Filtern nach
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 4 von 4.

  1. Designing efficient education and tax policies
    conference paper
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    We study education and income tax policies in a model with endogenous selection into college. Our framework is strongly influenced by the empirical college literature and incorporates heterogenous returns and tastes for college, earnings risk... mehr

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study education and income tax policies in a model with endogenous selection into college. Our framework is strongly influenced by the empirical college literature and incorporates heterogenous returns and tastes for college, earnings risk (implying uncertain returns to college) and potentially borrowing constraints. We (i) calculate revenue effects of various policy reforms starting from the current system and (ii) derive conditions for optimal education and tax policies with various degrees of sophistication: optimal college subsidies for given income taxes and vice versa, jointly optimal taxes and subsidies, and optimal education dependent taxes. We estimate the relevant parameters of the model for quantitative analysis. We find that the endogeneity of the college choice has only a small impact on optimal taxes and increasing subsidies to their optimal level leads to large welfare gains. Finally, we find that for the current US policies, an increase in education subsidies is self-financing via higher tax revenue in the future; if we allow grants to condition on parental background, this effect gets even stronger and children with poor academic background should receive higher subsidies for pure efficiency reasons -- efficient policies favor social mobility.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (Einzellizenz)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100504
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Preliminary version
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V2
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (43 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Education policies and taxation without commitment
    Erschienen: May 27, 2014
    Verlag:  Universität Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim

    We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies chosen by benevolent governments. Individual wages are determined by both innate abilities and education levels. Consistent with real world practices, the government can... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 540 (14-16)
    keine Fernleihe
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies chosen by benevolent governments. Individual wages are determined by both innate abilities and education levels. Consistent with real world practices, the government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. Deviations from full commitment tend to make education policies more progressive, increasing the education subsidy for initially low skilled agents and decreasing it for initially high skilled agents. We provide suggestive cross-country correlations for this mechanism.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129569
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: May 27, 2014
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Mannheim, Department of Economics ; 14-16
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Efficient labor and capital income taxation over the life cycle
    Erschienen: May 11, 2014
    Verlag:  Universität Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim

    This paper analyzes Pareto optimal taxation of labor and capital income in a lifecycle framework with private information and idiosyncratic risk. We focus on historyindependent tax systems. We thereby complement the Mirrlees taxation literature,... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 540 (14-17)
    keine Fernleihe
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper analyzes Pareto optimal taxation of labor and capital income in a lifecycle framework with private information and idiosyncratic risk. We focus on historyindependent tax systems. We thereby complement the Mirrlees taxation literature, which has so far typically either characterized optimal history-dependent distortions or focused on static environments. For labor income taxes, we provide a novel decomposition of tax formulas into a redistribution and an insurance component. The latter is independent of redistributive motives and is determined by the degree of income risk and risk aversion. We show that the optimal linear capital tax rate is non-zero and derive a simple formula, which trades off redistributive and insurance benefits against the efficiency loss from savings distortions. Our quantitative results show that the insurance component contributes significantly to optimal labor tax rates. Optimal capital taxes are significant and yield sizable welfare gains.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129570
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Mannheim, Department of Economics ; 14-17
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Designing efficient education and tax policies
    conference paper
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    We study education and income tax policies in a model with endogenous selection into college. Our framework is strongly influenced by the empirical college literature and incorporates heterogenous returns and tastes for college, earnings risk... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DSM 13
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study education and income tax policies in a model with endogenous selection into college. Our framework is strongly influenced by the empirical college literature and incorporates heterogenous returns and tastes for college, earnings risk (implying uncertain returns to college) and potentially borrowing constraints. We (i) calculate revenue effects of various policy reforms starting from the current system and (ii) derive conditions for optimal education and tax policies with various degrees of sophistication: optimal college subsidies for given income taxes and vice versa, jointly optimal taxes and subsidies, and optimal education dependent taxes. We estimate the relevant parameters of the model for quantitative analysis. We find that the endogeneity of the college choice has only a small impact on optimal taxes and increasing subsidies to their optimal level leads to large welfare gains. Finally, we find that for the current US policies, an increase in education subsidies is self-financing via higher tax revenue in the future; if we allow grants to condition on parental background, this effect gets even stronger and children with poor academic background should receive higher subsidies for pure efficiency reasons -- efficient policies favor social mobility.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100504
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Preliminary version
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V2
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (43 S.), graph. Darst.