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  1. How Do Top Acquirers Compare in Technology Mergers? New Evidence from an S&P Taxonomy
    Autor*in: Jin, Ginger Zhe; Leccese, Mario; Wagman, Liad
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Some argue that large platforms, such as Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft (or GAFAM), are unusual in their number, pace and concentration of technology mergers, with the potential to harm market competition. Using a unique... mehr

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Some argue that large platforms, such as Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft (or GAFAM), are unusual in their number, pace and concentration of technology mergers, with the potential to harm market competition. Using a unique taxonomy developed by S&P Global Market Intelligence, we compare the M&A activities of GAFAM to other top acquirers from 2010 to 2020. We find: (i) GAFAM completed more tech acquisitions per firm than other groups of top acquirers, and acquired younger and more consumer-facing firms on average. (ii) The top 25 private equity firms outpaced GAFAM in tech acquisitions per firm since 2018. (iii) GAFAM acquisitions are less concentrated across tech categories than other top acquirer groups, due, in part, to an "acquire-adjacent-and-then-expand" strategy. (iv) Over time, more and more GAFAM and other top acquirers acquire in the same categories. (v) No evidence suggesting that a GAFAM acquisition in a category, compared to similar categories without GAFAM acquisitions, is correlated with a slowdown in the number of new acquirers acquiring in that category. Overall, we find that technology acquisitions do not shield GAFAM from competition, at least not from other GAFAM members or other firms that acquire in the same categories

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w29642
    Schlagworte: Großunternehmen; IKT-Sektor; Innovationsmanagement; Übernahme; Wettbewerb; Aktienindex; S&P 500; Big Tech; GAFAM; Schätzung; Wirkungsanalyse
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  2. Competitors' reactions to big tech acquisitions
    evidence from mobile apps
    Autor*in: Affeldt, Pauline Luise; Kesler, Reinhold
    Erschienen: 9. Dezember 2021
    Verlag:  DIW Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin

    Since 2010, Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM) have acquired more than 400 companies. Competition authorities did not scrutinize most of these transactions and blocked none. This raised concerns that GAFAM acquisitions target... mehr

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    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bibliothek
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    Online-Ressource
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Since 2010, Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM) have acquired more than 400 companies. Competition authorities did not scrutinize most of these transactions and blocked none. This raised concerns that GAFAM acquisitions target potential competitors yet fly under the radar of current merger control due to the features of the digital economy. We empirically study the competitive effects of big tech acquisitions on competitors in a relevant online market. We identify acquisitions by GAFAM involving apps from 2015 to 2019, matching these to a comprehensive database covering apps available in the Google Play Store. We find that competing apps tend to innovate less following an acquisition by GAFAM, while there seems to be no impact on prices and privacy-sensitive permissions of competing apps. Additionally, we find evidence that affected developers reallocate innovation efforts to unaffected apps and that affected markets experience less entry post-acquisition.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249161
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 1987
    Schlagworte: mergers and acquisitions; digital markets; GAFAM; apps; innovation; privacy; event study
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten), Diagramme
  3. Die 10. GWB-Novelle: neue Wettbewerbsregeln für die Digitalökonomie
    Autor*in: Budzinski, Oliver; Polk, Andreas
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics, Ilmenau ; Universitätsbibliothek

    Mit der 10. Novelle des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB; Anfang 2021 in Kraft getreten) sollen die deutschen Wettbewerbsregeln modernisiert und an die Erfordernisse der Digitalwirtschaft angepasst werden, weswegen die Novelle auch als... mehr

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    Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
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    WIR 2021
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    Standort:
    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 61
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    Mit der 10. Novelle des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB; Anfang 2021 in Kraft getreten) sollen die deutschen Wettbewerbsregeln modernisiert und an die Erfordernisse der Digitalwirtschaft angepasst werden, weswegen die Novelle auch als GWB-Digitalisierungsgesetz bezeichnet wird. Der Beitrag stellt die wesentlichen digitalisierungsbezogenen Änderungen der deutschen Wettbewerbsregeln in verständlicher Weise dar und zeigt anhand der Fallpraxis des Bundeskartellamts eine Reihe von relevanten Auswirkungen auf.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/246744
    Schriftenreihe: Ilmenau economics discussion papers ; vol. 27, no. 155
    Schlagworte: Wettbewerbspolitik; Digitalisierung; Marktmacht; Internetkonzerne; Wettbewerbsrecht; Digitalwirtschaft; GAFAM
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (13 Seiten)
  4. Start-up acquisitions, venture capital and innovation
    a comparative study of Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft
    Autor*in: Gugler, Klaus; Szücs, Florian; Wohak, Ulrich
    Erschienen: July 2023
    Verlag:  Vienna University of Economics and Business, Wien

