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  1. Contests vs. piece rates in product market competition
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, Tübingen

    We study product market competition between firm owners (principals) where workers (agents) decide on their efforts and, hence, on output levels. Two worker compensation schemes are compared: a piece rate compensation as a benchmark when workers'... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 278 (85)
    keine Fernleihe
    Universitätsbibliothek der Eberhard Karls Universität
    keine Fernleihe
    Fachbibliothek Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Bibliothek
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study product market competition between firm owners (principals) where workers (agents) decide on their efforts and, hence, on output levels. Two worker compensation schemes are compared: a piece rate compensation as a benchmark when workers' output performance is verifiable, and a contest-based compensation scheme with variable, revenue-based prizes when it is only verifiable who the best performing worker is, i.e., only 'contest performance' is verifiable.Without rivalry between firms, the two compensation schemes lead to the same results. In case of product market competition, however, contest-based compensation schemes lead to more employment, more production, and lower firm profits. The reduction in profits represents the cost of being only able to verify workers' contest performance instead of output performance.

     

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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10900/64218
    hdl: 10419/112715
    Schriftenreihe: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 85
    Schlagworte: Kompensation
    Umfang: Online-Ressource