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  1. Effort and performance in public-policy contests
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel
    Erschienen: 2002
    Verlag:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible 'prizes' are determined by the existing status-quo and some new public- policy proposal . In this paper we study the general class of such two-player public-policy contests... mehr

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    Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible 'prizes' are determined by the existing status-quo and some new public- policy proposal . In this paper we study the general class of such two-player public-policy contests and examine the effect of a change in the proposed policy, a change that may affect the payoffs of the two contestants, on their effort and performance. We extend the existing comparative statics studies that focus on the effect of changes either in the value of the prize in symmetric contests or in one of the contestants' valuation of the prize in asymmetric contests. Our results hinge on the relationship between the strategic own-stake ("income") effect and the strategic rival's-stake ("substitution") effect. This relationship is determined by three types of ability and stakes asymmetry between the contestants. In particular, we specify the asymmetry condition under which a more restrained government intervention that reduces the contestants' prizes has the perverse effect of increasing their aggregate lobbying efforts.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 634
    Schlagworte: Politische Reform; Wettbewerb; Interessenpolitik; Spieltheorie; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Theorie
    Umfang: 23 S
    Bemerkung(en):

    Literaturverz. S. 22 - 23

    Internetausg.: ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/634.pdf
  2. Strategic restraint in contests
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel
    Erschienen: 2000
    Verlag:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    Economic policy is modeled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature the policies fought for are exogenous. We extend... mehr

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    Economic policy is modeled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature the policies fought for are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities.

     
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    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper series ; 271
    Schlagworte: Wirtschaftspolitik; Interessenpolitik; Wettbewerb; Rent-Seeking; Theorie; Nichtkooperatives Spiel
    Umfang: 14 S, graph. Darst
    Bemerkung(en):

    Literaturverz. S. 13 - 14

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/271.pdf verfügbar
  3. The politics of randomness
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel
    Erschienen: 2002
    Verlag:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.], Munich

    The main drawback of the public-policy contest is that the notion of contest success function, a crucial component of the contest model, does not have micro-foundations and, therefore, the random behavior of the government seems ad-hoc. In the... mehr

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    The main drawback of the public-policy contest is that the notion of contest success function, a crucial component of the contest model, does not have micro-foundations and, therefore, the random behavior of the government seems ad-hoc. In the present paper we propose a partial micro-foundation for the public-policy contest. The possible rationalization of random government behavior is illustrated in the case of the all-pay auction and Tullock's lottery logit functions. We also clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from the government's point of view, of these CSFs.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 803
    Schlagworte: Wirtschaftspolitik; Interessenpolitik; Wettbewerb; Rent-Seeking; Theorie; Nichtkooperatives Spiel
    Umfang: 15 S
    Bemerkung(en):

    Literaturverz. S. 14-15
  4. Tournaments
    there is more than meets the eye
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel
    Erschienen: 2004
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 4306
    Schlagworte: Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Wettbewerb; Erwerbsverlauf; Theorie; Tournament
    Umfang: 18 S
  5. Political culture and discrimination in contests
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel
    Erschienen: [2010]
    Verlag:  Bar-Ilan Univ., Dep. of Economics], [Ramat-Gan

    Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective... mehr

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    Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize. We consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer's preferred discrimination between the contestants. Focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs), we show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point of view of the contest designer. This result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature. -- Rent Seeking ; Political Culture ; Discrimination ; Contests ; Logit contest success function ; All-Pay-Auction

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/96053
    Schriftenreihe: [Department Working papers / Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics ; 2010,18]
    Schlagworte: Wettbewerb; Extensives Spiel; Auktionstheorie; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie; Politische Kultur; Rent-Seeking; Diskriminierung; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (26 S.)
  6. Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective... mehr

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    Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize. We consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer's preferred discrimination between the contestants. Focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs), we show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point of view of the contest designer. This result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature. -- rent seeking ; political culture ; discrimination ; contests ; logit contest success function ; All-Pay-Auction

     
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    hdl: 10419/46281
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 3170
    Schlagworte: Wettbewerb; Extensives Spiel; Auktionstheorie; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie; Politische Kultur; Rent-Seeking; Diskriminierung; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 27 S., 223 KB)
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    Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen
  7. A political economy of the immigrant assimilation
    internal dynamics
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N.
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help... mehr

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    Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources invested by the groups’ supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters – absolute and relative ranking – in achieving their goals. -- migration ; assimilation ; political economy

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/44159
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 5059
    Schlagworte: Migranten; Soziale Integration; Nonprofit-Organisation; Wettbewerb; Ethnische Gruppe; Neue politische Ökonomie; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 19 S., 291,72 KB)
  8. A political economy of the immigrant assimilation
    internal dynamics
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N.
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Bar-Ilan Univ., Dep. of Economics, Ramat-Gan

    Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help... mehr

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 205 (2010.13)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources invested by the groups’ supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters – absolute and relative ranking – in achieving their goals.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/96082
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics ; 2010,13
    Schlagworte: Migranten; Soziale Integration; Nonprofit-Organisation; Wettbewerb; Ethnische Gruppe; Neue politische Ökonomie; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (29 S.)
  9. Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type... mehr

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    The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all-pay-auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the designer's payoff under the optimal lottery is equal to his expected payoff under the optimal all-pay auction. -- contest design ; efforts (revenue) maximization ; discrimination ; endogenous lottery ; all-pay auction

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/69449
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 7032
    Schlagworte: Wettbewerb; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie; Glücksspiel; Auktionstheorie; Gerechtigkeit; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 19 S., 388,14 KB)
  10. Political culture and discrimination in contests
    Autor*in: Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4 (5158)
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    Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize. We consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer's preferred discrimination between the contestants. Focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs), we show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point of view of the contest designer. This result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature. -- rent seeking political culture ; discrimination ; contests ; logit contest success function ; all-pay-auction

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/46104
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 5158
    Schlagworte: Wettbewerb; Extensives Spiel; Auktionstheorie; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie; Politische Kultur; Rent-Seeking; Diskriminierung; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 26 S., 851 KB)