Verlag:
Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo
This paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two-tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition. The merger of regions induces three effects on regional and local tax policies, which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically: i)...
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ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
Signatur:
VS 156 (37)
Fernleihe:
keine Fernleihe
This paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two-tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition. The merger of regions induces three effects on regional and local tax policies, which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically: i) an alleviation of tax competition at the regional level, ii) a rise in the regional tax base, and iii) a larger internalization of tax externalities generated by cities. It is shown that the merger of regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates. This Nash equilibrium with mergers is then compared with the Nash equilibrium with coalitions of regions
