Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Error theory and motivation -- 1.0 FAULTY FRAMEWORKS -- 1.1 THE SEMANTICS OF AN ERROR THEORY -- 1.2 NONCOGNITIVISM -- 1.3 MACKIE'S ERROR THEORY -- 1.4 INTERNALISM ABOUT MOTIVATION -- 1.5 PURE EVIL -- 1.6 MOTIVATION INTERNALISM AS A COMMITMENT OF MORAL DISCOURSE -- 1.7 IMPASSE -- 2 Error theory and reasons -- 2.0 MORAL INESCAPABILITY -- 2.1 INSTITUTIONAL OUGHT''S -- 2.2 STRONG CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES AS REASON-BRINGING -- 2.3 INSTITUTIONAL REASONS -- 2.4 AN ARGUMENT FOR A MORAL ERROR THEORY -- 2.5 CARNAP'S ARGUMENT AGAINST EXTERNAL QUESTIONING -- 2.6 PRACTICAL REASONS AS NON-INSTITUTIONAL -- 3 Practical instrumentalism -- 3.0 OBJECTIVE REASONS, SUBJECTIVE REASONS, AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY -- OBJECTIVE REASONS: -- SUBJECTIVE REASONS: -- INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY: -- 3.1 ENDS: DESIRES OR INTERESTS? -- 3.2 MORALITY AS A SYSTEM OF HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES -- 3.3 SMITH'S ARGUMENT FOR MORALITY AS A SYSTEM OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES --
- 3.4 SMITH'S ARGUMENT FOR MOTIVATION INTERNALISM -- 3.5 TAKING STOCK OF THE STRATEGY -- 3.6 THE NON-HUMEAN THEORY OF NORMATIVE REASONS -- 3.7 RATIONALITY AND EPISTEMIC SUCCESS -- 3.8 NORMATIVE REASONS AND MORAL REASONS -- 3.9 SUMMARY AND PREVIEW -- 4 The relativity of reasons -- 4.0 THE RATIONALIST'S DILEMMA -- 4.1 THE RELATIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS: THE CONCEPTUAL QUESTION -- 4.2 THE RELATIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS: THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION -- 4.3 HARMAN'S MURDER, INCORPORATED -- 4.4 MORAL RELATIVISM -- 4.5 SUMMARY AND PREVIEW -- 5 Internal and external reasons -- 5.0 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS -- 5.1 EXTERNAL REASONS AND MOTIVATION -- 5.2 MILLGRAM'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.3 HAMPTON'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.4 KORSGAARD'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.5 SUMMARY -- 6 Morality and evolution -- 6.0 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: HELPING KIN -- 6.1 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: RECIPROCAL HELPING -- 6.2 EVOLUTIONARY ETHICAL NATURALISM --
- 6.3 EVOLUTIONARY ETHICAL NATURALISM AND THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY -- 6.4 MORAL GENEALOGY, MORAL ERROR, AND THE GENETIC FALLACY -- 6.5 UNJUSTIFIED MORAL JUDGMENTS VS. PROBABLY FALSE MORAL JUDGMENTS -- 6.6 SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS -- 7 Fictionalism -- 7.0 IF THERE'S NOTHING THAT WE OUGHT TO DO, THEN WHAT OUGHT WE TO DO? -- 7.1 WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF MORAL BELIEFS? -- 7.2 THE FICTIONALIST OPTION -- 7.3 FICTIVE JUDGMENTS: VAIHINGER -- 7.4 FICTIVE JUDGMENTS: CRITICAL CONTEXTS -- 7.5 FICTIONALISM AND MAKE-BELIEVE -- 7.6 FICTIONALISM AND METAETHICS -- 7.7 CONCLUSION -- 8 Moral fictionalism -- 8.0 THE VALUE OF MORAL BELIEFS -- 8.1 MORALITY AS FICTION -- 8.2 THE RETURN OF GYGES AND THE SENSIBLE KNAVE -- 8.3 ODYSSEUS AND THE SIRENS -- 8.4 A MODEST CONCLUSION -- Epilogue: Debunking myths -- Select bibliography
"In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgments is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. Joyce argues that natural selection is to blame, in that it has provided us with a tendency to invest the world with values that it does not contain, and demands that it does not make. Should we therefore do away with morality, as we did away with other faulty notions such as witches? Possibly not. We may be able to carry on with morality as a useful fiction - allowing it to have a regulative influence on our lives and decisions, perhaps even playing a central role - while not committing ourselves to believing or asserting falsehoods, and thus not being subject to accusations of error."--Jacket
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [u.a.]
;
EBSCO Industries, Inc., Birmingham, AL, USA
"In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgments is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended....
mehr
"In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgments is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. Joyce argues that natural selection is to blame, in that it has provided us with a tendency to invest the world with values that it does not contain, and demands that it does not make. Should we therefore do away with morality, as we did away with other faulty notions such as witches? Possibly not. We may be able to carry on with morality as a useful fiction - allowing it to have a regulative influence on our lives and decisions, perhaps even playing a central role - while not committing ourselves to believing or asserting falsehoods, and thus not being subject to accusations of error."--Jacket.
"In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgments is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended....
mehr
Universitätsbibliothek der Eberhard Karls Universität
Fernleihe:
keine Fernleihe
"In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgments is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. Joyce argues that natural selection is to blame, in that it has provided us with a tendency to invest the world with values that it does not contain, and demands that it does not make. Should we therefore do away with morality, as we did away with other faulty notions such as witches? Possibly not. We may be able to carry on with morality as a useful fiction - allowing it to have a regulative influence on our lives and decisions, perhaps even playing a central role - while not committing ourselves to believing or asserting falsehoods, and thus not being subject to accusations of error."--Jacket
Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on print version record
CoverContents -- Preface -- 1 Error theory and motivation -- 1.0 FAULTY FRAMEWORKS -- 1.1 THE SEMANTICS OF AN ERROR THEORY -- 1.2 NONCOGNITIVISM -- 1.3 MACKIE'S ERROR THEORY -- 1.4 INTERNALISM ABOUT MOTIVATION -- 1.5 PURE EVIL -- 1.6 MOTIVATION INTERNALISM AS A COMMITMENT OF MORAL DISCOURSE -- 1.7 IMPASSE -- 2 Error theory and reasons -- 2.0 MORAL INESCAPABILITY -- 2.1 INSTITUTIONAL OUGHT''S -- 2.2 STRONG CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES AS REASON-BRINGING -- 2.3 INSTITUTIONAL REASONS -- 2.4 AN ARGUMENT FOR A MORAL ERROR THEORY -- 2.5 CARNAP'S ARGUMENT AGAINST EXTERNAL QUESTIONING -- 2.6 PRACTICAL REASONS AS NON-INSTITUTIONAL -- 3 Practical instrumentalism -- 3.0 OBJECTIVE REASONS, SUBJECTIVE REASONS, AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY -- OBJECTIVE REASONS: -- SUBJECTIVE REASONS: -- INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY: -- 3.1 ENDS: DESIRES OR INTERESTS? -- 3.2 MORALITY AS A SYSTEM OF HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES -- 3.3 SMITH'S ARGUMENT FOR MORALITY AS A SYSTEM OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES -- 3.4 SMITH'S ARGUMENT FOR MOTIVATION INTERNALISM -- 3.5 TAKING STOCK OF THE STRATEGY -- 3.6 THE NON-HUMEAN THEORY OF NORMATIVE REASONS -- 3.7 RATIONALITY AND EPISTEMIC SUCCESS -- 3.8 NORMATIVE REASONS AND MORAL REASONS -- 3.9 SUMMARY AND PREVIEW -- 4 The relativity of reasons -- 4.0 THE RATIONALIST'S DILEMMA -- 4.1 THE RELATIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS: THE CONCEPTUAL QUESTION -- 4.2 THE RELATIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS: THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION -- 4.3 HARMAN'S MURDER, INCORPORATED -- 4.4 MORAL RELATIVISM -- 4.5 SUMMARY AND PREVIEW -- 5 Internal and external reasons -- 5.0 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS -- 5.1 EXTERNAL REASONS AND MOTIVATION -- 5.2 MILLGRAM'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.3 HAMPTON'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.4 KORSGAARD'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.5 SUMMARY -- 6 Morality and evolution -- 6.0 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: HELPING KIN -- 6.1 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: RECIPROCAL HELPING -- 6.2 EVOLUTIONARY ETHICAL NATURALISM -- 6.3 EVOLUTIONARY ETHICAL NATURALISM AND THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY -- 6.4 MORAL GENEALOGY, MORAL ERROR, AND THE GENETIC FALLACY -- 6.5 UNJUSTIFIED MORAL JUDGMENTS VS. PROBABLY FALSE MORAL JUDGMENTS -- 6.6 SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS -- 7 Fictionalism -- 7.0 IF THERE'S NOTHING THAT WE OUGHT TO DO, THEN WHAT OUGHT WE TO DO? -- 7.1 WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF MORAL BELIEFS? -- 7.2 THE FICTIONALIST OPTION -- 7.3 FICTIVE JUDGMENTS: VAIHINGER -- 7.4 FICTIVE JUDGMENTS: CRITICAL CONTEXTS -- 7.5 FICTIONALISM AND MAKE-BELIEVE -- 7.6 FICTIONALISM AND METAETHICS -- 7.7 CONCLUSION -- 8 Moral fictionalism -- 8.0 THE VALUE OF MORAL BELIEFS -- 8.1 MORALITY AS FICTION -- 8.2 THE RETURN OF GYGES AND THE SENSIBLE KNAVE -- 8.3 ODYSSEUS AND THE SIRENS -- 8.4 A MODEST CONCLUSION -- Epilogue: Debunking myths -- Select bibliography.
