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  1. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash
    a discontinuity in behavior infinitely repeated duopoly games
    Autor*in: Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland
    Erschienen: 15 February 2022
    Verlag:  CentER, Tilburg University, [Tilburg]

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / CentER ; no. 2022, 003
    Schlagworte: Cournot; Bayesian game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; repeated games; collusion; cooperation; experimental economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Performance ranks, conformity, and cooperation
    evidence from a sweater factory
    Autor*in: Ashraf, Anik
    Erschienen: February 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Performance ranks introduce a trade-off for workers. They have to choose between signaling high productivity or signaling social compatibility to peers. Using a long-term experiment at a sweater factory, this paper disentangles the incentives... mehr

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    Performance ranks introduce a trade-off for workers. They have to choose between signaling high productivity or signaling social compatibility to peers. Using a long-term experiment at a sweater factory, this paper disentangles the incentives underlying performance ranks. Treated workers receive either private or public ranks. In response, intrinsic incentives from private ranks do not affect productivity. But publicly-ranked workers reduce productivity to conform to their social groups in the workplace. Additionally, cooperation decreases among the workers, although with limited effect on productivity. The paper shows how inducing competition among workers may be counterproductive for firms.

     
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    hdl: 10419/252108
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9591 (2022)
    Schlagworte: ranks; social conformity; cooperation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Intelligence disclosure and cooperation in repeated interactions
    Autor*in: Lambrecht, Marco; Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo; Sofianos, Andis
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We investigate in a laboratory setting whether revealing information on intelligence affects behavior in games with repeated interactions. In our experimental design we communicate information on the cognitive ability of both players. We use three... mehr

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    We investigate in a laboratory setting whether revealing information on intelligence affects behavior in games with repeated interactions. In our experimental design we communicate information on the cognitive ability of both players. We use three stage games: Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) and two versions of Battle of Sexes (BoS), with high and low payoff inequality. We find that the information affects strategic behavior significantly in two distinct ways. In PD, disclosure markedly hampers cooperation, as higher intelligence players are less cooperative once they are made aware that they play against someone of lower ability than themselves in the disclosure treatment. Similarly, in BoS with low payoff inequality, disclosure disrupts coordination on outcomes with positive payoffs, as higher intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome onto the less intelligent. However, in BoS with high payoff inequality, this pattern of behavior dramatically changes. Disclosure does not significantly affect coordination rates. Differently from the low payoff inequality game, coordination is achieved more often on outcomes that favour less intelligent players. We conjecture that when coordination becomes more difficult, because of the high inequality between payoffs, intelligence and inequality together form a coordination device.

     
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    hdl: 10419/248917
    hdl: 10419/248918
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9372 (2021)
    Schlagworte: repeated prisoners dilemma; cooperation; intelligence; IQ
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Airline cooperation effects on airfare distribution
    an auction-model-based approach
    Autor*in: Ivaldi, Marc; Petrova, Milena; Urdanoz, Miguel
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1259
    Schlagworte: Airline; cooperation; auction; price dispersion; price distribution
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten)
  5. Risk, temptation, and efficiency in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma
    Autor*in: Gächter, Simon; Lee, Kyeongtae; Sefton, Martin; Weber, Till O.
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is arguably the most important model of social dilemmas, but our knowledge about how a PD’s material payoff structure affects cooperation is incomplete. In this paper we investigate the effect of variation in material... mehr

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    The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is arguably the most important model of social dilemmas, but our knowledge about how a PD’s material payoff structure affects cooperation is incomplete. In this paper we investigate the effect of variation in material payoffs on cooperation, focussing on one-shot PD games where efficiency requires mutual cooperation. Following Mengel (2018) we vary three payoff indices. Indices of risk and temptation capture the unilateral incentives to defect against defectors and co-operators respectively, while an index of efficiency captures the gains from cooperation. We conduct two studies: first, varying the payoff indices over a large range and, second, in a novel orthogonal design that allows us to measure the effect of one payoff index while holding the others constant. In the second study we also compare a student and non-student subject pool, which allows us to assess generalizability of results. In both studies we find that temptation reduces cooperation. In neither study, nor in either subject pool of our second study, do we find a significant effect of risk.

