Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 2 von 2.

  1. The targeted assignment of incentive schemes
    Autor*in: Opitz, Saskia; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo; Zimmermann, Tom
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    A central question in designing optimal policies concerns the assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments. We study this question in the context of increasing workers' performance by using targeted... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 711
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    A central question in designing optimal policies concerns the assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments. We study this question in the context of increasing workers' performance by using targeted incentives based on measurable worker characteristics. To do so, we ran two large-scale experiments. The key results are that (i) performance can be predicted by accurately measured personality traits, (ii) a machine learning algorithm can detect such heterogeneity in worker responses to different schemes, and (iii) a targeted assignment of schemes to individual workers increases performance in a second experiment significantly above the level achieved by the single best scheme.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/262349
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: April 8, 2022
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 187
    Schlagworte: Randomized Controlled Trial; Incentives; Heterogeneity; Treatment Effects; Selection; Algorithm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Strategic incentives in intermediary markets
    field-experimental evidence
    Autor*in: Thon, Max; Gürtler, Oliver; Heinz, Matthias; Schäfer, Kai; Sliwka, Dirk
    Erschienen: April 2024
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, [Bonn]

    We investigate how to strategically motivate sales agents in intermediary markets. In collaboration with a large travel company, we run a field experiment with more than 1, 200 independently owned intermediaries that sell our study firm's own... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 711
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We investigate how to strategically motivate sales agents in intermediary markets. In collaboration with a large travel company, we run a field experiment with more than 1, 200 independently owned intermediaries that sell our study firm's own products as well as products from competitors to end customers. The intermediaries employ sales agents responsible for customer interaction. We compare the impact of different forms of monetary incentives with non-monetary incentives provided through direct support to reduce the sales agents' effort costs. We develop a conceptual formal model hypothesizing that incentives for intermediaries (i) generally increase sales, and are more effective when targeting (ii) sales agents rather than owners of the intermediaries, (iii) intermediaries with weaker monetary incentives prior to the intervention, and (iv) products where the firm has no competitive advantage. We find that providing sales-agent support increases sales, while higher commission payments to the agencies' owners has no discernible effects. Directly incentivizing sales agents through vouchers raises sales for agencies with low prior commission rates. The incentive effects are driven by products where the firm has a weaker market position, while they have no discernible effects on product sales where the firm has a strong competitive advantage. We analyze underlying mechanisms using surveys and further administrative data.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/293980
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 297
    Schlagworte: Incentives; intermediaries; competitive advantage; strategy; productivity; field experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen