demand
    evidence from a two-sided audit
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda; Cowgill, Bo; Gee, Laura K.
    Erschienen: 12-2-2022
    Verlag:  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI

    We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand, and how salary history bans shape hiring and wages. We show how these effects depend on the properties of the labor market, and we measure the key properties using a novel, two-sided... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 208
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand, and how salary history bans shape hiring and wages. We show how these effects depend on the properties of the labor market, and we measure the key properties using a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our field experiment features hundreds of recruiters reviewing more than 2, 000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary history questions as well as job candidates' disclosures. We find that employers make negative inferences about nondisclosing candidates, and that they anticipate positive selection into disclosure. Recruiters view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than about worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly paid candidates) yield higher salary offers; however, they are negative signals of the value (net of salary) that a worker brings to the firm, and thus they yield fewer callbacks. While disclosures (especially of high amounts) generally increase recruiter beliefs about quality and competing offers, male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other sources (such as the premiums from working at higher-paying firms or being well paid compared to peers). Recruiters correctly anticipate that women are less likely to disclose salary history at any level, and thus they punish women less than men for silence. When we simulate the effect of salary history bans using our results, we find muted effects on callbacks. Gender inequality in salary offers is reduced; however, equality comes at the expense of lower salaries overall (and especially for men).

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283974
    Schriftenreihe: Upjohn Institute working paper ; 22, 379
    Schlagworte: blinding; disclosure; recruiting; statistical discrimination; salary history; field experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 102 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Is your lawyer a lemon?
    incentives and selection in the public provision of criminal defense
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda; Freedman, Matthew; Owens, Emily
    Erschienen: May 2018
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (24579)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 24579
    Schlagworte: Rechtsberufe; Dienstleistungsqualität; USA
    Umfang: 47 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  5. Is your lawyer a lemon?
    incentives and selection in the public provision of criminal defense
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda; Freedman, Matthew; Owens, Emily
    Erschienen: September 2017
    Verlag:  Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 327 (613)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section ; #613
    Schlagworte: Rechtsberufe; Dienstleistungsqualität; USA
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Labor market impacts of reducing felony convictions
    Autor*in: Agan, Amanda; Garin, Andrew; Koustas, Dmitri; Mas, Alexandre; Yang, Crystal
    Erschienen: October 2023
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We study the labor market impacts of retroactively reducing felonies to misdemeanors in San Joaquin County, CA, where criminal justice agencies implemented Proposition 47 reductions in a quasi-random order, without requiring input or action from... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study the labor market impacts of retroactively reducing felonies to misdemeanors in San Joaquin County, CA, where criminal justice agencies implemented Proposition 47 reductions in a quasi-random order, without requiring input or action from affected individuals. Linking records of reductions to administrative tax data, we find employment benefits for individuals who (likely) requested their reduction, consistent with selection, but no benefits among the larger subset of individuals whose records were reduced proactively. A field experiment notifying a subset of individuals about their proactive reduction also shows null results, implying that lack of awareness is unlikely to explain our findings.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282655
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16528
    Schlagworte: crime; labor markets
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen