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  1. Selling reputation when going out of business
    Autor*in: Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin
    Erschienen: 2004
    Verlag:  Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim, Mannheim

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008) ; 04-52
    Schlagworte: Takeover; Unternehmernachfolge; Image; Unternehmen; Arzt; Ärztin; Immaterialgut; Theorie; Übernahme ; Unternehmernachfolge ; Corporate Identity ; Immaterielles Wirtschaftsgut
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)Übernahme; (stw)Unternehmensnachfolge; (stw)Firmenimage; (stw)Ärzte; (stw)Immaterielle Güter; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Umfang: Online-Ressource
  2. Umbrella branding and the provision of quality
    Autor*in: Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin
    Erschienen: 2004
    Verlag:  Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim, Mannheim

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008) ; 04-51
    Schlagworte: Marketing; Unternehmenskooperation; Vertikales Marketing; Affiliate-Programm; Qualität; Markenartikel; Markenimage; Signaling; Asymmetrische Information; Moral Hazard; Gemeinschaftsmarketing ; Qualität ; Markenartikel ; Produktimage ; Signaling ; Asymmetrische Information ; Moral Hazard
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)Marketingkooperation; (stw)Produktqualität; (stw)Markenartikel; (stw)Markenimage; (stw)Signalling; (stw)Asymmetrische Information; (stw)Moral Hazard; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Umfang: Online-Ressource
  3. On the incentive effect of job rotation
    conference paper
    Autor*in: Hakenes, Hendrik; Katolnik, Svetlana
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    The longer an agent is employed in a job, the more the principal will have learned about his ability through the history of performance. With implicit incentives, influence perceptions and effort incentives decrease over time. Rotating agents to a... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The longer an agent is employed in a job, the more the principal will have learned about his ability through the history of performance. With implicit incentives, influence perceptions and effort incentives decrease over time. Rotating agents to a different job deletes learning effects about ability, creating fresh impetus for effort. However, job rotation also reduces the time horizon, and thus reduces rents from working and also incentives. In this trade-off, we derive conditions for the desirability of job rotation and show how in the presence of career concerns job rotation may emerge endogenously. Finally, our model allows for more general comments on the optimal rotation frequency as well as the preferred organizational design of a firm.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Volltext (Einzellizenz)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100574
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V3
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (20 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. Tapping the financial wisdom of the crowd
    crowdfunding as a tool to aggregate vague information ; conference paper
    Autor*in: Hakenes, Hendrik; Schlegel, Friederike
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    Crowdfunding, a novel form of financing, has seen massive growth over the last few years. Under crowdfunding, a large number of small households offers small loans to a firm. But if some threshold is missed, the firm cannot draw the loans. We... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Crowdfunding, a novel form of financing, has seen massive growth over the last few years. Under crowdfunding, a large number of small households offers small loans to a firm. But if some threshold is missed, the firm cannot draw the loans. We construct a model to argue that this mechanism can be used to aggregate vague information by many households (for example, potential future consumers of the firms product). Each household can spend an effort to produce a bit of vague information too vague to justify a straight loan. But if the firm sets the threshold high, a household knows that his money will be drawn only if many other households also get positive information. We describe the equilibrium behavior of households and firms. A welfare analysis reveals that with crowdfunding, firms set the loan rate too low and the threshold too low, inducing households to generate too much information. In comparison to straight finance, crowdfunding is employed too often.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (Einzellizenz)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100563
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V1
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (25 S.), graph. Darst.
  5. On the existence and prevention of speculative bubbles
    Autor*in: Enders, Zeno; Hakenes, Hendrik
    Erschienen: June 11, 2014
    Verlag:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Heidelberg

    We develop a parsimonious model of bubbles based on the assumption of imprecisely known market depth. In a speculative bubble, traders drive the price above its fundamental value in a dynamic way, driven by rational expectations about future price... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 532 (567)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We develop a parsimonious model of bubbles based on the assumption of imprecisely known market depth. In a speculative bubble, traders drive the price above its fundamental value in a dynamic way, driven by rational expectations about future price developments. At a previously unknown date, the bubble will endogenously burst. We provide a general condition for the possibility of bubbles depending on the risk-free rate, uncertainty about market depth, and traders’ degree of leverage. This allows us to discuss several policy measures. Bubbles always reduce aggregate welfare. Among others, certain monetary policy rules, minimum leverage ratios, and a correctly implemented Tobin tax can prevent their occurrence. Implemented incorrectly, however, some of these measures backfire and facilitate bubbles.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/127383
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; no. 567
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Banks without parachutes
    competitive effects of government bail-out policies
    Autor*in: Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel
    Erschienen: 2004
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, München

