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  1. A note on the use of syndicated loan data
    Erschienen: [06. Juli 2022]
    Verlag:  Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, Halle (Saale), Germany

    Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan has become an essential input in banking research over recent years. This data is rich enough to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial shocks or climate change. However,... mehr

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt / Zentrale
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 13
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    Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan has become an essential input in banking research over recent years. This data is rich enough to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial shocks or climate change. However, many data options raise the question of how to choose the estimation sample. We employ a standard regression framework analyzing bank lending during the financial crisis to study how conventional but varying usages of DealScan affect the estimates. The key finding is that the direction of coefficients remains relatively robust. However, statistical significance seems to depend on the data and sampling choice.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/261361
    Schriftenreihe: IWH discussion papers ; 2022, no. 17 (July 2022)
    Schlagworte: DealScan; meta-analysis; scrutiny; syndicated lending
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (III, 22 Seiten, 2,67 MB), Diagramme
  2. Power, scrutiny, and congressmen's favoritism for friends' firms
    Erschienen: November 2023
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Does higher office always lead to more favoritism? We argue that firms may lose their benefit from a connected politicians ascent to higher office, if it entails stricter scrutiny that may reduce favoritism. Around close Congress elections, we find... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63
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    Does higher office always lead to more favoritism? We argue that firms may lose their benefit from a connected politicians ascent to higher office, if it entails stricter scrutiny that may reduce favoritism. Around close Congress elections, we find RDD-based evidence of this adverse effect that a politicians win reduces his former classmates firms stock value by 3.2% after a week. Exploiting the entry of Craigslist across the U.S., we find that state-level scrutiny drives this effect. It further varies with politicians power, firm size and governance, and connection strength, and diminishes as a politicians career concern fades over time.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282448
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10760 (2023)
    Schlagworte: favoritism; power; scrutiny; political connection; congressmen; close election; RDD
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen