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  1. Social norms and market behavior
    evidence from a large population sample
    Autor*in: Riehm, Tobias; Fugger, Nicolas; Gillen, Philippe; Gretschko, Vitali; Werner, Peter
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    We test the importance of social norms for market interactions associated with negative real-world externalities in a large-scale experiment with a heterogeneous population sample from Germany. The majority of experimental participants refuses to... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 15
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    We test the importance of social norms for market interactions associated with negative real-world externalities in a large-scale experiment with a heterogeneous population sample from Germany. The majority of experimental participants refuses to trade, thus behaving in a moral way. Our data suggest the importance of norm conformity for the decision to trade as a significant share of buyers and sellers condition market entry on the decisions of others. Moreover, a majority of observers is willing to incur personal costs to sanction trading. Moral behavior is significantly linked to demographic characteristics and stated preferences and attitudes of the participants.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/231303
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 017 (02/2021)
    Schlagworte: Markets; moral behavior; negative externalities; social norms; punishment; large population sample; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (81 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Shifting punishment on minorities: experimental evidence of scapegoating
    Autor*in: Bauer, Michal; Cahlíková, Jana; Chytilová, Julie; Roland, Gérard; Želinský, Tomáš
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    This paper provides experimental evidence showing that members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority. We develop a new incentivized task, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 4
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    This paper provides experimental evidence showing that members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority. We develop a new incentivized task, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander ("a scapegoat"). We manipulate the ethnic identity of the scapegoats and study interactions between the majority group and the Roma minority in Slovakia. We find that when no harm is done, there is no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority. In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment "passed" on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group. These results illuminate how individualized tensions can be transformed into a group conflict, dragging minorities into conflicts in a way that is completely unrelated to their behavior.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/245659
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14608
    Schlagworte: punishment; minority groups; inter-group conflict; discrimination; scapegoating; lab-in-field experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Crime and (a preference for) punishment
    the effects of drug policy reform on policing activity
    Autor*in: Soliman, Adam
    Erschienen: June 25, 2021
    Verlag:  Economic Research Initiatives @ Duke (ERID), Durham, NC

    We still know very little about the incentives of police, often due to data constraints and the underlying policy environment. Using geocoded crime data and a novel source of within-city spatial and temporal variation in punishment severity, I am... mehr

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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We still know very little about the incentives of police, often due to data constraints and the underlying policy environment. Using geocoded crime data and a novel source of within-city spatial and temporal variation in punishment severity, I am able to shed light on enforcement behavior. I find that in parts of a city where drug penalties were weakened, there is a 13% decrease in drug arrests within a year; there is no displacement of non-drug offenses and majority black neighborhoods have a larger decline in drug arrests. If offenders were significantly deterred by harsher penalties, as the law intended and Becker’s (1968) model predicts, there should have been an increase in drug arrests. My results are therefore consistent with police treating enforcement effort and punishment severity as complementary. I also find that citywide crime and drug use do not increase following the weakening of drug penalties; this calls into question the "War on Drugs" view of punishment and suggests that certain types enforcement can be reduced without incurring large public safety costs

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; number 303
    Schlagworte: crime; enforcement; deterrence; punishment; enhanced penalty zones
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Shifting punishment on minorities
    experimental evidence of scapegoating
    Autor*in: Roland, Gérard; Bauer, Michal; Cahlíková, Jana; Chytilová, Julie; Želinský, Tomáš
    Erschienen: 14 August 2021
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP16453
    Schlagworte: punishment; minority groups; inter-group conflict; discrimination; scapegoating; lab-infieldexperiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Shifting punishment on minorities: experimental evidence of scapegoating
    Autor*in: Bauer, Michal; Cahlíková, Jana; Chytilová, Julie; Roland, Gérard; Želinský, Tomáš
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  Charles University, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Prague

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 823
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9788073435042; 9788073445997
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / CERGE-EI ; 697
    Schlagworte: punishment; minority groups; inter-group conflict,discrimination; scapegoating; lab-in-field experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Deviant or wrong?
    the effects of norm information on the efficacy of punishment
    Autor*in: Bicchieri, Cristina; Dimant, Eugen; Xiao, Erte
    Erschienen: May 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235437
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9067 (2021)
    Schlagworte: conformity; punishment; social norms; trust
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Herding, warfare, and a culture of honor
    global evidence
    Autor*in: Cao, Yiming; Enke, Benjamin; Falk, Armin; Giuliano, Paola; Nunn, Nathan
    Erschienen: 21 September 2021
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    LZ 161
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP16569
    Schlagworte: Culture of honor; conflict; punishment; revenge
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 68 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Herding, warfare, and a culture of honor: global evidence
    Autor*in: Cao, Yiming; Enke, Benjamin; Falk, Armin; Giuliano, Paola; Nunn, Nathan
    Erschienen: September 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    According to the widely known 'culture of honor' hypothesis from social psychology, traditional herding practices are believed to have generated a value system that is conducive to revenge-taking and violence. We test this idea at a global scale... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 4
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    According to the widely known 'culture of honor' hypothesis from social psychology, traditional herding practices are believed to have generated a value system that is conducive to revenge-taking and violence. We test this idea at a global scale using a combination of ethnographic records, historical folklore information, global data on contemporary conflict events, and large-scale surveys. The data show systematic links between traditional herding practices and a culture of honor. First, the culture of pre-industrial societies that relied on animal herding emphasizes violence, punishment, and revenge-taking. Second, contemporary ethnolinguistic groups that historically subsisted more strongly on herding have more frequent and severe conflict today. Third, the contemporary descendants of herders report being more willing to take revenge and punish unfair behavior in the globally representative Global Preferences Survey. In all, the evidence supports the idea that this form of economic subsistence generated a functional psychology that has persisted until today and plays a role in shaping conflict across the globe.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/245789
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14738
    Schlagworte: culture of honor; conflict; punishment; revenge
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Nudging enforcers
    how norm perceptions and motives for lying shape sanctions
    Autor*in: Dimant, Eugen; Gesche, Tobias
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The enforcement of social norms is the fabric of a functioning society. Through the lens of mul-tiple studies using different methodologies (a behavioral experiment and a vignette experiment in Study 1, as well as a norm elicitation experiment in... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    The enforcement of social norms is the fabric of a functioning society. Through the lens of mul-tiple studies using different methodologies (a behavioral experiment and a vignette experiment in Study 1, as well as a norm elicitation experiment in Study 2), we examine how motives for lying and norm perceptions steer norm enforcement. Pursuing a pre-registered three-part data collection effort, our study investigates the extent to which norm breaches are sanctioned, how norm-nudges affect punishment behavior, and how enforcement links to norm perceptions. Using a representative sample of U.S. participants, we provide robust evidence that norm-enforcement is not only sensitive to the magnitude of the observed transgression (= size of the lie) but also to the consequence of the transgression (= whether the lie remedies or creates payoff inequalities). We also find that norm enforcers are sensitive to different norm-nudges that convey social in-formation about actual lying behavior or its social disapproval. Importantly, these results hold both in the behavioral experiment and in an add-on vignette study that confirm the robustness of our findings in the context of whistleblowing. To explain the punishment patterns of the behavioral experiment in Study 1, we subsequently examine how norms are perceived across dif-ferent transgressions and how norm-nudges change these perceptions. We find that social norm perceptions are malleable: norm-nudges are most effective when preexisting norms are vague. Importantly, we find that punishment patterns in the first experiment closely follow these norm perceptions. With that, our findings suggest that norm enforcement can be nudged successfully.

     
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    hdl: 10419/248930
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9385 (2021)
    Schlagworte: lying; norm-nudges; nudging; punishment; social norms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 103 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people
    Autor*in: Bühren, Christoph; Dannenberg, Astrid
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DSM 13
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    We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is particularly large when members know about the composition of their group. The experimental results confirm these hypotheses. However, the information about the composition of the group turns out to be even more important than we expected. It helps cooperative groups to avoid wasting resources for an unneeded punishment institution. In uncooperative groups, it helps members to recognize the need for punishment early on and not to follow an uncooperative path that produces a persistently competitive attitude. These findings highlight the role of group composition and information for institution formation and that lessons learned by one group cannot be readily transferred to other groups.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242427
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 101
    Schlagworte: Institution formation; public goods game; cooperation; punishment; controlled groupformation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen