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  1. From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance
    theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  WZB, Berlin

    We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 388 (2013,205)
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments.

     

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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/74787
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Choice, Research Unit Market Behavior ; SP II 2013-205
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (71 S.), graph. Darst.