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Department of Economics working paper / Vienna University of Economics and Business ; no. 340
    Schlagworte: M&A; big-tech; innovation; investment; GAFAM
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Regulating big tech: from competition policy to sector regulation?
    Autor*in: Budzinski, Oliver; Mendelsohn, Juliane
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics, Ilmenau ; Universitätsbibliothek

    The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool for the governance of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of so-called gatekeeper companies to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
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    WIR 2021
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    Standort:
    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 61
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool for the governance of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of so-called gatekeeper companies to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We review the provisions of the DMA both from a legal and from an economics perspective. Notwithstanding a number of benefits, we identify several issues with the current proposal. When looking at the core provisions of the proposal from an economic perspective, five issues of contention arise: many of the provisions seem to be quite narrow in scope and it seems difficult to extrapolate more general rules from them; the economic harm of some of the provisions is both uncertain and in principle debatable; the alleged distinction between different types of obligations cannot be verified, and, last but not least, while the DMA seeks to control existing gatekeepers, the “tipping” of markets and the rise of further gatekeepers is not guaranteed by this proposal; this in turn leads to a larger critical analysis of the gatekeeper as DMA’s norm addressee. From a legal perspective, the first hurdle is the lack of clarity pertaining to the nature and goals of the DMA, this is further compounded by procedural provisions and an enforcement regime with many uncertainties and loopholes – all of which tend to undermine the intended stringency of the regulation and its overall chances of making digital markets systemically more contestable and fairer. Thus, we think that a reform of the competition policy regime would better suit the need of regulating big tech

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
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    hdl: 10419/245950
    Schriftenreihe: Ilmenau economics discussion papers ; vol. 27, no. 154
    Schlagworte: big tech; digital economy; digital ecosystems; GAFAM; competition policy; antitrust; Digital Markets Act (DMA); sector-specific regulation; law and economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (35 Seiten)
  6. Regulating big tech: from competition policy to sector regulation?
    Autor*in: Budzinski, Oliver; Mendelsohn, Juliane
    Erschienen: October 2022
    Verlag:  Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics, Ilmenau ; Universitätsbibliothek

    The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool for the governance of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of socalled gatekeeper companies to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
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    WIR 2022
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    Standort:
    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 61
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool for the governance of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of socalled gatekeeper companies to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We review the provisions of the DMA both from a legal and from an economic perspective. Notwithstanding a number of benefits, we identify several issues with the current proposal. When looking at the core provisions of the proposal from an economic perspective, several issues of contention arise: many of the provisions seem to be quite narrow in scope and it seems difficult to extrapolate more general rules from them; the economic harm of some of the provisions is both uncertain and in principle debatable; the alleged distinction between different types of obligations cannot be verified; and, in addition, Art. 5-7 DMA seem to contain three distinct regulatory instruments; last but not least, while the DMA seeks to control existing gatekeepers, the “tipping” of markets and the rise of further gatekeepers is not guaranteed by the proposed regulation, this in turn leads to a larger critical analysis of the gatekeeper as the DMA’s norm addressee. While the goals and nature of the DMA have gained in clarity throughout the legislative process, its scope remains somewhat obtuse. On the one hand it seems set on regulating gatekeepers as they exist today, on the other, also wants to bring about systemic change in the digital single market. How it expects to achieve the latter is not entirely clear. In this light and by critically looking at the nature of ex ante and ex post measures in broader competition policy, we conclude that a reform of the competition policy regime would better suit the overalls aims of reining in big tech in future.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265544
    RVK Klassifikation: QR 760 ; PZ 3800
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Updated October 2022 with the final DMA
    Schriftenreihe: Ilmenau economics discussion papers ; vol. 27, no. 168
    Schlagworte: big tech; digital economy; digital ecosystems; GAFAM; competition policy; antitrust; Digital Markets Act (DMA); sector-specific regulation; law and economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (37 Seiten)