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  1. Market power, competition and innovation in digital markets
    a survey
    Autor*in: Calvano, Emilio; Polo, Michele
    Erschienen: 15 January 2020
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP14314
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten)
  2. Merger policy in digital markets
    an ex-post assessment
    Autor*in: Argentesi, Elena; Buccirossi, Paolo; Calvano, Emilio; Duso, Tomaso; Marrazzo, Alessia; Nava, Salvatore
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that create important challenges for competition policy. We show that these features have been key determinants of the theories of harm in major merger cases in the past few years. We then analyse the characteristics of almost 300 acquisitions carried out by three major digital companies -Amazon, Facebook, and Google -between 2008 and 2018. We cluster target companies on their area of economic activity and show that they span a wide range of economic sectors. In most cases, their products and services appear to be complementary to those supplied by the acquirers. Moreover, target companies seem to be particularly young, being four-years-old or younger in nearly 60% of cases at the time of the acquisition. Finally, we examine two important merger cases, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze, providing a systematic assessment of the theories of harm considered by the UK competition authorities as well as evidence on the evolution of the market after the transactions were approved. We discuss whether the CAs performed complete and careful analyses to foresee the competitive consequences of the investigated mergers and whether a more effective merger control regime can be achieved within the current legal framework.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/214987
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; no. 7985 (December 2019)
    Schlagworte: Electronic Commerce; Digitale Plattform; Übernahme; Fusion; Wettbewerbspolitik; Fusionskontrolle; Welt; Großbritannien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten)
  3. Merger policy in digital markets
    an ex-post assessment
    Autor*in: Argentesi, Elena; Buccirossi, Paolo; Calvano, Emilio; Duso, Tomaso; Marrazzo, Alessia; Nava, Salvatore
    Erschienen: 2019
    Verlag:  DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin

    This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 14
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that create important challenges for competition policy. We show that these features have been key determinants of the theories of harm in major merger cases in the past few years. We then analyse the characteristics of almost 300 acquisitions carried out by three major digital companies - Amazon, Facebook, and Google - between 2008 and 2018. We cluster target companies on their area of economic activity and show that they span a wide range of economic sectors. In most cases, their products and services appear to be complementary to those supplied by the acquirers. Moreover, target companies seem to be particularly young, being four-years-old or younger in nearly 60% of cases at the time of the acquisition. Finally, we examine two important merger cases, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze, providing a systematic assessment of the theories of harm considered by the UK competition authorities as well as evidence on the evolution of the market after the transactions were approved. We discuss whether the CAs performed complete and careful analyses to foresee the competitive consequences of the investigated mergers and whether a more effective merger control regime can be achieved within the current legal framework.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/213307
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 1836
    Schlagworte: Electronic Commerce; Digitale Plattform; Übernahme; Fusion; Wettbewerbspolitik; Fusionskontrolle; Welt; Großbritannien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Artificial intelligence, algorithmic pricing and collusion
    Autor*in: Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Pastorello, Sergio
    Erschienen: 20 December 2018
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 32 (13405)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; DP13405
    Umfang: 44 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  5. Autonomous algorithmic collusion: economic research and policy implications
    Autor*in: Assad, Stephanie; Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Clark, Robert; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Ershov, Daniel; Johnson, Justin P.; Pastorello, Sergio; Rhodes, Andrew; Xu, Lei; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 330
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1210
    Schlagworte: Algorithmic Pricing; Antitrust; Competition Policy; Artificial Intelligence; Collusion; Platforms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Algorithmic collusion, genuine and spurious
    Autor*in: Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Pastorello, Sergio
    Erschienen: 25 July 2021
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP16393
    Schlagworte: artificial intelligence; Reinforcement Learning; Collusion; exploration
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 9 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Either or both competition
    a "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships ; conference paper
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect the viewer composition and thereby the resulting value of a viewer for the other platform. We label this form of competition "either or both." A central result is that platform ownership does not affect advertising levels, despite nontrivial strategic interaction between platforms. This result holds for general viewer demand functions and is robust to allowing for viewer fees. We show that the equilibrium advertising level is inefficiently high. We also demonstrate that entry of a platform leads to an increase in the advertising level if viewers' preferences for the platforms are negatively correlated, which contrasts with predictions of standard models with either/or competition. We validate this result in an empirical analysis using panel data for the U.S. cable television industry.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79912
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V2
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.
  8. Financial markets, industry dynamics, and growth
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for studying competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for studying competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effect of strategic interaction on advertising levels, and the impact of entry and mergers. We show that novel forces come into play, which reflect the outlets' incentives to control the composition of the customer base in addition to its size. We link consumer preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes. The model can explain a number of empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile with existing models

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 170
    Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper ; No. 170
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (41 S.), graph. Darst.
  9. Issues in on-line advertising and competition policy
    a two-sided market perspective
    Autor*in: Calvano, Emilio; Jullien, Bruno
    Erschienen: 2011

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / IGIER ; 427
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (24 S.)
  10. Artificial intelligence, algorithmic recommendations and competition
    Autor*in: Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Pastorello, Sergio
    Erschienen: 29 May 2023
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18176
    Schlagworte: Artificial intelligence; Recommender system; Search; Product market competition; Manipulation; Biased recommendations; Niche products
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. A theory of community formation and social hierarchy
    Autor*in: Athey, Susan; Calvano, Emilio; Jha, Saumitra
    Erschienen: August 2016
    Verlag:  [Stanford Graduate School of Business], [Stanford, CA]

    We analyze the classic problem of sustaining trust when cheating and leaving trading partners is easy, and outside enforcement is difficult. We construct equilibria where individuals are loyal to smaller groups – communities – that allow repeated... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We analyze the classic problem of sustaining trust when cheating and leaving trading partners is easy, and outside enforcement is difficult. We construct equilibria where individuals are loyal to smaller groups – communities – that allow repeated interaction. Hierarchies provide incentives for loyalty and allow individuals to trust agents to extent that the agents are actually trustworthy. We contrast these with other plausible institutions for engendering loyalty that require inefficient withholding of trust to support group norms, and are not robust to coalitional deviations. In communities whose members randomly match, we show that social mobility within hierarchies falls as temptations to cheat rise. In communities where individuals can concentrate their trading with pre-selected members, hierarchies where senior members are favored for trade sustain trust even in the presence of proximate non-hierarchical communities. We link these results to the emergence of trust in new market environments and early human societies

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: [Stanford University Graduate School of Business research paper ; no. 16-41]
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (ca. 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. The impact of the internet on advertising markets for news media
    Autor*in: Athey, Susan; Calvano, Emilio; Gans, Joshua
    Erschienen: 2013

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (19419)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; 19419
    Schlagworte: Online-Marketing; Printwerbung; Pressemarkt; Digitale Plattform; Wettbewerb; Werbung; Markt; Theorie
    Umfang: 54 S.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  13. Pricing payment cards
    Autor*in: Bedre-Defolie, Özlem; Calvano, Emilio
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main

    In a payment card association such as Visa, each time a consumer pays by card, the bank of the merchant (acquirer) pays an interchange fee (IF) to the bank of the cardholder (issuer) to carry out the transaction. This paper studies the determinants... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 534 (1139)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In a payment card association such as Visa, each time a consumer pays by card, the bank of the merchant (acquirer) pays an interchange fee (IF) to the bank of the cardholder (issuer) to carry out the transaction. This paper studies the determinants of socially and privately optimal IFs in a card scheme where services are provided by a monopoly issuer and perfectly competitive acquirers to heterogeneous consumers and merchants. Different from the literature, we distinguish card membership from card usage decisions (and fees). In doing so, we reveal the implications of an asymmetry between consumers and merchants: the card usage decision at a point of sale is delegated to cardholders since merchants are not allowed to turn down cards once they are affiliated with a card network. We show that this asymmetry is sufficient to induce the card association to set a higher IF than the socially optimal IF, and thus to distort the structure of user fees by leading to too low card usage fees at the expense of too high merchant fees. Hence, cap regulations on IFs can improve the welfare. These qualitative results are robust to imperfect issuer competition, imperfect acquirer competition, and to other factors affecting final demands, such as elastic consumer participation or strategic card acceptance to attract consumers. - Payment card associations ; Interchange fees ; Merchant fees

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/153573
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; 1139
    Schlagworte: Kreditkartengesellschaft; Gebühr; Anreizregulierung; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, (37 S., 891 KB)
  14. Pricing payment cards
    Autor*in: Bedre-Defolie, Özlem; Calvano, Emilio
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  European School of Management and Technology, Berlin

    Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial "interchange" fees to cardholders' banks, on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure,... mehr

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 450 (2010,5)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial "interchange" fees to cardholders' banks, on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, over-subsidizing card usage and over-taxing merchants. In contrast to the literature we show that this distortion is systematic and arises from the fact that consumers make two distinct decisions (membership and usage) whereas merchants make only one (membership). These findings are robust to competition for cardholders and/or for merchants, network competition, and strategic card acceptance to attract consumers.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/96557
    Schriftenreihe: ESMT working paper ; 10-005
    Schlagworte: Kreditkartengesellschaft; Gebühr; Anreizregulierung; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 40 S., 428 KB)
  15. Either or both competition
    a "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships ; conference paper
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect the viewer composition and thereby the resulting value of a viewer for the other platform. We label this form of competition "either or both." A central result is that platform ownership does not affect advertising levels, despite nontrivial strategic interaction between platforms. This result holds for general viewer demand functions and is robust to allowing for viewer fees. We show that the equilibrium advertising level is inefficiently high. We also demonstrate that entry of a platform leads to an increase in the advertising level if viewers' preferences for the platforms are negatively correlated, which contrasts with predictions of standard models with either/or competition. We validate this result in an empirical analysis using panel data for the U.S. cable television industry.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Volltext (Einzellizenz)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79912
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V2
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.