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  1. Welfare in experimental news markets
    Autor*in: Albertazzi, Andrea; Ploner, Matteo; Vaccari, Federico
    Erschienen: December 2022
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    We perform a controlled experiment to study the welfare effects of competition in a strategic communication environment. Two equally informed senders with conflicting interests can misreport information at a cost. We compare a treatment where only... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We perform a controlled experiment to study the welfare effects of competition in a strategic communication environment. Two equally informed senders with conflicting interests can misreport information at a cost. We compare a treatment where only one sender communicates to a treatment where both senders privately communicate with a decision-maker. Data show that competition between senders does not increase the amount of information decision-makers obtain. We find evidence of under-communication, as the information transmitted is lower than what theory predicts in the most informative equilibrium. Senders are worse off under competition because their relative gains from persuasion are more than offset by their expenditures in misreporting costs. As a result, competition between senders reduces the total welfare.

     
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      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/267506
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2022, 41
    Schlagworte: Experiment; Welfare; Multiple senders; Competition; Sender-receiver games
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Competition in signaling
    Autor*in: Vaccari, Federico
    Erschienen: December 2022
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information that is transmitted in equilibrium and the language used by senders to convey such information. Fully revealing and pure-strategy equilibria exist but are not plausible. I first identify sufficient conditions under which equilibria are essentially unique, robust, and always exist, and then deliver a complete characterization of these equilibria. As an application, I study the informative value of different judicial procedures.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/267503
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2022, 38
    Schlagworte: Signaling; Multi-sender; Competition; Misreporting; Communication
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Efficient communication in organizations
    Autor*in: Vaccari, Federico
    Erschienen: December 2022
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. An efficient communication protocol grants completeinformation payoffs to all organization members, thereby overcoming... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. An efficient communication protocol grants completeinformation payoffs to all organization members, thereby overcoming asymmetric information problems at no cost. This paper characterizes efficient protocols assuming that: (i) some agents within the organization have the knowledge required for optimal decision-making; (ii) both the organization and consulted agents incur losses proportional to the exerted influence activities; and (iii) informed agents can discuss their strategies before being consulted. Under these assumptions, "public advocacy" is the unique efficient communication protocol. This result provides a novel rationale for public advocacy.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/267504
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2022, 39
    Schlagworte: Information; Communication; Organizations; Efficiency; Costly Talk
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten)
  4. Influential news and policy-making
    Autor*in: Vaccari, Federico
    Erschienen: December 2022
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    This paper analyzes the implications of those types of interventions that affect misreporting costs. I study a model of communication between an uninformed voter and a media outlet that knows the quality of two competing candidates. The alternatives... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper analyzes the implications of those types of interventions that affect misreporting costs. I study a model of communication between an uninformed voter and a media outlet that knows the quality of two competing candidates. The alternatives available to the voter are endogenously championed by the two candidates. I show that higher costs may lead to more misreporting and persuasion, whereas low costs result in full revelation. Yet, interventions that increase misreporting costs never directly harm the voter, but those that do so slightly can be wasteful of public resources. Regulation produced by politicians leads to suboptimal interventions.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/267505
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2022, 40
    Schlagworte: Fake news; Misreporting; Media; Policy-making; Regulation; Disinformation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen