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  1. Rational play in games
    a behavioral approach
    Autor*in: Bonanno, Giacomo
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [University of California, Davis, Department of Economics], [Davis, CA]

    We argue in favor of a departure from the standard equilibrium approach in game theory in favor of the less ambitious goal of describing only the actual behavior of rational players. We investigate the notion of rationality in behavioral models of... mehr

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    We argue in favor of a departure from the standard equilibrium approach in game theory in favor of the less ambitious goal of describing only the actual behavior of rational players. We investigate the notion of rationality in behavioral models of extensive-form games (allowing for imperfect information), where a state is described in terms of a play of the game instead of a strategy profile. The players' beliefs are specified only at reached decision histories and are modeled as pre-choice beliefs, allowing us to carry out the analysis without the need for (objective or subjective) counterfactuals. The analysis is close in spirit to the literature on self-confirming equilibrium, but it does not rely on the notion of strategy. We also provide a characterization of rational play that is compatible with pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

     
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    hdl: 10419/267008
    Schriftenreihe: [Working papers / University of California, Davis, Department of Economics] ; [344]
    Schlagworte: Rationality; extensive-form game; self-confirming equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; behavioral model
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. A contribution to the theory of R&D investments
    Autor*in: Buccella, Domenico; Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen

    This research contributes to the theory of cost-reducing R&D investments by offering a tractable three-stage non-cooperative Cournot duopoly game in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival. Though in... mehr

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    This research contributes to the theory of cost-reducing R&D investments by offering a tractable three-stage non-cooperative Cournot duopoly game in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival. Though in a noncooperative context firms have no incentive to unilaterally disclose information on their costreducing R&D activity to prevent the rival from freely appropriate it, this work shows that there is room for the government to design an optimal policy aimed at incentivising unilaterally each owner towards R&D disclosure. Under this welfare improving policy, sharing R&D-related information becomes a Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium strategy of selfish firms. These findings suggest that introducing public subsidies aimed at favouring R&D disclosure represents a win-win result, eliminating the so far established - and unpleasant for both firms and society - non-disclosing outcome.

     
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    hdl: 10419/242484
    Schriftenreihe: GLO discussion paper ; no. 940
    Schlagworte: Cost-reducing innovation; Nash equilibrium; Government; Social welfare
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Empowerment of social norms on water consumption
    Autor*in: Pedehour, Pauline; Richefort, Lionel
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    This study develops a model of water extraction with endogenous social norms. Many users are connected by a unique shared resource that can become scarce in case of over-exploitation. Preferences of individuals are guided by their extraction values... mehr

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    This study develops a model of water extraction with endogenous social norms. Many users are connected by a unique shared resource that can become scarce in case of over-exploitation. Preferences of individuals are guided by their extraction values and their taste for conformity to social norms which provide incentives to follow others. As the main result of this study, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is established under a sufficient condition. Afterward, some comparative statics analysis shows the effects of change in individual heterogeneous parameters, conformism, and density of the network on the global quantity extracted. Welfare and social optimum properties are established to avoid the tragedy of the commons and sub-optimal consumptions of water. Lastly, this theoretical framework is completed by extensions to highlight levers of water preservation, including the calibration of social norm incentives.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2021, 020
    Schlagworte: Comparative statics; Conformism; Nash equilibrium; Network; Social norms; Water extraction
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Strategic uncertainty and market size
    an illustration on the Wright amendment
    Autor*in: Gagnepain, Philippe; Gauthier, Stéphane
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Paris School of Economics, Paris

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2021, 53
    Schlagworte: Market definition; Nash equilibrium; Airline industry; Transportation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Enabling reciprocity through blockchain design
    Autor*in: Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth
    Erschienen: February 2021
    Verlag:  Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO), University of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, Denmark

    We introduce a reciprocity protocol, an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains. Inherently decentralized and easy to implement, it puts emphasis on incentives rather than forcing specific sharing rules from the outset.... mehr

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    We introduce a reciprocity protocol, an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains. Inherently decentralized and easy to implement, it puts emphasis on incentives rather than forcing specific sharing rules from the outset. Analyzing the non-cooperative game the protocol induces, we identify a robust, strict, and Pareto-dominant symmetric equilibrium. In it, even self-centered participants show extensive reciprocity to one another. Thus, despite a setting that is generally unfavorable to reciprocal behavior, the protocol manages to build trust between the users by taking on a role akin to a social contract.

     
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    hdl: 10419/227737
    Auflage/Ausgabe: revised February 2021
    Schriftenreihe: IFRO working paper ; 2020, 14
    Schlagworte: Blockchain; reciprocity; protocol design; Nash equilibrium
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Disequilibrium play in tennis
    Autor*in: Anderson, Axel; Rosen, Jeremy; Rust, John; Wong, Kin-Ping
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Georgetown University, Department of Economics, Washington, DC

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Georgetown University, Department of Economics ; 21, 07
    Schlagworte: tennis; games; Nash equilibrium; Minimax theorem; constant sum games; mixed strategies; dynamic directional games; binary Markov games; dynamic programming; structural estimation; muscle memory
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. A category for extensive-form games
    Autor*in: Streufert, Peter Alfred
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Social Science Centre, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada

    This paper introduces Gm, which is a category for extensive-form games. It also provides some applications. The category's objects are games, which are understood to be sets of nodes which have been endowed with edges, information sets, actions,... mehr

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    This paper introduces Gm, which is a category for extensive-form games. It also provides some applications. The category's objects are games, which are understood to be sets of nodes which have been endowed with edges, information sets, actions, players, and utility functions. Its arrows are functions from source nodes to target nodes that preserve the additional structure. For instance, a game's information-set collection is newly regarded as a topological basis for the game's decision-node set, and thus a morphism's continuity serves to preserve information sets. Given these definitions, a game monomorphism is characterized by the property of not mapping two source runs (plays) to the same target run. Further, a game isomorphism is characterized as a bijection whose restriction to decision nodes is a homeomorphism, whose induced player transformation is injective, and which strictly preserves the ordinal content of the utility functions. The category is then applied to some game-theoretic concepts beyond the definition of a game. A Selten subgame is characterized as a special kind of categorical subgame, and game isomorphisms are shown to preserve strategy sets, Nash equilibria, Selten subgames, subgame-perfect equilibria, perfect-information, and no-absentmindedness. Further, it is shown that the full sub-category for distinguished-action sequence games is essentially wide in the category of all games, and that the full subcategory of action-set games is essentially wide in the full subcategory for games with no-absentmindedness.

     
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    hdl: 10419/261273
    Schriftenreihe: Department of Economics research report series ; # 2021, 2 (May 2021)
    Schlagworte: Continuously labeled tree; Selten subgame; Nash equilibrium; subgame-perfect equilibrium; distinguished-action game; sequence game; action-setgame
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Mean Field Game-based control of sharing daily solar energy between electric vehicles in a parking lot
    Autor*in: Muhindo, Samuel Mugisho; Malhamé, Roland P.; Joós, Géza
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  GERAD, HÉC Montréal, Montréal (Québec), Canada

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    Schriftenreihe: Les cahiers du GERAD ; G-2021, 29 (May 2021)
    Schlagworte: Aggregator; battery electric vehicle; Mean Field Games; Nash equilibrium; parking lot; solar energy
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Best response algorithms in ratio-bounded games: convergence of affine relaxations to Nash equilibria
    Autor*in: Caruso, Francesco; Ceparano, Maria Carmela; Morgan, Jacqueline
    Erschienen: December 2020
    Verlag:  CSEF, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance, Department of Economics, University of Naples, Naples, Italy

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / CSEF, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance ; no. 593
    Schlagworte: Two-player non-cooperative game; Nash equilibrium; existence and uniqueness; fixed point; contraction mapping; non-expansive mapping; super monotone operator; best response algorithm; convexrelaxation; affine non-convex relaxation; convergence and error bound
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten)
  10. Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue
    Autor*in: Breinbjerg, Jesper; Platz, Trine Tornøe; Østerdal, Lars Peter
    Erschienen: 2020
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg

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    hdl: 10398/ebb888e3-fd7f-4479-b5a8-bbfd170e4e0a
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School ; 2020, 17
    Schlagworte: Queueing; Strategic arrivals; Nash equilibrium; LCFS-PR; FCFS
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior
    Nash versus Kant
    Autor*in: De Donder, Philippe; Llavador, Humberto G.; Penczynski, Stefan; Roemer, John E.; Vélez Grajales, Roberto
    Erschienen: December 2021
    Verlag:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Schriftenreihe: Economics working paper series ; no. 1808
    Schlagworte: Kantian equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; vaccination; social norm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. "A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior
    Nash versus Kant"
    Autor*in: De Donder, Philippe; Llavador, Humberto G.; Penczynski, Stefan; Roemer, John E.; Vélez Grajales, Roberto
    Erschienen: January 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Whether or not to vaccinate one’s child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity).... mehr

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    Whether or not to vaccinate one’s child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an increasingly prevalent behavior, due to deleterious side effects that parents believe may accompany vaccination. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash behavioral protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. Because of the positive externality that each child’s vaccination generates for others, the Nash equilibrium suffers from a free-rider problem. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively –they may optimize according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We test, on a sample of six countries, whether childhood vaccination behavior conforms better to the individualistic or cooperative protocol. In order to do so, we conduct surveys of parents in these countries, to ascertain the distribution of beliefs concerning the subjective probability and severity of deleterious side effects of vaccination. We show that in all the countries of our sample the Kant model dominates the Nash model. We conjecture that, due to the free-rider problem inherent in the Nash equilibrium, a social norm has evolved, quite generally, inducing parents to vaccinate with higher probability than they would in the non-cooperative solution. Kantian equilibrium offers one precise version of such a social norm.

     
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    hdl: 10419/252024
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9507 (2022)
    Schlagworte: Kantian equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; vaccination; social norm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann Hypothesis
    Autor*in: Ewerhart, Christian
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    At the time of writing, the Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In this note, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH holds true, then any game in... mehr

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    At the time of writing, the Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In this note, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH holds true, then any game in this family admits a unique Nash equilibrium.

     
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    hdl: 10419/253269
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised version, April 2022
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 410
    Schlagworte: Riemann hypothesis; Nash equilibrium
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  14. R&D innovation with socially responsible firms
    Autor*in: Buccella, Domenico; Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [Università di Pisa, Dipartimento di Economia e Management], [Pisa]

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Università di Pisa, Dipartimento di Economia e Management ; n. 282 (2021)
    Schlagworte: Process innovation; Corporate social reponsibility; Nash equilibrium; Social welfare; duopoly; CSR; R&D investments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 12 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. The R&D investment decision game with product differentiation
    Autor*in: Buccella, Domenico; Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [Università di Pisa, Dipartimento di Economia e Management], [Pisa]

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Università di Pisa, Dipartimento di Economia e Management ; n. 278 (2021)
    Schlagworte: Process innovation; Corporate social reponsibility; Nash equilibrium; Social welfare
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior
    Nash versus Kant
    Autor*in: De Donder, Philippe; Llavador, Humberto G.; Penczynski, Stefan; Roemer, John E.; Vélez Grajales, Roberto
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  BSE, Barcelona School of Economics, [Barcelona]

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    Schriftenreihe: BSE working paper ; 1305 (December 2021)
    Schlagworte: Kantian equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; vaccination; social norm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. A local variation method for bilevel Nash equilibrium problems
    Autor*in: Caruso, Francesco; Ceparano, Maria Carmela; Morgan, Jacqueline
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  CSEF, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance, Department of Economics, University of Naples, Naples, Italy

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / CSEF, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance ; no. 620
    Schlagworte: Bilevel Nash equilibrium problem; Stackelberg problem; multi-leader-follower game; ratiobounded game; potential game; Nash equilibrium; existence and uniqueness; local variation method; global convergence; error estimation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior
    Nash versus Kant
    Autor*in: De Donder, Philippe; Llavador, Humberto G.; Penczynski, Stefan; Roemer, John E.; Vélez Grajales, Roberto
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

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    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2317 (December 2021)
    Schlagworte: Kantian equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; vaccination; social norm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior
    Nash versus Kant
    Autor*in: De Donder, Philippe; Llavador, Humberto G.; Penczynski, Stefan; Roemer, John E.; Vélez Grajales, Roberto
    Erschienen: December 2021
    Verlag:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1278
    Schlagworte: Kantian equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; vaccination; social norm
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  20. Are we better-off for working hard?
    Autor*in: He, Xue-zhong; Shi, Lei; Tolotti, Marco
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Quantitative Finance Research Centre, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney

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    Schriftenreihe: Research paper / Quantitative Finance Research Centre ; 391 (March 2018)
    Schlagworte: Uncertainty and effort; Nash equilibrium; endogenous information; asset pricing; efficiency; and social welfare
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  21. Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences
    Autor*in: Gong, Doudou; Dietzenbacher, Bas; Peters, Hans J. M.
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, Graduate School of Business and Economics, Maastricht, The Netherlands

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: [Research memorandum] / Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) ; RM/22, 007
    Schlagworte: division problems; single-dipped preferences; mechanisms; Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten)
  22. Viable Nash equilibria
    an experiment
    Autor*in: Kim, Duk Gyoo; Min, Daehong; Wooders, John
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not... mehr

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    This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265948
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9913 (2022)
    Schlagworte: Nash equilibrium; viability; laboratory experiments; coordination game
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  23. The n-player Hirshleifer contest
    Autor*in: Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as assumed by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the... mehr

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    While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as assumed by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high or intermediate levels of noise, the equilibrium is in pure strategies, with at most one player being active. For small levels of noise, however, we find a variety of equilibria in which some but not necessarily all players randomize. In the case of homogeneous valuations, we obtain a partial uniqueness result for symmetric equilibria. As the contest becomes increasingly decisive, at least two contestants bid up to the valuation of the second-ranked contestant, while any others ultimately drop out. In the limit, equilibria in the Hirshleifer contest converge to equilibria in the corresponding all-pay auction.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/266245
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised version, October 2022
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 361
    Schlagworte: Difference-form contest; Nash equilibrium; Rent dissipation; All-pay auction
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Colonel Blotto games with a head start
    Autor*in: Aspect, Leopold; Ewerhart, Christian
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    This paper studies Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields where one player has a head start in the form of additional troops on one of the battlefields. Such games arise naturally in marketing, electoral competition, and military conflict. Sion... mehr

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    This paper studies Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields where one player has a head start in the form of additional troops on one of the battlefields. Such games arise naturally in marketing, electoral competition, and military conflict. Sion and Wolfe (1957) have shown that, if the strategy space is continuous, a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium need not exist. Therefore, we consider a finite approximation. Using the iterated elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies, we identify an equilibrium for all parameter constellations and discuss its uniqueness properties. In equilibrium, resource decisions are typically not uniform but tend to concern units that roughly correspond in size to multiples of the head start. Moreover, competition takes the form of a hide-and-seek game, where the favorite tries to outguess the number of units that the underdog commits to the balanced battlefield. Somewhat unexpectedly, equilibrium payoffs of finite approximations of the Sion-Wolfe game accumulate around precisely three values. We also discuss the relation to the model with heterogeneous budgets but no head start.

     
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    hdl: 10419/266241
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 417
    Schlagworte: Colonel Blotto games; head start; Nash equilibrium; finite approximation
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  25. Do nonstrategic considerations matter for behavior in games?
    an experimental study informed by direct-sum decompositions of game
    Autor*in: Iriberri, Nagore; García-Galocha, Aleix; Iñarra García, Elena
    Erschienen: 18 October 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP17578
    Schlagworte: irect-sum decomposition; Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimality or efficiency; altruistic or social-welfare maximization preferences; experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen