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  1. Too little oil, too much coal
    optimal carbon tax and when to phase in oil, coal and renewables
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    Our main message is that it is optimal to use less coal and more oil once one takes account of coal being a backstop which emits much more CO2 than oil. The way of achieving this is to have a steeply rising carbon tax during the initial oil-only... mehr

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    keine Fernleihe
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63 (3526)
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Our main message is that it is optimal to use less coal and more oil once one takes account of coal being a backstop which emits much more CO2 than oil. The way of achieving this is to have a steeply rising carbon tax during the initial oil-only phase, a less-steeply rising carbon tax during the intermediate phase where oil and coal are used alongside each other and the following coal-only phase, and a flat carbon tax during the final renewables-only phase. The "laissez-faire" outcome uses coal forever or starts with oil until it is no longer cost-effective to do so and then switches to coal. We also analyze the effects on the optimal transition times and carbon tax of a carbon-free, albeit expensive backstop (solar or wind energy). Subsidizing renewables to just below the cost of coal does not affect the oil-only phase. The gain in green welfare dominates the welfare cost of the subsidy if the subsidy gap is small and the global warming challenge is acute. Without a carbon tax a prohibitive coal tax leads to less oil left in situ and substantially delays introduction of renewables, but curbs global warming substantially as coal is never used. Finally, we characterize under general conditions what the optimal sequencing oil and coal looks like. -- Hotelling rule ; non-renewable resource ; dirty backstop ; coal ; global warming ; carbon tax ; renewables ; tax on coal ; subsidy on renewables ; transition times ; Herfindahl rule

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/49509
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 3526
    Schlagworte: Ökosteuer; Mineralölsteuer; Kohlepolitik; Förderung erneuerbarer Energien; Energiesubstitution; Hotelling-Regel; Klimaschutz; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 35 S., 416 KB), graph. Darst.
  2. Global warming and the green paradox
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, Oxford

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Research papers / Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies ; 116
    Schlagworte: Klimawandel; Klimapolitik; Ökosteuer; Hotelling-Regel; Fossile Energie; Förderung erneuerbarer Energien; Erneuerbare Energie; Treibhausgas-Emissionen
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (23 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Is there really a green paradox?
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    The Green Paradox states that, in the absence of a tax on CO2 emissions, subsidizing a renewable backstop such as solar or wind energy brings forward the date at which fossil fuels become exhausted and consequently global warming is aggravated. We... mehr

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    keine Fernleihe
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    keine Fernleihe
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63 (2963)
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The Green Paradox states that, in the absence of a tax on CO2 emissions, subsidizing a renewable backstop such as solar or wind energy brings forward the date at which fossil fuels become exhausted and consequently global warming is aggravated. We shed light on this issue by solving a model of depletion of non-renewable fossil fuels followed by a switch to a renewable backstop, paying attention to timing of the switch and the amount of fossil fuels remaining unexploited. We show that the Green Paradox occurs for relatively expensive but clean backstops (such as solar or wind), but does not occur if the backstop is sufficiently cheap relative to marginal global warming damages (e.g., nuclear energy) as then it is attractive to leave fossil fuels unexploited and thus limit CO2 emissions. We show that, without a CO2 tax, subsidizing the backstop might enhance welfare. If the backstop is relatively dirty and cheap (e.g., coal), there might be a period with simultaneous use of the non-renewable and renewable fuels. If the backstop is very dirty compared to oil or gas (e.g., tar sands), there is no simultaneous use. The optimum policy requires an initially rising CO2 tax followed by a gradually declining CO2 tax once the dirty backstop has been introduced. We also discuss the potential for limit pricing when the non-renewable resource is owned by a monopolist. -- Green Paradox ; Hotelling rule ; non-renewable resource ; renewable backstop ; global warming ; carbon tax ; limit pricing

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/30701
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2963
    Schlagworte: Förderung erneuerbarer Energien; Wirkungsanalyse; Fossile Energie; Hotelling-Regel; Klimawandel; Ökosteuer; Steuertarif; Klimaschutz; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (32 S.), graph. Darst.
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