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  1. Disclosing the undisclosed
    commercial paper as hidden liquidity suffers
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Norges Bank, Oslo

    Using new transaction-level data for non-financial commercial paper (CP) in the U.S., we show that companies systematically reduce their outstanding short-term debt on quarterly and annual disclosure dates. Constraints on CP lending supply cannot... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 673
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Using new transaction-level data for non-financial commercial paper (CP) in the U.S., we show that companies systematically reduce their outstanding short-term debt on quarterly and annual disclosure dates. Constraints on CP lending supply cannot explain this pattern. Instead, companies optimize their disclosed liquidity buffers and strategically repay CP debt if doing so strengthens common accounting ratios, such as the current ratio. Unlike other CP issuers, firms that repay their CP debt neither hold lower cash buffers nor use CP as bridge financing, suggesting an alternative role of CP debt as "hidden liquidity buffer".

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9788283792157
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 11250/2835493
    hdl: 10419/264938
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Norges Bank ; 2021, 16
    Schlagworte: Commercial paper; balance sheet management; disclosure; cash management; window dressing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Window dressing of regulatory metrics
    evidence from repo markets
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behaviour in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 534
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behaviour in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable contraction in their repo transactions around regulatory reporting dates. We establish a causal link between these reductions and banks' incentives to window dress and document the role of the leverage ratio and the G-SIB framework as the most relevant drivers of window dressing behaviour. Our findings suggest that regulatory action is warranted to limit banks' ability to window dress.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289955133
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278342
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; no 2771 (February 2023)
    Schlagworte: banking regulation; window dressing; repo markets; leverage ratio; G-SIBs
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen