Filtern nach
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 1 von 1.

  1. An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 15
    keine Fernleihe
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank-order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rank-order-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/247704
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 095 (11/2021)
    Schlagworte: Childcare assignment; deferred acceptance algorithm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten), Illustrationen