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  1. You don't need an invoice, do you? An online experiment on collaborative tax evasion
    Autor*in: Burgstaller, Lilith; Pfeil, Katharina
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  Walter Eucken Institut, [Freiburg i. Br.]

    Collaborative evasion of taxes and social security fees is prevalent in household services, when a household hires a service provider and no third party is involved. However, evidence on the determinants of collaborative tax evasion in general and... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 24
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Collaborative evasion of taxes and social security fees is prevalent in household services, when a household hires a service provider and no third party is involved. However, evidence on the determinants of collaborative tax evasion in general and the household context in particular is lacking. This paper examines two coordination mechanisms of collaborative tax evasion: A partner’s signaled intention and information about majority’s evasion behavior (empirical evasion expectation). We implement an interactive tax evasion game in an online labor market (MTurk) with 560 participants. Our findings show that priming with an empirical evasion expectation increases the fraction of evaded transactions by 20 percentage points. Our treatment manipulation of intention signals does not render a significant effect on evasion. However, when willingness to evade is signaled first in the chat, the probability of evasion increases by 45 percentage points.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/261336
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: April 27, 2022
    Schriftenreihe: Freiburg discussionpapers on constitutional economics ; 22, 6
    Schlagworte: Collaborative Tax Evasion; Compliance; Social Norm; Intention; Online Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen