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  1. Making and breaking governments
    cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies
    Autor*in: Laver, Michael; Shepsle, Kenneth A.
    Erschienen: [1996]; © 1996
    Verlag:  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy... mehr

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Bamberg
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek der LMU München
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes

     
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    Volltext (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9780511625671
    Weitere Identifier:
    RVK Klassifikation: MF 6100 ; MG 11630 ; PL 625
    Schriftenreihe: Political economy of institutions and decisions
    Schlagworte: Cabinet system; Cabinet officers; Representative government and representation; Comparative government; Internationaler Vergleich; Regierung; Parlamentarismus
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 301 Seiten), Diagramme
  2. Making and breaking governments
    cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies
    Autor*in: Laver, Michael; Shepsle, Kenneth A.
    Erschienen: 1996
    Verlag:  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy... mehr

    Zugang:

    Standort:
    Universität Frankfurt, Elektronische Ressourcen
    Signatur:
    /
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Gießen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Kassel, Landesbibliothek und Murhardsche Bibliothek der Stadt Kassel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9780511625671
    RVK Klassifikation: MF 6100 ; PL 625
    Schriftenreihe: Political economy of institutions and decisions
    Schlagworte: Demokratie; Parlamentarismus; Regierungsbildung; Regierung; Auflösung; Internationaler Vergleich
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 301 pages)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)