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  1. The parasite game
    exploiting the abundance of nature in face of competition
    Autor*in: Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    A situation in which the regularity in nature can be utilized while competition is to be avoided is modelled by the Parasite game. In this game regular behaviour could enhance guessing nature but strategic randomization is required to avoid being... mehr

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    A situation in which the regularity in nature can be utilized while competition is to be avoided is modelled by the Parasite game. In this game regular behaviour could enhance guessing nature but strategic randomization is required to avoid being outguessed. In an experiment, 60 pairs of participants (partner design) played many rounds of the Parasite game. The treatments differed in nature's probabilities and whether or not these probabilities were announced in advance or could only be experienced over time. Before playing, the working memory (WM) of participants was measured. Data analyses test the correspondence of participants behavior to game-theoretic benchmarks and the effect of participants' WM on their behavior.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62706
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,34
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 18 S., 207,43 KB), graph. Darst.
  2. Predating predators
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Predating predators requires at least three specimen to which we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well-fed but must also avoid being hunted... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Predating predators requires at least three specimen to which we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well-fed but must also avoid being hunted by player 3. One major motivation is to test three benchmark solutions (uniformly perfect, impulse balance and payoff balance equilibrium) in such a complex strategic setting. In the experiment three participants play repeatedly the game (partner design) which allows to test whether certain types of behavior are just initial inclinations or stable patterns which survive learning and experience.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62686
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,35
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 176,30 KB), graph. Darst.
  3. Fairness in the mail and opportunism in the internet
    a newspaper experiment on ultimatum bargaining
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Schmidt, Carsten; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    On May 11, 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector-mode: Each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM 1.000-pie but also which of the... mehr

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    On May 11, 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector-mode: Each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM 1.000-pie but also which of the nine possible offers of DM 100, 200, ..., 900 (s)he would accept or reject. In addition, participants were asked to predict the most frequent type of behavior. Three randomly selected proposerresponder pairs were rewarded according to the rules of ultimatum bargaining and three randomly chosen participants of those who predicted the most frequent type of behavior received a prize of DM 500. Decisions could be submitted by mail, fax, or via the internet. Behavior is described, statistically analyzed, and compared to usual laboratory ultimatum bargaining results. -- fairness ; ultimatum bargaining ; newspaper (or internet) experiment ; distribution conflicts

     
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    hdl: 10419/62747
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,42
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 687,16 KB), graph. Darst.
  4. Experimental "beauty contests" with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior... mehr

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    We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. -- beauty contest experiments ; individual behavior

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62714
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,45
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 181,84 KB), graph. Darst.
  5. Langzeiteffekte der "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior"
    zur Anwendung der Spieltheorie in den (Sozial-)wissenschaften
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

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    Sprache: Deutsch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62733
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,8
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 257,61 MB), graph. Darst.
  6. Alternating offer bargaining experiments with varying institutional details
    Autor*in: Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Marchand, Nadège
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once... mehr

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    The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one what defines a cycle of altogether 16 successive plays. Participants play three such cycles. There are no major experience effects but strong and reliable effects of anticipated rule changes. The latter, however, are not due to strategic considerations but rather to the social norms of fairness and efficiency.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62678
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,9
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 278,46 KB), graph. Darst.
  7. Retributive responses
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses... mehr

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    Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor may inflict harmful consequences without intending and intend harmful consequences without inflicting them. Our experimental results indicate that retributive responses are more strongly influenced by observed consequences than by ascribed intentions. However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by concerns that are non-retributive altogether in that they focus on end state distributions independently of who brought them about.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62692
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,11
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 29 S., 171,47 KB), graph. Darst.
  8. From full to bounded rationality
    the limits of unlimited rationality
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Deriving advice that can in fact be utilized by boundedly rational decision makers is a central function of modeling choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that theories of... mehr

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    Deriving advice that can in fact be utilized by boundedly rational decision makers is a central function of modeling choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior of boundedly rational individuals. In view of such a causal role of theories we discuss how advice of a theory of boundedly rational behavior can become known, be followed among boundedly rational individuals and still be good advice.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62773
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,12
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 27 S., 136,19 KB)
  9. Heuristics as decision rules
    Part I: the single consumer
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Neuefeind, Wilhelm
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Many consumption prices are highly volatile. It would certainly overburden our cognitive system to fully adjust to all these changes. Households therefore often rely on simple heuristics when deciding what to consume, e.g. in the form of a constant... mehr

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    Many consumption prices are highly volatile. It would certainly overburden our cognitive system to fully adjust to all these changes. Households therefore often rely on simple heuristics when deciding what to consume, e.g. in the form of a constant budget share for a specific consumption commodity, like a vacation, or of a constant consumption amount for lowcost commodities as food items. Using utility functions we can measure the welfare loss, caused by such heuristics, and to what extent this can be reduced by adaptation. In the present Part I the analysis is mainly restricted to a single consumer with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. General utility functions will also be considered. Part II will study exchange economies.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62762
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,13
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 22 S., 150,73 KB), graph. Darst.
  10. Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative... mehr

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    We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second–price auctions. -- Experiments ; Sealed Bid Auctions ; Asymmetric Bidders ; Private-Independent Values

     
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    hdl: 10419/62694
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,15
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 356,87 KB), graph. Darst.
  11. Illusion of expertise in portfolio decisions
    an experimental approach
    Autor*in: Fellner, Gerlinde; Güth, Werner; Maciejovsky, Boris
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    Overall, 72 subjects invest their endowment in four risky assets. Each com-bination of assets yields the same expected return and variance of returns. Illusion of expertise prevails when one prefers nevertheless the self-selected portfolio. After... mehr

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    Overall, 72 subjects invest their endowment in four risky assets. Each com-bination of assets yields the same expected return and variance of returns. Illusion of expertise prevails when one prefers nevertheless the self-selected portfolio. After being randomly assigned to groups of four subjects are asked to elect their expert based on responses to a prior decision task. Using the random price mecha-nism reveals that 64% of the subjects prefer their own portfolio over the average group portfolio or the expert’s port-folio. Illusion of expertise is shown to be stable individually, over alternatives, and for both eliciting methods, willingness to pay and to accept.

     
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    hdl: 10419/76012
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo Working Paper ; 621
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (26 S.), graph. Darst.
  12. Overconfidence in investment decisions
    an experimental approach
    Autor*in: Dittrich, Dennis; Güth, Werner; Maciejovsky, Boris
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    We experimentally test overconfidence in investment decisions by offering participants the possibility to substitute their own for alternative investment choices. Overall, 149 subjects participated in two experiments, one with just one risky asset,... mehr

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    We experimentally test overconfidence in investment decisions by offering participants the possibility to substitute their own for alternative investment choices. Overall, 149 subjects participated in two experiments, one with just one risky asset, the other with two risky assets. Overconfidence increases (i) with the absolute deviation from optimal choices, (ii) with task complexity, and (iii) decreases with uncertainty as indicated by the difference between willingness to pay and to accept.

     
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    hdl: 10419/76087
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo Working Paper ; 626
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (21 S.), graph. Darst.