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  1. Closed-end funds and discount control mechanisms
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value, We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 108
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    The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value, We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors, Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk-adjusted performance.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/270846
    Schriftenreihe: CFS working paper series ; no. 707
    Schlagworte: Closed-end funds; discount; performance; skill; signaling; information asymmetry; repurchases; continuation vote
    Weitere Schlagworte: Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)