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  1. An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
    Autor*in: Reischmann, Tobias; Klein, Thilo; Giegerich, Sven
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 15
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank-order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rank-order-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/247704
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 095 (11/2021)
    Schlagworte: Childcare assignment; deferred acceptance algorithm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Beyond truth-telling
    a replication study on school choice
    Autor*in: Andersson, Tommy; Kessel, Dany; Lager, Nils; Olme, Elisabet; Reese, Simon
    Erschienen: January 2024
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Lund

    4207 In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 815
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    4207 In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth-telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 52 of the 58 investigated data sets (P-value threshold 0.05).

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Department of Economics, Lund University ; 2024, 1
    Schlagworte: school choice; deferred acceptance algorithm; truth-telling; stability; replication study
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 13 Seiten)