    The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main... mehr

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 445 (8)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously leads to higher risk-taking at those banks that do not enjoy a bail-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the rotected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition in the deposit market and depressing other banks' margins. In contrast, the effects on the protected bank's risk taking and on welfare depend on the transparency of the banking sector.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/94105
    Auflage/Ausgabe: First Version: November 12, 2003, This Version: June 16, 2004
    Schriftenreihe: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 8
    Umfang: Online-Ressource ([1], 35 S.), graph. Darst.
  7. Teamwork as a self-disciplining device
    Autor*in: Fahn, Matthias; Hakenes, Hendrik
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. In a situation where individuals have present-biased preferences, any effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63 (5131)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. In a situation where individuals have present-biased preferences, any effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual's long-run self. If agents interact repeatedly and can monitor each other, a relational contract involving teamwork can help to improve an agent's performance. The mutual promise to work harder is credible because the team breaks up after an agent has not kept this promise - which leads to individual (under-) production in the future and reduces an agent's future utility. This holds even though the standard free-rider problem is present and teamwork renders no technological benefits. Moreover, we show that even if teamwork does render technological benefits, the performance of a team of present-biased agents can actually be better than the performance of a team of time-consistent agents.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/107302
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 5131
    Umfang: Online-Ressource ([1], 25 S.), graph. Darst.
  8. On the incentive effect of job rotation
    conference paper
    Autor*in: Hakenes, Hendrik; Katolnik, Svetlana
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    The longer an agent is employed in a job, the more the principal will have learned about his ability through the history of performance. With implicit incentives, influence perceptions and effort incentives decrease over time. Rotating agents to a... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The longer an agent is employed in a job, the more the principal will have learned about his ability through the history of performance. With implicit incentives, influence perceptions and effort incentives decrease over time. Rotating agents to a different job deletes learning effects about ability, creating fresh impetus for effort. However, job rotation also reduces the time horizon, and thus reduces rents from working and also incentives. In this trade-off, we derive conditions for the desirability of job rotation and show how in the presence of career concerns job rotation may emerge endogenously. Finally, our model allows for more general comments on the optimal rotation frequency as well as the preferred organizational design of a firm.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100574
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V3
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (20 S.), graph. Darst.
  9. Tapping the financial wisdom of the crowd
    crowdfunding as a tool to aggregate vague information ; conference paper
    Autor*in: Hakenes, Hendrik; Schlegel, Friederike
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    Crowdfunding, a novel form of financing, has seen massive growth over the last few years. Under crowdfunding, a large number of small households offers small loans to a firm. But if some threshold is missed, the firm cannot draw the loans. We... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Crowdfunding, a novel form of financing, has seen massive growth over the last few years. Under crowdfunding, a large number of small households offers small loans to a firm. But if some threshold is missed, the firm cannot draw the loans. We construct a model to argue that this mechanism can be used to aggregate vague information by many households (for example, potential future consumers of the firms product). Each household can spend an effort to produce a bit of vague information too vague to justify a straight loan. But if the firm sets the threshold high, a household knows that his money will be drawn only if many other households also get positive information. We describe the equilibrium behavior of households and firms. A welfare analysis reveals that with crowdfunding, firms set the loan rate too low and the threshold too low, inducing households to generate too much information. In comparison to straight finance, crowdfunding is employed too often.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100563
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V1
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (25 S.), graph. Darst.
  10. I spy with my little eye... a banking crisis
    early warnings and incentive schemes in banks
    Autor*in: Hakenes, Hendrik; Schlegel, Friederike
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    The severity and depth of the recent financial crisis hit many by surprise. Despite warning signs, the financial system seems to have been unable to aggregate existing information. As the events of Fall 2008 showed, many investors were caught off... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63 (5140)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The severity and depth of the recent financial crisis hit many by surprise. Despite warning signs, the financial system seems to have been unable to aggregate existing information. As the events of Fall 2008 showed, many investors were caught off guard by the large number of banks collapsing worldwide. But what triggers an early warning, and what are the incentives to implement such a trigger? We construct a theoretical model of a bank that is financed with debt and equity, and a bank manager monitoring the bank’s loan portfolio. The manager must be incentivized to warn the board before a crisis. However, we show that the board may implement a contract with insufficient incentives to communicate a warning, as refinancing conditions deteriorate when lenders notice an upcoming crisis. We discuss policies to improve information efficiency and give conditions under which regulatory measures, such as capital and liquidity regulation, increase welfare.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/107361
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 5140
    Umfang: Online-Ressource ([1], 36 S.), graph. Darst.