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  1. Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production
    a laboratory experiment
    Autor*in: Klockmann, Victor; Schenk, Alicia von; Siemens, Ferdinand von
    Erschienen: January 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Following Garicano (2000), we consider groups whose members decide what knowledge to acquire and how to use this knowledge in production. If efficient production requires common knowledge, all group members should become workers and acquire common... mehr

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    Following Garicano (2000), we consider groups whose members decide what knowledge to acquire and how to use this knowledge in production. If efficient production requires common knowledge, all group members should become workers and acquire common knowledge. But if efficient production requires diverse knowledge, one group member should become manager, acquire rare knowledge, and stand ready to help the other workers. In our laboratory experiment, we find that most groups eventually manage to coordinate on an efficient division of labor. Still, we find substantial adoption frictions. Coordination takes time, and some groups coordinate on an inefficient division of labor, probably because they do not understand what organization of knowledge is most efficient.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/232419
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8822 (2021)
    Schlagworte: knowledge; division of labor; organizational economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. What do employee referral programs do?
    measuring the direct and overall effects of a management practice
    Autor*in: Friebel, Guido; Heinz, Matthias; Hoffman, Mitchell; Zubanov, Nick
    Erschienen: May 2022
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    Employee referral programs (ERPs) are randomly introduced in a grocery chain. On direct effects, larger referral bonuses increase referral quantity but decrease quality, though the increase in referrals from ERPs is modest. However, the overall... mehr

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    Employee referral programs (ERPs) are randomly introduced in a grocery chain. On direct effects, larger referral bonuses increase referral quantity but decrease quality, though the increase in referrals from ERPs is modest. However, the overall effect of having an ERP is substantial, reducing attrition by 15% and significantly decreasing labor costs. This occurs, partly, because referrals stay longer than non-referrals, but, mainly, from indirect effects: non-referrals stay longer in treated than in control stores. The most-supported mechanism for these indirect effects is workers value being involved in hiring. Attrition impacts are larger in higher-performing stores and better local labor markets.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/262108
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 164
    Schlagworte: Management practices; organizational economics; hiring; respect
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 90 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The organizational economics of school chains
    Autor*in: Neri, Lorenzo; Pasini, Elisabetta; Silva, Olmo
    Erschienen: July 2022
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of... mehr

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    Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of centralization. Despite their prominence, no evidence exists on the determinants and effects of differences in the organizational set-up of school chains. Our work aims to fill this gap. We use some of the key insights of the organizational economics of firms to study the organization of school chains. We match survey information on decentralization decisions of procurement activities for approximately 400 chains and 2,000 schools in England to student-, school and market-level administrative records. We find that chains with a larger share of schools whose leadership background is aligned with the chain board's expertise, younger chains, and chains that are closer to the market value-added (productivity) frontier decentralize more. We find instead no association between the value-added heterogeneity of the markets in which chains operate and their decision to delegate. We also investigate the link between the structures of chains and their students' performance. We find no association between decentralization and performance. This is consistent with the intuition that chains choose their organization in ways that maximize output (i.e., students' learning) and so the equilibrium relationship between performance and organizational set-up is flat.

     
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    hdl: 10419/263658
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15442
    Schlagworte: school chains; school autonomy; organizational economics; incomplete contracts
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Past and future developments in the economics of relational contracts
    Autor*in: Fahn, Matthias; MacLeod, William Bentley; Mühlheußer, Gerd
    Erschienen: September 2023
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    This paper was written as an editorial preface to a "Symposium on Relational Contracts", that was jointly edited by the three authors, and that will appear in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). The Symposium contains... mehr

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    This paper was written as an editorial preface to a "Symposium on Relational Contracts", that was jointly edited by the three authors, and that will appear in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). The Symposium contains eleven contributions to the economics of relational contracts, written by many of the leading scholars in the field. This editorial preface provides a narrative that positions the eleven contributions within the broader context of relational contracts, as addressed by economists, and it explains how these contributions are linked to each other.

     
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    hdl: 10419/279125
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16427
    Schlagworte: relational contracts; organizational economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Death and turmoil in R&D teams
    Autor*in: Thomas, Åstebro; Ejermo, Olof; Toivanen, Otto
    Erschienen: 06 November 2023
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18578
    Schlagworte: innovation; knowledge spillovers; managerial response; organizational economics; peereffects; R&D teams
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. "No man is an island"
    an empirical study on team formation and performance
    Autor*in: Allocca, Alessandra
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Do self-formed teams perform better than other team structures? Using unique data from Virgo, a Nobel-prize-winning scientific organization with self-formed teams, first, I uncover new evidence on team formation and performance. Then, I develop a... mehr

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    Do self-formed teams perform better than other team structures? Using unique data from Virgo, a Nobel-prize-winning scientific organization with self-formed teams, first, I uncover new evidence on team formation and performance. Then, I develop a structural model to i) estimate which teams perform better controlling for self-formation and ii) evaluate the performance of counterfactual team structures. Regarding i), estimation results show that small teams perform better than large teams. Regarding ii), counterfactual results show that randomly formed teams perform worse than the observed self-formed teams, and teams with a more diverse membership perform better.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282081
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 389 (February 21, 2023)
    Schlagworte: teamwork; entry game; structural estimation; knowledge production; organizational economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. On the merit of equal pay
    when influence activities interact with incentive setting
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Chapman Univ., Economic Science Inst., Orange, Calif.

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Chapman University, Economic Science Institute ; 15,09
    Schlagworte: Influence activities; incentive theory; theory of the firm; organizational economics
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S.), graph. Darst.