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  1. Preference signaling and worker-firm matching: evidence from interview auctions
    Autor*in: Laschever, Ron A.; Weinstein, Russell
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We study whether there are improvements in worker-firm matching when employers and applicants can credibly signal their interest in a match. Using a detailed résumé dataset of more than 400 applicants from one university over five years, we analyze a... mehr

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    We study whether there are improvements in worker-firm matching when employers and applicants can credibly signal their interest in a match. Using a detailed résumé dataset of more than 400 applicants from one university over five years, we analyze a matching process in which firms fill some of their inter- view slots by invitation and the remainder are filled by an auction. Consistent with the predictions of a signaling model, we find the auction is valuable for less desirable firms trying to hire high desirability applicants. Second, we find evidence that is consistent with the auction benefiting overlooked applicants. Candidates who are less likely to be invited for an interview (e.g., non-U.S. citizens) are hired after having the opportunity to interview through the auction. Among hires, these candidates are more represented among auction winners than invited interviewees, and this difference is more pronounced at more desirable firms. Finally, counterfactual analysis shows the auction increases the number and quality of hires for less desirable firms, and total hires in the market.

     
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    hdl: 10419/245673
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14622
    Schlagworte: labor markets; signaling; hiring; interview; matching
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Optimal redistribution in the presence of signaling
    Autor*in: Bastani, Spencer; Blumḳin, Tomer; Micheletto, Luca
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in... mehr

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    We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in the latter case firms have an informational advantage vis-a-vis the government. The dual role of income taxation in redistributing income and affecting signalling incentives is analyzed, as well as extended tax systems that combine income taxation with direct instruments allowing the signals to be taxed. A key focus is the analysis of the feasibility and social desirability of redistribution through wage compression.

     
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    hdl: 10419/245391
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9210 (2021)
    Schlagworte: optimal taxation; signaling; education; monitoring
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Labor market signaling and the value of college: evidence from resumes and the truth
    Autor*in: Kreisman, Daniel; Smith, Jonathan; Arifin, Bondi
    Erschienen: June 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    How do college non-completers list schooling on their resumes? The negative signal of not completing might outweigh the positive signal of attending but not persisting. If so, job-seekers might hide non-completed schooling on their resumes. To test... mehr

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    How do college non-completers list schooling on their resumes? The negative signal of not completing might outweigh the positive signal of attending but not persisting. If so, job-seekers might hide non-completed schooling on their resumes. To test this we match resumes from an online jobs board to administrative educational records. We find that fully one in three job-seekers who attended college but did not earn a degree omit their only post-secondary schooling from their resumes. We further show that these are not casual omissions but are strategic decisions systematically related to schooling characteristics, such as selectivity and years of enrollment. We also find evidence of lying, and show which degrees listed on resumes are most likely untrue. Lastly, we discuss implications. We show not only that this implies a commonly held assumption, that employers perfectly observe schooling, does not hold, but also that we can learn about which college experiences students believe are most valued by employers.

     
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    hdl: 10419/236514
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14483
    Schlagworte: signaling; resume; employer learning; statistical discrimination; jobs board
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Price signaling and quality monitoring in markets for credence goods
    Autor*in: Mahenc, Philippe; Volle, Alexandre
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  CEE-M, Center for Environmental Economics, Montpellier

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    Schriftenreihe: CEE-M working paper ; 2021, 01
    Schlagworte: credence good; fraud; monitoring; signaling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. The good, the bad and the complex
    product design with imperfect information
    Autor*in: Asriyan, Vladimir; Foarta, Dana; Vanasco, Victoria
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Bocconi ; n. 155 (February 2021)
    Schlagworte: complexity; information acquisition; signaling; regulation; financial products
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. How altruistic is indirect reciprocity?
    evidence from gift-exchange games in the lab
    Autor*in: Becker, Johannes; Hopp, Daniel; Süß, Karolin
    Erschienen: 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    Indirect reciprocity is defined as a specific kind of behavior: An agent rewards or penalizes another agent for having behaved kindly or unkindly toward a third party. This paper analyzes the question of what drives indirect reciprocity: Does the... mehr

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    Indirect reciprocity is defined as a specific kind of behavior: An agent rewards or penalizes another agent for having behaved kindly or unkindly toward a third party. This paper analyzes the question of what drives indirect reciprocity: Does the agent reward or penalize because she (altruistically) cares for the third party? Or does she take the other agent's behavior as a signal of how the latter would treat her if they met? In order to measure the relative importance of the altruism motive versus the signaling motive, we consider a gift-exchange game with three players: an employer pays wages to a worker and a coworker, before the worker (but not the coworker) may reciprocate by exerting effort. We offer a theoretical framework to analyze both motives for indirect reciprocity and run a series of lab experiments. The treatments manipulate the worker's information on wages. We find that, if only the coworker's wage is observable, the worker's effort increases in the coworker's wage. In contrast, if the worker can observe her own wage, the coworker's wage does not affect worker effort at all. We interpret this as support for the signaling motive: Indirect reciprocity is rather a byproduct of direct reciprocity than an act of altruism.

     
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    hdl: 10419/224592
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 85
    Schlagworte: gift-exchange; indirect reciprocity; signaling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Pioneer, early follower or late entrant
    entry dynamics with learning and market competition
    Autor*in: Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Mukherjee, Arijit
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    Timing of market entry is one of the most important strategic decisions a firm must make, but its decision process becomes convoluted with information and payoff spillovers. The threat of competition pushes firms to enter earlier to preempt their... mehr

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    Timing of market entry is one of the most important strategic decisions a firm must make, but its decision process becomes convoluted with information and payoff spillovers. The threat of competition pushes firms to enter earlier to preempt their rivals while the possibility of learning make them cautiously wait for others to take action. This combination amounts to a new class of timing games where first-mover advantage first emerges as in preemption games but second-mover advantage later prevails as in wars of attrition. Our model identifies under what conditions a firm becomes a pioneer, early follower or late entrant and shows that the timing of entry is excessively early (late) when there emerges a late entrant (early follower). We also argue that consumer inertia is often efficiency-enhancing in this environment, highlighting an elusive link between static market competition and dynamic entry competition.

     
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    hdl: 10419/234943
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1132
    Schlagworte: market entry; market competition; private learning; signaling; preemption; consumerinertia
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion
    the case of spying and counter-spying
    Autor*in: Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports... mehr

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    We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both sender and receiver of messages have private information and the sender has a chance to make an unobserved move. Whereas spying without counterspy exclusively benefits the spying bidder, the potential presence of a counterspy yields a collusive outcome, even if the likelihood that the spy is a counterspy is arbitrarily small. That collusive impact shows up in all equilibria and is strongest in the unique pooling equilibrium which is also the payoff dominant equilibrium.

     
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    hdl: 10419/235391
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9021 (2021)
    Schlagworte: auctions; tacit collusion; espionage; second-mover advantage; signaling; incomplete information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 16 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Selling the circularity
    investigating the impact of circularity promotion on the performance of Italian manufacturing companies
    Autor*in: Blasi, Silvia; Crisafulli, Benedetta; Sedita, Silvia Rita
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Università degli studi di Padova, dSEA, [Padova]

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    Schriftenreihe: Marco Fanno working papers ; 259 (July 2020)
    Schlagworte: circular economy; big data; web scraping; signaling; communication; sustainability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten)
  10. Signaling with private monitoring
    Autor*in: Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver... mehr

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    We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his actions. Preferences are linear-quadratic and the information structure is Gaussian. We construct linear Markov equilibria using belief states up to the sender's second-order belief. Because of the private monitoring, this state is an explicit function of the sender's past play, leading to a novel separation effect through the second-order belief channel. Applications to models of organizations and reputation are examined.

     
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    hdl: 10419/262044
    Schriftenreihe: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; no. 994 (December 2021)
    Schlagworte: signaling; private monitoring; continuous time
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Information acquisition and credibility in cheap talk
    Autor*in: Hidir, Sinem
    Erschienen: August 2017
    Verlag:  Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications, Coventry, United Kingdom

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications ; no: 36
    Schlagworte: Information acquisition; cheap talk; communication; signaling; credibility
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten)
  12. Of hired guns and ideologues
    why would a law firm ever retain an honest expert witness?
    Autor*in: Richardson, Martin
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [Australian National University], [Canberra]

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    Schriftenreihe: [ANU working papers in economics and econometrics] ; [#678]
    Schlagworte: expert witnesses; signaling; litigation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Signaling ideology through consumption
    Autor*in: Schneider, Florian
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Firms often discourage certain categories of individuals from buying their products, seemingly at odds with typical assumptions about profit maximization. This paper provides a potential rationale for such firm behavior: Consumers seek to signal that... mehr

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    Firms often discourage certain categories of individuals from buying their products, seemingly at odds with typical assumptions about profit maximization. This paper provides a potential rationale for such firm behavior: Consumers seek to signal that they have "desirable" ideological values to themselves and others by avoiding products popular among people with "undesirable" values. In laboratory experiments and surveys, I provide causal evidence that consumption can be diagnostic of consumers' ideologies and that demand for a product is lower if its customer base consists of individuals whose ideological values are widely considered undesirable. These effects occur for both observable and unobservable consumption and for products that do not possess any inherent ideological or undesirable qualities.

     
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    hdl: 10419/261389
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised version, July 2022
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 367
    Schlagworte: Ideology; social image; self-image; signaling; consumption; experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 108 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Closed-end funds and discount control mechanisms
    Autor*in: Kräussl, Roman; Pollet, Joshua M.; Stefanova, Denitsa
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value, We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms... mehr

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    The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value, We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors, Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk-adjusted performance.

     
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    hdl: 10419/270846
    Schriftenreihe: CFS working paper series ; no. 707
    Schlagworte: Closed-end funds; discount; performance; skill; signaling; information asymmetry; repurchases; continuation vote
    Weitere Schlagworte: Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)
  15. Study-work trade-off in contests with capacity-constrained students
    Autor*in: Anastasiia, Altunina
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  National Research University, Higher School of Economic, [Moscow]

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 259/EC/2022
    Schlagworte: contest theory; signaling; contract theory; education trajectories
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  16. The signaling value of legal form in debt financing
    Autor*in: Bracht, Felix; Mahieu, Jeroen; Vanhaverbeke, Steven
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1914 (April 2023)
    Schlagworte: legal form; minimum capital requirements; signaling; access to debt; financial constraint
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Imperfect signals
    Autor*in: Graetz, Georg
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1919 (May 2023)
    Schlagworte: human capital; signaling; employer learning; returns to schooling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Signaling with debt currency choice
    Autor*in: Eren, Egemen; Malamud, Semyon; Zhou, Haonan
    Erschienen: January 2023
    Verlag:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

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    Schriftenreihe: BIS working papers ; no 1067
    Schlagworte: Foreign currency debt; corporate debt; signaling; exchange rates
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Imperfect signals
    Autor*in: Graetz, Georg
    Erschienen: May 2023
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    A pre-condition for employer learning is that signals at labor market entry do not fully reveal graduates' productivity. I model various distinct sources of signal imperfection - such as noise and multi-dimensional types - and characterize their... mehr

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    A pre-condition for employer learning is that signals at labor market entry do not fully reveal graduates' productivity. I model various distinct sources of signal imperfection - such as noise and multi-dimensional types - and characterize their implications for the private return to skill acquisition. Structural estimates using NLSY data suggest an important role for noise, pushing the private return below the social return. This induces substantial under-investment and causes output losses of up to 22 percent. Value-added-based evidence from Swedish high school graduates also points to noise and under-investment. Highlighting the distinction between schooling duration and skills acquired, I conclude that individuals likely spend too much time in school, but learn too little.

     
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    hdl: 10419/272731
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16104
    Schlagworte: human capital; signaling; employer learning; returns to schooling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Signaling specific skills and the labor market of college graduates
    Autor*in: Busso, Matias; Montaño, Sebastián; Muñoz-Morales, Juan
    Erschienen: September 2023
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We use census-like data and a regression discontinuity design to study the labor market impacts of a signal provided by a government-sponsored award given to top-performing students on a nationwide college exit exam in Colombia. Students who can... mehr

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    We use census-like data and a regression discontinuity design to study the labor market impacts of a signal provided by a government-sponsored award given to top-performing students on a nationwide college exit exam in Colombia. Students who can signal their high level of specific skills earn seven to ten percent more than identical students lacking such a signal. The signal allows workers to find jobs in more productive firms and sectors that better use their skills. The positive returns persist for up to five years. The signal favors workers from less advantaged groups who enter the market with weaker signals.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282576
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16449
    Schlagworte: signaling; skills; wage returns; awards; college reputation; Colombia
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 78 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Tickets to the global market
    first US patent awards and Chinese firm exports
    Autor*in: Li, Yao; Manova, Kalina; Sun, Stephen Teng
    Erschienen: 23 November 2023
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18637
    Schlagworte: Patent rights; innovation; export performance; trade; market protection; asymmetric information; signaling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 78 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. The hidden costs of choice in the labor market
    Autor*in: Au, Pak Hung; Li, King King; Zhang, Qing; Zhu, Rong
    Erschienen: November 2023
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Freedom of choice is often thought to improve efficiency. We experimentally investigate the effect of giving workers a choice between compensation schemes with and without a CSR component (CSR/NoCSR) on labor market participation decision and work... mehr

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    Freedom of choice is often thought to improve efficiency. We experimentally investigate the effect of giving workers a choice between compensation schemes with and without a CSR component (CSR/NoCSR) on labor market participation decision and work performance, compared to the alternative of exogenous assignment. Classical economic theory suggests that giving workers a choice should not reduce their performance. Our results show that there are hidden costs associated with the right of choice. When a worker is allowed to choose his or her compensation scheme, the labor market participation rate is significantly lower than when the same scheme is exogenously assigned. Work quality is also significantly lower for those who choose CSR, as well as for those who choose no CSR, than for those who are exogenously assigned to the same scheme.We propose a model of signaling with image concerns to explain why the freedom of choice may induce reduced participation and effort exertion of workers.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282750
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16623
    Schlagworte: choice; signaling; image concerns; corporate social responsibility; labor; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Tickets to the global market
    first US patent awards and Chinese firm exports
    Autor*in: Gong, Kaiji; Li, Yao; Manova, Kalina; Sun, Stephen Teng
    Erschienen: November 2023
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We investigate how international patent activity enables firms from emerging economies to thrive in the global marketplace. We match Chinese customs data to US patent records, and leverage the quasi-random assignment of USPTO patent examiners to... mehr

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    We investigate how international patent activity enables firms from emerging economies to thrive in the global marketplace. We match Chinese customs data to US patent records, and leverage the quasi-random assignment of USPTO patent examiners to identify the causal effect of a US patent grant on the subsequent export performance of Chinese firms. Successful first-time patent applicants achieve significantly higher export growth, compared to otherwise similar first-time applicants that failed. This effect operates only in small part through market protection for technologically patent-related products in the US, and is largely driven by expansion in other markets. The response across destinations and products reveals that a US patent award signals the Chinese firm’s capacity to produce high-quality products and credibility to honor contracts, mitigating information frictions in international trade. There is little evidence for the relaxation of financial constraints or the promotion of follow-on innovation.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282478
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10790 (2023)
    Schlagworte: patent rights; innovation; export performance; trade; market protection; asymmetric information; signaling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 77 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Career concerns as public good the role of signaling for open source software development
    Autor*in: El-Komboz, Lena Abou; Goldbeck, Moritz
    Erschienen: January 2024
    Verlag:  ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich, Germany

    Much of today's software relies on programming code shared openly online. Yet, it is unclear why volunteer developers contribute to open-source software (OSS), a public good. We study OSS contributions of some 22,900 developers worldwide on the... mehr

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    Much of today's software relies on programming code shared openly online. Yet, it is unclear why volunteer developers contribute to open-source software (OSS), a public good. We study OSS contributions of some 22,900 developers worldwide on the largest online code repository platform, GitHub, and find evidence in favor of career concerns as a motivating factor to contribute. Our difference-in-differences model leverages time differences in incentives for labor market signaling across users to causally identify OSS activity driven by career concerns. We observe OSS activity of users who move for a job to be elevated by about 16% in the job search period compared to users who relocate for other reasons. This increase is mainly driven by contributions to projects that increase external visibility of existing works, are written in programming languages that are highly valued in the labor market, but have a lower direct use-value for the community. A sizable extensive margin shows signaling incentives motivate first-time OSS contributions. Our findings suggest that signaling incentives on private labor markets have sizable positive externalities through public good creation in open-source communities, but these contributions are targeted less to community needs and more to their signal value.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282189
    Schriftenreihe: Ifo working papers ; 405 (2024)
    Schlagworte: software; knowledge work; digital platforms; signaling; open source; job search
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Following social norms, signaling, and cooperation in the public goods game
    Autor*in: Cui, Chi; Dai, Ming; Schwieren, Christiane
    Erschienen: 12 Apr. 2024
    Verlag:  Universität, Heidelberg ; Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg

    In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people's cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on... mehr

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    In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people's cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling mechanism, less cooperative players disguise themselves in the rule-following game, but this does not decrease cooperation overall. More importantly, the signaling mechanism has a heterogeneous effect on cooperation in rule-following and rule-breaking groups: It increases cooperation in rule-following groups but decreases cooperation in rule-breaking groups. Finally, the signaling mechanism tends to offset the decline of contributions among participants in rule-breaking groups rather than rulefollowing groups. Overall, this paper provides a feasible way to improve social cooperation and enriches the literature on cooperation in the public goods game.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: AWI discussion paper series ; no. 746 (April 2024)
    Schlagworte: public goods game; cooperation; signaling; internalization of social norms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten), Illustrationen