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  1. Political cycles and yardstick competition in the recycling of waste
    evidence from Italian provinces
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Institut d’Economia de Barcelona, Facultat d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2020, 12
    Schlagworte: Spatial interactions; political budget cycle; waste management; recycling; yardstick competition
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Out of communal land: clientelism through delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Do local institutions influence the nature of political clientelist exchange? We find a positive answer in the context of a village institution prevalent in Java since the Dutch colonial rule, where democratically elected village heads receive... mehr

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    Do local institutions influence the nature of political clientelist exchange? We find a positive answer in the context of a village institution prevalent in Java since the Dutch colonial rule, where democratically elected village heads receive usufruct rights over a piece of communal village land (bengkok land) as a compensation for their service in lieu of salary. To formulate how limited-term private ownership of bengkok land promotes clientelism, we model a timely delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts to villagers-cum-voters as an incumbent re-election strategy. Based on a household survey fielded in 2018 across 130 villages in Java, Indonesia, we find that the chances of a bengkok plot being rented out increase by 6 percentage points as the time of the next election becomes closer by one year, and sharecropping is preferred to a fixed-rental contract as the election approaches. The empirical results are statistically significant and remain largely unchanged against a series of robustness checks. We also find suggestive evidence of short-term efficiency loss from clientelist politics over bengkok land.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236294
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14263
    Schlagworte: tanah bengkok; political budget cycle; clientelism; agricultural tenancy; electoral competition; Indonesia
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Out of communal land
    clientelism through delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts
    Erschienen: August 2021
    Verlag:  Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, [Canberra]

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in trade and development ; no. 2021, 20
    Schlagworte: tanah bengkok; political budget cycle; clientelism; agricultural tenancy; electoral competition; Indonesia
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen