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  1. Politics in the family
    nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms
    Autor*in: Gagliarducci, Stefano; Manacorda, Marco
    Erschienen: March 2016
    Verlag:  School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London

    In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample of around 1 million... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 217 (786)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample of around 1 million private sector employees with the universe of around 500,000 individuals ever holding political office, and we exploit information available in both datasets on a substring of each individual's last name and municipality of birth in order to identify family ties. Using a diff-in-diff analysis that follows individuals as their family members enter and leave office, and correcting for the measurement error induced by our fuzzy matching method, we estimate that the monetary return to having a politician in the family is around 3.5 percent worth of private sector earnings and that each politician is able to extract rents for his family worth between one fourth and one full private sector job per year. The effect of nepotism is long lasting, extending well beyond the period in office. Consistent with the view that this is a technology of rent appropriation on the part of politicians, the effect increases with politicians' clout and with the resources available in the administration where they serve.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/175223
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London ; no. 786
    Schlagworte: Patronage; Familie; Politiker; Rent-Seeking; Personalbeschaffung; Privatwirtschaft; Schätzung; Italien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Politics in the family
    nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms
    Autor*in: Gagliarducci, Stefano; Manacorda, Marco
    Erschienen: March 2016
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample of around 1 million... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4 (9841)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample of around 1 million private sector employees with the universe of around 500,000 individuals ever holding political office, and we exploit information available in both datasets on a substring of each individual's last name and municipality of birth in order to identify family ties. Using a diff-in-diff analysis that follows individuals as their family members enter and leave office, and correcting for the measurement error induced by our fuzzy matching method, we estimate that the monetary return to having a politician in the family is around 3.5 percent worth of private sector earnings and that each politician is able to extract rents for his family worth between one fourth and one full private sector job per year. The effect of nepotism is long lasting, extending well beyond the period in office. Consistent with the view that this is a technology of rent appropriation on the part of politicians, the effect increases with politicians' clout and with the resources available in the administration where they serve.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/141600
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / IZA ; no. 9841
    Schlagworte: Patronage; Familie; Politiker; Rent-Seeking; Personalbeschaffung; Privatwirtschaft; Schätzung; Italien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Politics in the family
    nepotism and the hiring decisions of Italian firms
    Autor*in: Manacorda, Marco; Gagliarducci, Stefano
    Erschienen: April 2016
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Performance, London

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Keine Speicherung
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: CEP discussion paper ; no. 1422
    Schlagworte: Patronage; Familie; Politiker; Rent-Seeking; Personalbeschaffung; Privatwirtschaft; Schätzung; Italien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Politics in the family neporism and the hiring decision of Italian firms
    Autor*in: Gagliarducci, Stefano; Manacorda, Marco
    Erschienen: 2016
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 32 (11277)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP 11277
    Schlagworte: Patronage; Familie; Politiker; Rent-Seeking; Personalbeschaffung; Privatwirtschaft; Schätzung; Italien
    Umfang: 49 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  5. Gender differences in cooperative environments?
    evidence from the U.S. congress
    Autor*in: Gagliarducci, Stefano; Paserman, Marco Daniele
    Erschienen: August 2016
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    This paper uses data on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in the U.S. House of Representatives to estimate gender differences in cooperative behavior. We employ a number of econometric methodologies to address the potential selection of female... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4 (10128)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper uses data on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in the U.S. House of Representatives to estimate gender differences in cooperative behavior. We employ a number of econometric methodologies to address the potential selection of female representatives into electoral districts with distinct preferences for cooperativeness, including regression discontinuity and matching. After accounting for selection, we find that among Democrats there is no significant gender gap in the number of cosponsors recruited, but women-sponsored bills tend to have fewer cosponsors from the opposite party. On the other hand, we find robust evidence that Republican women recruit more cosponsors and attract more bipartisan support on the bills that they sponsor. This is particularly true on bills that address issues more relevant for women, over which female Republicans have possibly preferences that are closer to those of Democrats. We interpret these results as evidence that cooperation is mostly driven by a commonality of interest, rather than gender per se.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/145262
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / IZA ; no. 10128
    Schlagworte: Parlament; Politische Entscheidung; Abgeordnete; Geschlechterunterschiede; Kooperation; Interessenvertretung; USA
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Gender differences in cooperative environments?
    evidence from the U.S. Congress
    Autor*in: Gagliarducci, Stefano; Paserman, Marco Daniele
    Erschienen: August 2016
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (22488)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 22488
    Schlagworte: Parlament; Politische Entscheidung; Abgeordnete; Geschlechterunterschiede; Kooperation; Interessenvertretung; USA
    Umfang: 46 Seiten, 12 ungezählte Seiten, Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe