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  1. Non-partisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts and policy outcomes
    Autor*in: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Erschienen: 2009

    Abstract: "This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they... mehr

     

    Abstract: "This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size." (author's abstract)

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/25809
    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Klassifikation: Politikwissenschaft (320)
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2009-07
    Schlagworte: Wahlverhalten; Nichtstaatliche Organisation; Verteilungspolitik; Ökonomische Theorie der Politik; Public-Choice-Theorie; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Nichtregierungsorganisation; (stw)Verteilungspolitik; (stw)Neue politische Ökonomie; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)politische Aktivität; (thesoz)politische Kultur; (thesoz)Wahlbeteiligung; (thesoz)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Nichtwähler; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Wahlergebnis; (thesoz)politisches Verhalten; (thesoz)Non-Profit-Organisation; (thesoz)politische Partizipation; (thesoz)politischer Einfluss; get out the vote; redistributive politics; nonprofit advocacy organizations; Colonel Blotto game; Tullock game; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, 26 S.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  2. Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games with application to the economics of alliances
    Autor*in: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Erschienen: 2008

    Abstract: "This paper examines a multi-player and multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two separate opponents, 1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players... mehr

     

    Abstract: "This paper examines a multi-player and multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two separate opponents, 1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players 1 and 2 have the opportunity to form an alliance to share their endowments of a one-dimensional resource (e.g., troops, military hardware, money). This paper examines 'non-cooperative' alliances in which only individually rational ex ante transfers of the resource are allowed. Once these transfers take place, each alliance member maximizes his payoff in his respective Colonel Blotto game, given his resource constraint and player A's allocation of its endowment across the two games. No ex post transfers are enforceable. Remarkably, there are several ranges of parameters in which endogenous unilateral transfers take place within the alliance. That is, one player gives away resources to his ally, who happily accepts the gift. Unilateral transfers ar

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/25833
    DDC Klassifikation: Wirtschaft (330)
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2008-02
    Schlagworte: Koalitionstheorie; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Bündnis; Theorie
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)Koalition; (stw)Nichtkooperatives Spiel; (stw)Militärbündnis; (stw)Theorie; alliance; noncooperative game; Colonel Blotto game; self-enforcing; exploitation; commitment; C70; D43; D74; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, 25 S.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  3. Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games
    Autor*in: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Chapman Univ., Economic Science Inst., Orange, Calif.

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Chapman University, Economic Science Institute ; 15,07
    Schlagworte: Colonel Blotto game; General Lotto game; Multi-battle contest,Redistributive politics; All-pay auction
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (39 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. The tennis coach problem
    a game-theoretic and experiemntal study
    Erschienen: Sept. 2008
    Verlag:  Foerder Inst. for Economic Research [u.a.], Tel-Aviv

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Keine Speicherung
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Foerder Institute for Economic Research ... ; 2008,7
    Schlagworte: Allokation; Spieltheorie; Experiment; level-k thinking; tennis coach problem; experimental game theory; Colonel Blotto game
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, 41 S., Text
    Bemerkung(en):

    Published in: Arad, Ayala. 2012. The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 12 (1) (Contributions), Article 10