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  1. Born in the right place?
    health ministers, foreign aid and infant mortality
    Autor*in: Widmer, Philine; Zurlinden, Noémie
    Erschienen: 2019
    Verlag:  School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, St. Gallen

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 466
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / University of St.Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics ; no. 2019, 11 (August 2019)
    Schlagworte: Foreign aid; favoritism; political capture; patronage; clientelism; aid allocation; Africa; World Bank; infant mortality; child health; georeferenced data; spatial analysis
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Trading favors?
    UN Security Council membership and subnational favoritism in aid recipients
    Autor*in: Perrotta Berlin, Maria; Desai, Raj M.; Olofsgård, Anders
    Erschienen: February 2022
    Verlag:  Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

    We test the hypothesis that aid recipient governments are better able to utilize aid flows for political favoritism during periods in which they are of geo-strategic value to major donors. We examine the effect of a country's (non-permanent)... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 672
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    We test the hypothesis that aid recipient governments are better able to utilize aid flows for political favoritism during periods in which they are of geo-strategic value to major donors. We examine the effect of a country's (non-permanent) membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the subnational distribution of World Bank aid. Specifically, we analyze whether World Bank projects are targeted to regions in which the head of state was born, or to regions dominated by the same ethnic group as that of the head of the state. We find that all regions of a recipient country, on average, receive a greater number of aid projects during UNSC membership years. Moreover, a leader's co-ethnic regions (but not birth regions) receive significantly more World Bank projects and loan commitments during UNSC membership years compared to other years. This effect is driven chiefly by interest bearing loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Most importantly, we find stronger subnational political bias in aid allocation for aid recipients whose UNSC votes are fully aligned with those of the United States, indicating that exchanges of aid for favors occur in multilateral settings.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/280876
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics ; no. 57
    Schlagworte: Aid Recipients; UN Security Council Membership; World Bank aid; aid allocation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The importance of oil in the allocation of foreign aid
    the case of the G7 donors
    Autor*in: Couharde, Cécile; Karanfil, Fatih; Kilama, Eric Gabin; Omgba, Luc Désiré
    Erschienen: [2017]
    Verlag:  Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, Nanterre

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 334 (2017,40)
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / EconomiX ; 2017, 40
    Schlagworte: aid allocation; G7 donors; oil competition; spatial lag model
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Global samaritans?
    donor election cycles and the allocation of humanitarian aid
    Autor*in: Annen, Kurt; Strickland, Scott
    Erschienen: [2016]
    Verlag:  Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Department of Economics and Finance University of Guelph ; 2016-07
    Schlagworte: Humanitarian aid; election cycles; aid allocation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen