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  1. I want you!
    an experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power
    Autor*in: Brandts, Jordi; Güth, Werner; Stiehler, Andreas
    Erschienen: 2002
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 20 (2002,51)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/65313
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2002,51
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 21 S., 68,76 KB)
  2. Privately contributing to public goods over time
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas
    Erschienen: 2002
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 20 (2002,18)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly endowed participants encounter repeatedly the weakest link-, the usual average contribution- and the best shot-technology of public good provision in a within subject-design. Some striking findings are that the weakest link-technology fares much better than the other two technologies in terms of welfare, and that the willingness to voluntarily contribute is greatly affected by the (increasing or decreasing) clock mechanism. -- Public goods ; Voluntary contributions ; Efficient provision ; Clock mechanism

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/65343
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2002,18
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 38 S., 200,22 KB), graph. Darst.