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  1. Nonlinear pricing under regulation
    comparing cap rules and taxes in the laboratory
    Autor*in: Nuño Ledesma, José G.; Wu, Steven Y.
    Erschienen: October 2022
    Verlag:  [Banco de México], [Ciudad de México, México]

    We report an experiment contrasting the impacts of a tax and a cap rule in a single-product market with two privately-informed buyers. We discuss the effects on choice set and consumer surplus. The policy environment varies across treatments. With... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 192
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We report an experiment contrasting the impacts of a tax and a cap rule in a single-product market with two privately-informed buyers. We discuss the effects on choice set and consumer surplus. The policy environment varies across treatments. With regulations, we aim to halve the size of the unregulated large option. Compared to the regulation-free baseline, sellers facing a cap attempt to serve the buyers separately with similar frequency. With a tax, subjects are less likely to offer menus with two alternatives. We find that consumer surplus remains unaffected under a cap rule, while buyers with high appreciation for the product see their surplus diminished by the tax. These results have implications for policy making in the food retail industry and others where authorities aim to regulate consumption while protecting consumer surplus.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/273666
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Banco de México ; no 2022, 10
    Schlagworte: Experiment; Nonlinear pricing; portion cap rule; quantity restriction; tax
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten)
  2. Manipulative consumers
    Autor*in: Richter, Michael; Roketskiy, Nikita
    Erschienen: 17 January 2024
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    We study optimal monopoly pricing with evasive consumers. The monopolist uses consumer data to estimate demand and menu pricing to optimally screen the residual uncertainty about consumers' preferences. Third degree price discrimination encourages... mehr

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    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    We study optimal monopoly pricing with evasive consumers. The monopolist uses consumer data to estimate demand and menu pricing to optimally screen the residual uncertainty about consumers' preferences. Third degree price discrimination encourages data-conscious consumers to manipulate their observable attributes (at a cost). This reduces the precision of demand estimation, sometimes rendering the consumer data useless. We derive the monopolist's gains from using data and characterize the optimal investigation strategy. Large number of observable consumer attributes results in small overall value of data. Randomly restricting monopolist's access to consumer data increases profit.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18756
    Schlagworte: Nonlinear pricing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Manipulative consumers
    Autor*in: Richter, Michael; Roketskiy, Nikita
    Erschienen: 17 January 2024
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    We study optimal monopoly pricing with evasive consumers. The monopolist uses consumer data to estimate demand and menu pricing to optimally screen the residual uncertainty about consumers' preferences. Third degree price discrimination encourages... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study optimal monopoly pricing with evasive consumers. The monopolist uses consumer data to estimate demand and menu pricing to optimally screen the residual uncertainty about consumers' preferences. Third degree price discrimination encourages data-conscious consumers to manipulate their observable attributes (at a cost). This reduces the precision of demand estimation, sometimes rendering the consumer data useless. We derive the monopolist's gains from using data and characterize the optimal investigation strategy. Large number of observable consumer attributes results in small overall value of data. Randomly restricting monopolist's access to consumer data increases profit.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18756
    Schlagworte: Nonlinear pricing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Nonlinear pricing with finite information
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn.

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 29 (1981)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; 1981
    Schlagworte: Mechanism design; Nonlinear pricing; Multi-Dimension; Multi-product; Private information; Limited information; Quantization; Information theory
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (38 S.), graph. Darst.