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  1. When the cat is near, the mice won't play
    the effect of external examiners in Italian schools
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  IZA, Bonn

    We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner in standardized school tests reduces the proportion of correct answers in monitored classes by 5.5 to 8.5% - depending on the grade and the test - with respect to classes... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 4 (6629)
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner in standardized school tests reduces the proportion of correct answers in monitored classes by 5.5 to 8.5% - depending on the grade and the test - with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. We find that the effect of external monitoring in a class spills over to other classes in the same school. We argue that the negative effect of external supervision is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to distraction from having a stranger in the class. -- education ; testing ; external monitoring

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62414
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 6629
    Schlagworte: Allgemeinbildung; Experiment; Allgemeinbildende Schule; Italien (Süd)
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 32 S., 451,57 KB), Kt.
  2. When the cat is near, the mice won't play
    the effect of external examiners in Italian schools
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Inst. of Social and Economic Research, Osaka

    Using a natural experiment designed by the Italian national test administrator (INVALSI) to monitor test procedures in Italian primary schools, this paper shows that the presence of an external examiner who monitors test procedures has both a direct... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 198 (845)
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Using a natural experiment designed by the Italian national test administrator (INVALSI) to monitor test procedures in Italian primary schools, this paper shows that the presence of an external examiner who monitors test procedures has both a direct and an indirect effect on the measured performance of monitored classes and schools. The direct effect is the difference in the test performance between classes of the same school with and without external examiners. The indirect effect is instead the difference in performance between un-monitored classes in a school with an external examiner and un-monitored classes in schools without external monitoring. We find that having an external examiner in the class reduces the proportion of correct answers by 5.5 to 8.6 percent compared to classes in schools with no external monitor. Comparing results of un-monitored classes across schools with and without external examiners, we estimate indirect effects that range between 1.2 and 1.9 percent. The size of the overall effect of external supervision varies significantly across regions and it is higher in Southern Italy. -- education ; testing ; monitoring ; indirect treatment effects

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/92863
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research ; 845
    Schlagworte: Allgemeinbildung; Experiment; Allgemeinbildende Schule; Italien (Süd)
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 28 S., 550,96 KB)