     
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    hdl: 10419/248994
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9449 (2021)
    Schlagworte: prisoner's dilemma; cooperation; temptation; risk; efficiency
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Conforming with peers in honesty and cooperation
    Autor*in: Isler, Ozan; Gächter, Simon
    Erschienen: December 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Peer observation can influence social norm perceptions as well as behavior in various moral domains, but is the tendency to be influenced by and conform with peers domain-general? In an online experiment (N = 815), we studied peer effects in honesty... mehr

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    Peer observation can influence social norm perceptions as well as behavior in various moral domains, but is the tendency to be influenced by and conform with peers domain-general? In an online experiment (N = 815), we studied peer effects in honesty and cooperation and tested the individual-level links between these two moral domains. Participants completed both honesty and cooperation tasks after observing their peers. Consistent with the literature, separate analysis of the two domains indicated both negative and positive peer influences in honesty and in cooperation, with negative influences tending to be stronger. Behavioral tests linking the two domains at the individual-level revealed that cooperative participants were also more honest - a link that was associated with low Machiavellianism scores. While standard personality trait measures showed no links between the two domains in the tendency to conform, individual-level tests suggested that conformism is a domain-general behavioral trait observed across honesty and cooperation. Based on these findings, we discuss the potential of and difficulties in using peer observation to influence social norm compliance as an avenue for further research and as a tool to promote social welfare.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9493 (2021)
    Schlagworte: honesty; cooperation; peer influence; conformism; social norms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. When face masks signal social identity: explaining the deep face-mask divide during the COVID-19 pandemic
    Autor*in: Powdthavee, Nattavudh; Riyanto, Yohanes Eko; Wong, Erwin C. L.; Yeo, Jonathan X. W.; Chan, Qi Yu
    Erschienen: September 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    With the COVID-19 pandemic still raging and the vaccination program still rolling out, there continues to be an immediate need for public health officials to better understand the mechanisms behind the deep and perpetual divide over face masks in... mehr

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    With the COVID-19 pandemic still raging and the vaccination program still rolling out, there continues to be an immediate need for public health officials to better understand the mechanisms behind the deep and perpetual divide over face masks in America. Using a random sample of Americans (N=615), following a pre-registered experimental design and analysis plan, we first demonstrated that mask wearers were not innately more cooperative as individuals than non-mask wearers in the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game when information about their own and the other person's mask usage was not salient. However, we found strong evidence of in-group favouritism among both mask and non-mask wearers when information about the other partner's mask usage was known. Non-mask wearers were 23 percentage points less likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a mask-wearing partner, and 26 percentage points more likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a non-mask-wearing partner. Our analysis suggests social identity effects as the primary reason behind people's decision whether to wear face masks during the pandemic.

     
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    hdl: 10419/245766
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14715
    Schlagworte: face mask; COVID-19; cooperation; social identity; prisoners' dilemma
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union in the fields of peacekeeping and crisis management in unpredictable times
    Autor*in: Pădureanu, Mihaela-Adriana
    Erschienen: February 2022
    Verlag:  European Institute of Romania, Bucharest

    The United Nations and the European Union have been working together since 2003 in the areas of peace operations and crisis management. They cooperate in regions such as the Western Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East. As the main representatives of... mehr

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    The United Nations and the European Union have been working together since 2003 in the areas of peace operations and crisis management. They cooperate in regions such as the Western Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East. As the main representatives of the most important global and regional organizations, the UN and the EU aim to deploy efficient and fast responses to different types of crises such as: civilian, political, or institutional. In September 2018, they identified eight priorities to be addressed in the framework of the UNEU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management for 2019-2021, stressing especially the importance of women for peace, and security. Then, two years later, in September 2020, during the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, they signed the Framework Agreement on Mutual Support in the context of their respective missions and operations in the field. In this working paper, we use primary sources such as official documents, interviews, and declarations to look at how this relationship has developed, and to assess the main implications of the partnership for the parties concerned and its main beneficiaries.

     
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    hdl: 10419/251191
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / European Institute of Romania ; no. 41
    Schlagworte: UN; EU; peacekeeping; crisis management; cooperation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten)
  9. Strategy assortativity and the evolution of parochialism
    Autor*in: Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo; Tampieri, Alessandro
    Erschienen: Octobre, 2021
    Verlag:  University of Luxemborg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2021, 20
    Schlagworte: prisoner dilemma; cooperation; in-group favoritism; cultures; asymptotic stability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten)
  10. The roots of cooperation
    Autor*in: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and... mehr

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    We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest as a means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment doubles cooperation rates in comparison to a control condition. Children also reciprocate others' behavior, yet direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase overall cooperation rates. We also examine the influence of children's cognitive skills and parents' socioeconomic background on cooperation.

     
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    hdl: 10419/248949
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9404 (2021)
    Schlagworte: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 93 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Observability of partners' past play and cooperation
    experimental evidence
    Autor*in: Kamei, Kenju; Kobayashi, Hajime; Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information... mehr

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    The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information per se may not improve cooperation. A structural estimation suggests that a certain percentage of players act according to the "Always Defect" strategy, whether or not the reputational information is available. The remaining players adopt available cooperative strategies: specifically, the tit-for-tat strategy when reputational information is not available, and a strategy that conditions on the matched partner's past play when reputational information is available.

     
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    hdl: 10419/248604
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1145
    Schlagworte: experiment; cooperation; infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game; reputation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. The EU-UNDP partnership and added value in EU development cooperation
    Autor*in: Lundsgaarde, Erik
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn

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  13. Handlungsstrategien interdisziplinärer Forschungskooperation. Theoriebasierte Entwicklung und empirische Validierung der Erhebung mentaler Modelle von Handlungsstrategien.
    Autor*in: Scheffler, Dirk
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Universität Trier, Trier

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    Beteiligt: Antoni, Conny H. (Akademischer Betreuer); Mieg, Harald A. (Akademischer Betreuer)
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
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    Schlagworte: Interdisziplinäre Forschung; Kooperation; Forschungskooperation; Interdependenz; Interdisziplinarität; Strategie; Kognitives Schema; Interdisziplinarität; Forschungskooperation; Struktur-Lege-Technik; Strategie
    Weitere Schlagworte: Handlungsstrategie; mentale Modelle; Interdependenz; Sonderforschungsbereich; Kooperation; action strategy; mental model; intedisciplinarity; cooperation; cognitiv mapping
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    Dissertation, Trier, Universität Trier, 2009
  14. To insure or not to insure?
    promoting trust and cooperation with insurance advice in markets
    Autor*in: Grodeck, Ben; Tausch, Franziska; Wang, Chengsi; Xiao, Erte
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  [Monash University, Monash Business School, Department of Economics], [Clayton]

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Monash University, Department of Economics ; no. 2022, 25
    Schlagworte: asymmetric information; insurance; trust; cooperation; experimental economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Should they compete or should they cooperate?
    the view of agency theory
    Autor*in: Fleckinger, Pierre; Martimort, David; Roux, Nicolas
    Erschienen: March 2023
    Verlag:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1421
    Schlagworte: Incentive contracts; moral hazard; teams; competition vs; cooperation; collusion; free riding; tournaments; peer effects; organizational design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 87 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Carbon pricing, carbon dividends and cooperation
    experimental evidence
    Autor*in: Bachler, Sebastian; Flecke, Sarah Lynn; Huber, Jürgen; Kirchler, Michael; Schwaiger, Rene
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Anthropogenic climate change is one of the most pressing global issues today and finding means of mitigation is of utmost importance. To this end, we investigate whether carbon taxes on their own and coupled with revenue recycling schemes (symmetric... mehr

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    Anthropogenic climate change is one of the most pressing global issues today and finding means of mitigation is of utmost importance. To this end, we investigate whether carbon taxes on their own and coupled with revenue recycling schemes (symmetric or asymmetric carbon dividends) improve cooperative behavior in a modified threshold public goods game of loss avoidance. We implement a randomized controlled trial on a large sample of the U.S. population and measure the portion of groups who successfully remain below a critical consumption threshold. We find that a carbon tax with symmetric dividends reduces harmful consumption levels, but coupling the tax with asymmetric dividends not only enhances consumption reduction but also significantly improves group cooperation in avoiding simulated climate change. Our results show that the application of a carbon tax and asymmetric carbon dividends reduces the failure rate to about one-fourth (6%), compared to the 22% observed in a baseline condition. We find that environmental attitudes, conservatism, education, and gender are significantly associated with success rates in staying below the threshold.

     
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    hdl: 10419/278530
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2023, 07
    Schlagworte: climate change; carbon pricing; carbon tax; carbon dividend; revenue recycling; cooperation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 80 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Decoding GPT's hidden "rationality" of cooperation
    Autor*in: Bauer, Kevin; Liebich, Lena; Hinz, Oliver; Kosfeld, Michael
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, [Frankfurt am Main]

    In current discussions on large language models (LLMs) such as GPT, understanding their ability to emulate facets of human intelligence stands central. Using behavioral economic paradigms and structural models, we investigate GPT's cooperativeness in... mehr

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    In current discussions on large language models (LLMs) such as GPT, understanding their ability to emulate facets of human intelligence stands central. Using behavioral economic paradigms and structural models, we investigate GPT's cooperativeness in human interactions and assess its rational goal-oriented behavior. We discover that GPT cooperates more than humans and has overly optimistic expectations about human cooperation. Intriguingly, additional analyses reveal that GPT's behavior isn't random; it displays a level of goal-oriented rationality surpassing human counterparts. Our findings suggest that GPT hyper-rationally aims to maximize social welfare, coupled with a strive of self-preservation. Methodologically, our research highlights how structural models, typically employed to decipher human behavior, can illuminate the rationality and goal-orientation of LLMs. This opens a compelling path for future research into the intricate rationality of sophisticated, yet enigmatic artificial agents.

     
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    hdl: 10419/277755
    Schriftenreihe: SAFE working paper ; no. 401 (September 2023)
    Schlagworte: large language models; cooperation; goal orientation; economic rationality
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Operations research applications for coordination, cooperation, and collaboration in humanitarian relief chains
    a framework and literature review
    Autor*in: Adsanver, Birce; Balcik, Burcu; Bélanger, Valérie; Rancourt, Marie-Eve
    Erschienen: July 2023
    Verlag:  Bureau de Montreal, Université de Montreal, Montréal (Québec)

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    Schriftenreihe: CIRRELT ; CIRRELT-2023, 22
    Schlagworte: Humanitarian logistics; coordination; cooperation; collaboration
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Indefinitely repeated contests
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Brookins, Philip; Ryvkin, Dmitry; Smyth, Andrew
    Erschienen: February 14, 2018
    Verlag:  [Chapman University, Economic Science Institute], [Orange, CA]

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: [Working papers / Chapman University, Economic Science Institute ; 18, 01]
    Schlagworte: contest; repeated game; cooperation; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Negotiating cooperation under uncertainty
    communication in noisy, indefinitely repeated interactions
    Autor*in: Dvorak, Fabian; Fehrler, Sebastian
    Erschienen: October 2018
    Verlag:  TWI, Thurgau Institute of Economics at the University of Konstanz, Kreuzlingen

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Research paper series / Thurgau Institute of Economics and Department of Economics at the University of Konstanz ; no. 112
    Schlagworte: infinitely repeated games; monitoring; communication; cooperation; strategic uncertainty; prisoner’s dilemma
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 77 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Kunstgeschichte, Kunsttechnologie und Restaurierung
    neue Perspektiven der Zusammenarbeit : eine Einführung = Art history, conservation and conservation and conservation science : new perspectives for cooperation : an introduction
    Beteiligt: Burnstock, Aviva (Hrsg.); Klemm, Tanja (Hrsg.); Laaser, Tilly (Hrsg.); Leonhard, Karin (Hrsg.); Neugebauer, Wibke (Hrsg.); Reden, Anna von (Hrsg.); Holt, Lee; Opstelten, Bram; Schmidt, Katharine
    Erschienen: [2024]; © 2024
    Verlag:  Reimer, Berlin

    Standort:
    Universität der Bundeswehr München, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Beteiligt: Burnstock, Aviva (Hrsg.); Klemm, Tanja (Hrsg.); Laaser, Tilly (Hrsg.); Leonhard, Karin (Hrsg.); Neugebauer, Wibke (Hrsg.); Reden, Anna von (Hrsg.); Holt, Lee; Opstelten, Bram; Schmidt, Katharine
    Sprache: Deutsch; Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783496030829
    Weitere Identifier:
    RVK Klassifikation: LH 60360
    Weitere Schlagworte: Kunstgeschichte; Kunsttechnologie; Restaurierung; Interdisziplinarität; material studies; material turn; Objektwissenschaften; object-based studies; Natur- und Kulturwissenschaften; Kunstwissenschaft; Technical Art History; Kunsttechnik; Kollaboration; Einführungsband; Konservierung; interdisciplinarity; cooperation; conservation-restoration; art history; materiality; humanities and sciences; Art technology
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (622 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Auf dem Cover: "A matter of teamwork"
  22. European Association for American Studies
    Erschienen: 2006

    Scholarly Organizations ; so1 The European Association for American Studies is a confederation of national and joint national associations of American Studies in Europe. During the more than forty years of its existence the EAAS has succeeded... mehr

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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Scholarly Organizations ; so1 The European Association for American Studies is a confederation of national and joint national associations of American Studies in Europe. During the more than forty years of its existence the EAAS has succeeded remarkably well in making (West)European Americanists aware of each other. The main task of the association will be to integrate the new national organizations and their members into existing (or yet to be constructed) networks of scholarly dialogue and academic exchange, to encourage the study of and research in all areas of American culture and society and to promote cooperation and intercommunication between European scholars of the United States from all parts of Europe and from various disciplines. The EAAS organizes regular conferences and publishes the newsletter American Studies in Europe.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schlagworte: American studies in Europe; American culture and society; cooperation; intercommunication; conferences; newsletter; American literature; United States; United States
    Bemerkung(en):

    Source: SUB
  23. Asymmetric social norms
    Autor*in: Camera, Gabriele; Gioffre, Alessandro
    Erschienen: December 8, 2016
    Verlag:  [Chapman University, Economic Science Institute], [Orange, CA]

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: [Working papers / Chapman University, Economic Science Institute ; 16, 30]
    Schlagworte: cooperation; repeated games; social dilemmas
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 12 Seiten)
  24. Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas
    Autor*in: Ghidoni, Riccardo; Cleave, Blair L.; Suetens, Sigrid
    Erschienen: 10 January 2018
    Verlag:  CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 37 (2018,2)
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    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / CentER, Center for Economic Research ; no. 2018, 002
    Schlagworte: cooperation; contagion; matching protocol; laboratory experiment; meta-study
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people
    Autor*in: Bühren, Christoph; Dannenberg, Astrid
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free... mehr

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    We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is particularly large when members know about the composition of their group. The experimental results confirm these hypotheses. However, the information about the composition of the group turns out to be even more important than we expected. It helps cooperative groups to avoid wasting resources for an unneeded punishment institution. In uncooperative groups, it helps members to recognize the need for punishment early on and not to follow an uncooperative path that produces a persistently competitive attitude. These findings highlight the role of group composition and information for institution formation and that lessons learned by one group cannot be readily transferred to other groups.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242427
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 101
    Schlagworte: Institution formation; public goods game; cooperation; punishment; controlled groupformation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen